Mauritanian elections and W. Sahara

Since the coup d'êtat in August 2005, the Mauritanian political system has changed profoundly. A constitutional referendum has set limits on the president's terms (but also left him to exercise overwhelming powers), and parliamentary and municipal elections have been held -- not completely without irregularities, but freely and fairly enough to be groundbreaking for Mauritania and, indeed, for the Maghreb region. During the transition phase, power has been in the hands of a junta, the Comité militaire pour la justice et la démocratie (CMJD), headed by a certain col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, a former strongman under ousted president Mouaouiya Ould Taya. Presidential elections, the grand prize, are now scheduled for March 11, and a full 20 candidates had reported for the race as registration closed in february. What implications does this hold for Western Sahara?

The easy answer is, very few. Mauritania is politically sandwiched between Morocco and Algeria, with no escape route through either dirt-poor Mali to the east, or hostile Senegal to the south, which takes exception to the Mauritanian state's deeply racist attitude to its black citizens. A profoundly weak state, with just above three million inhabitants and no army to speak of, and completely preoccupied with its own internal fissures, Mauritania is in no position to anger either of its powerful northern neighbours. It also holds a particular fear, still today, of Morocco, which refused to recognize its independence until 1969, and even set up a minister for "Mauritanian affairs" to underline that the country is in reality nothing but a stray Moroccan province. The Polisario Front also plays a powerful role, even without its Algerian backer, as it has an important presence on Mauritanian soil. This is mainly in the Zouerate region, where the UN counts some 25,000 Sahrawi refugees (many of them having left the Tindouf camps for better conditions and work in Mauritania), and an untold number of other sympathizers among fraternal tribes.

What history teaches

The last time Mauritania tried to take sides in the conflict, at its inception in 1975, the results were disastrous. The country's economy and social order crumbled under Polisario attacks as Mauritania tried to annex the southern third of the former Spanish Sahara as a new province, the "Tiris El Gharbiya". The decision was taken with Moroccan backing, but equally much in a panicked attempt to stave off Moroccan expansionism.

In 1978, the regime fell, to be replaced by a squabbling bunch of colonels from the northern tribes who had been particularly angered by the governments decision to invade Western Sahara. The upsurge of tribalism that this brought, has plagued Mauritania ever since - not that tribalism wasn't a major problem before, of course. Equally seriously, king Hassan II of Morocco lashed out like a betrayed lover at Mauritania as it pulled out of combat, spinning a series of plots to overthrow the regime and massing troops at its border. Mauritania dropped straight into the arms of Algeria, and the junta leader in charge from 1979, Mohamed Khouna Ould Heidallah, began taking plenty of arms and advice from Algiers to secure his regime. His relations with Polisario were excellent -- he's born in Western Sahara himself -- and in 1984 he acted upon the OAU's decision to let the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic take up membership, and decided to recognize it as Western Sahara's rightful government. Relations with Morocco got no better for that, and within his own junta, pro-Moroccan tendencies combined with other disgruntled military men -- all of whom had been gradually pushed out of power by Heidallah -- to stage a revolt.

The 1984 coup that brought Ould Taya to power meant an improvement in relations with Morocco, and that Mauritania gradually found a balance between Rabat and Algiers, all the while allowing Polisario to remain in the country under the 1979 understanding, and retaining its recognition of the SADR. Relations were more fully healed recently, and they are now quite good. Mauritania's statements to the UN (it is acknowledged, along with Algeria and the African Union, as an "interested third party" to the conflict and accorded observer status in the proceedings) during the twists and turns of the referendum process has said only one thing: we hope for progress and will accept any solution that is acceptable to both parties. The general public seems content with the compromise that has been struck, knowing that any attempt to again shift the balance could easily result in severe pressures from the wounded party, not to mention internal tribal unrest, considering the close relations of some Mauritanian tribes to Morocco, on the one hand, and the virtual membership in Polisario of others.

So, the presidential election is unlikely to change much, since Mauritania's strategic position hasn't changed. The improved relations with Morocco are partially offset by Algiers rise to economic superpower status through exploding oil prices, and Mauritania's need for assistance in combatting cross-border raids by the Algeria-based al-Qaida/GSPC movement. Thus, it is unlikely that Mauritania would by itself seek another position on the matter, but it may still succumb to pressures from either party, or indeed from the West.

Some notable candidates

In the present political situation, however, a few characters deserve mention. First of course, is the former pro-Polisario president, Mohamed Khouna Ould Heidallah, who is now again campaigning for the presidency, on a nationalist-islamist platform. He came second in the 2003 elections (picture), under Ould Taya, and took much heat in opposition to the regime after being let out of jail. His time in power is not fondly remembered by anyone -- it was one of chaos, coups, war and economic disaster -- but he is seen as personally honest and committed to his nation; additionally, some from the black minorities has a soft spot for him, after he made the first and only honest attempt in Mauritaina to ban slavery in 1981. He is strongly supported by various northern nomadic tribes and by some Islamists, who remember him instituting shari'a law when in power (it was later repealed by Ould Taya). Still, today Heidallah is a distinctly second-rate contender, who will not stand a good chance at moving to the second round of elections unless he manages to stitch together a coalition with a little help from the powers that be.

Among the more likely victors, "Sidioca", for Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdellahi, is running for the al-Mithaq, a very strong coalition of former Ould Taya cronies, independents and others with a stake in preserving the pre-coup status quo. He's also accused of running with the tacit support of the CMJD, which one must not forget is itself a product of the former regime. His positions on Western Sahara aren't known, but the odds are they will reflect whatever former regime components and tribal alliances he will ultimately base his rule on after an election win -- and that's true for all contestants, by the way. Also, the half-brother of former president Mokhtar Ould Daddah (who invaded Western Sahara in 1975), is also a good guess for next president. Ahmed Ould Daddah has spent the nineties in opposition to Taya's regime (he himself lost all privilege along with the overthrow of his family), and has his strongest support among tribes of the Trarza area, historically the site of a once pro-Moroccan emirate just south of Western Sahara.

And what if there is no change of power?

Last but not least, the divided political field in Mauritania means that members of the ruling junta may well continue to exercise a powerful influence after stepping down from their posts; especially since its membership comes straight from the heart of the Taya-era security establishment, and may want to manipulate elections to bar too far-reaching changes (which could threaten the position of them and their tribal and factional entourage). So far, while in power, they have played the balancing act well, and taken no initiatives whatsoever in the Western Sahara conflict; they have dispatched envoys equally to Morocco, Polisario and Algeria, to reassure all sides of their continued neutrality. But with tribalism always the major determinant in Mauritanian politics, col. Ely's tribal background may well count for something: he's from the Bou Sbaa tribe, originally present in all three of Mauritania, Western Sahara and Morocco, but historically also with some pro-Moroccan leanings, and once badly victimized by the powerful Reguibat tribe (later a mainstay of Polisario) in the early 1900s.

Will that matter? Depends on how much of a sham the Mauritanian revolution will turn out to be: if the process ultimately proves to be cosmetic (with, say, Abdellahi taking the presidency and col. Vall & Co remaining a force behind the scenes à l'Algérie), then maybe. If they turn out to produce genuine political change, then certainly not. But genuine political change, of course, also means that long-held convictions will have to be tested again, and that populist rhetoric, not to mention elected politicians vying for foreign support to best their rivals, and it may thus be the most powerful propellant for change in Mauritania's relation to the Sahara question. But in what way? Among the Moorish tribes of the Mauritania/Sahara/Morocco areas, alliances have always been temporary affairs to secure power and protection, and the most firmly held convictions could easily turn into the opposite opinion overnight. That was the way to survive, and in the Mauritanian political climate it still holds much truth. But in this particular case, the fundamental vulnerability of the Mauritanian state will ultimately provide a powerful incentive against change or radicalization in either direction.