Sneak peeks

Moroccan diplomats are now all over the Western world to try to sell their autonomy proposal for Western Sahara, in the capitals that matter. First on the list was France, and both Moroccan and French official reactions made a point of Morocco chosing Paris (instead of Washington) as its first stop. Chirac, who has brought Morocco and France closer than ever on this issue, said he thought the plan was "constructive", but without commenting directly on what to do with it at the UN. In response to a predictable Polisario shock-and-dismay response, French officials made minor clarifications with no intention to clarify anything. As usual, both Moroccan and Polisario propaganda seems to read too much into the statements, each in their way. If anything, one would have expected a more enthusiastic French response, since France is jealously guarding its role as Morocco's best friend abroad, against increasing attempts by Washington to take primacy in the region. (Perhaps later comments about the importance of "territorial integrity" in Africa were intended to make up for that?)

Then came Spain, a slightly second-rank player in Western Sahara, not to mention in the Security Council, but important nevertheless. Foreign minister Moratinos "listened with interest" to the plan, but then had the poor taste to evoke the principle of self-determination.

Last but certainly not least of Western Sahara's big three was Washington. US officials "appreciated" the "promising" plan and made clear they are generally supportive of Morocco presenting autonomy as a compromise, but also said they want it presented on schedule (more below), and there were no hints that they would support its imposition over referendum plans.

All three of the main diplomatic supporters of Morocco have thus nodded some sort of encouragement to the plan, but also carefully guarded their step, and refused to commit themselves to it in any way. Possibly, especially in the case of Washington, that may be because it isn't official yet, nor fully completed. It can still be subject to radical change through putting in the right exemption clauses and other tricks, until a final version is on the table -- or, it can then be presented in such a way as to subtly alter the content. This lack of knowledge of course bothers neither Polisario nor Algeria, who have launched a series of preventive strikes, slamming it as a destructive "mirage"; nor does it trouble the Moroccan parties and press, who have predictably lined up to cheer it as a groundbreaking achievement without even knowing the basic outlines.

But in the Western pro-Moroccan capitals, reactions are more guarded. France has always been fully committed to Morocco, while the US and Spain (since the shift of government) are also generally pro-Moroccan, but most of all just interested in seeing the end of the dispute, and with no messy consequences. For them, that means the plan must be credible enough to sap the support of Polisario and so force it and Algeria to concessions -- because right now, Sahrawi support is clearly moving towards independence, with Polisario making important inroads in a number of the historically pro-Moroccan tribes (such as the Tekna Aït Oussa, which Polisario once wanted to bar from voting: today, its most famous member is pro-independence icon Ali Salem Tamek). That, in turn, means that all sides are now waiting for the final presentation, which Morocco has said will come in April, to see if it holds up to scrutiny. And then Morocco had better deliver, because with patience running out and Algeria a distinctly more attractive partner for Western states than it was ten years ago, Rabat may always not enjoy the support it presently does.

But wait, April? Yes, UNSC resolution 1720 set the date of April 30, 2007 as the new expiration date for Minurso. Chances are, then, that Morocco whips out its new plan on, say, April 25th, and leaves the Council no time to react, thus winning another six-month postponement. On the other hand, even the staunchest of Moroccan allies have voiced some irritation at the repeated delays in the Security Council, after Morocco started used this tactic again and again to wriggle free of SC action in the wake of the Baker Plan embarrassment. Is another April fool's joke coming up in 2007, or will this be it? The big plan? Either way, expect nothing but a new six-month extension for Minurso: all the importance lies between the lines in the Council's resolution, in what attitude it takes to the mission's final goal. As of today, and since 1991, it has been to keep the peace and to organize a referendum where the Sahrawis freely choose between Morocco and Polisario. How to change that after 15 years without coming off as a cheater?