Whither Algeria?

Algeria's rise from the ashes continues, there's no doubt about that. But it remains shrouded in uncertainty on one crucial point: towards exactly what is it rising?

Whatever it is, it must have something to do with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. There's been some real progress on his watch, from 1999, and as it happens, he doesn't seem ready to step down just yet. While there's not exactly peace, the civil war has definitely been won. The bands of marauding Islamist guerrillas that continue to make parts of Algeria unsecure are no longer a threat to the government or the nation's stability, even if they remain a major irritant, not least to the hundreds that still die every year. The president has decreed reconciliation, which in practical terms mean that while people still fear and loathe each other, they're not officially allowed to anymore, which is some sort of step forward. The bulk of the political-minded Islamists (i.e. not the al-Qaida apocalypse junkies) are about to be reintegrated into the political system -- barring any particularly clumsy attempts to interfere in the parliamentary elections in May this year, which still have a potential to upset the reintegration process. (By the way, do read this fine report, on Islamism in Algeria.) And the economy is looking up, with reform work slogging on slowly but surely, and the climbing oil and gas prices bringing in bucks by the busload regardless.

Bouteflika's regime seems to separate international politics from business far more than any of its predecessors. This is in part because it's aiming at effective liberalization of the economy, and in part because it is chastened by the messy crash landing of the 90s. No Algerian has forgotten how the country's supposed friends and allies stopped returning calls back then, when they were most needed -- something which effectively killed off any lingering desire for international grandstanding and bloc politics.

But that doesn't mean that the country's economic and political comeback won't impact its regional policies. Certainly, an Algeria with internal peace, a more robust economy, and a good relationship to most, if not all, major international players, will become more assertive regionally. So let's have a look at it.


This rentier state aint big enough for the both of us...

Let's first make a few things clear: no nice person has ever led Algeria, pre- or post-independence. And that includes the "Martyr Boudiaf," who, while probably among the least vicious politicians to ever grace Algeria's presidency, still only retains his saintly reputation because he never had time to fuck up. (Remember how he got in power, eh?) This established, and with a look to how things are in Algeria today, I think it's also safe to say no nice person will rule Algeria in the future either, for at least 20 years or so, and probably longer.

So that's a fact, or at least I'm going to treat it as such.

However, that any president will necessarily be a crook doesn't mean it's irrelevant which crook. At present, the scoundrel-in-charge is Abdelaziz Bouteflika -- a power-hungry veteran of Algerian factional intrigue, that is undoubtedly corrupt, has a rather spotty human rights record, and not a single democratic bone in his body. Plus he looks like a choleric little hobbit.

[pic: abdelaziz bouteflika]

But, that said, he has his good sides as well. For one thing, he's a pragmatic realist in what he thinks he can achieve, and how he goes about it. For another, he's got a reasonably good sense of what the economy requires to function and grow -- even if he will mercilessly subordinate economic requirements to his personal agenda, if the need arises. Third, he's eminently pragmatic on how to settle the war: amnesties for all, a good life for sociopathic killers so they stop doing it, and no vain attempts to impose total victory. And fourthly, while not a democrat, he's not exactly an anti-democrat either. He's just a non-democrat: he doesn't give a fuck how he's elected, as long as he's elected. That leaves a little bit of space for oppositional movements to organize in, even if it comes with strings attached and obvious limits. The same goes for freedom of speech -- you're free to dissent as much as you like, even openly, as long as you're not causing him, his allies or his pet projects any serious discomfort. Then you go to jail.

But the most important upside to Bouteflika, may in fact be his sheer efficiency in sucking up power. He has gone from being a military puppet on all too visible strings in 1999, to strapping down most of the military itself in 2004. Methodically, ruthlessly and surprisingly quickly, he has centralized and restructured power to take it away from the competing cliques and fractions of the military state that held it from the downfall of Chadli in 1992 (and arguably, to a lesser extent, before that). He hasn't succeeded entirely -- Toufik Mediène and Smail Lamari are still in place at the DRS and DCE security services, respectively, from where they wield immense power and are certainly in a position to threaten the president himself. But former army head Muhammad Lamari (no relation), presidential "adviser" Larbi Belkheir and powerbroker-at-large Khaled Nezzar have all been forced out of the game, along with many others; the governing apparatus is being restaffed with old Boutef cronies brought back from the political wastelands. Of course, this shift of influence hasn't empowered the Algerian people -- nothing ever does.

What it has done is to increase Bouteflika's own independence from the army, and grant him more power and status within the system. In the process, the political opposition, both leftist/democratic, Berber nationalist and Islamist, has been reduced to a lamentable state of fragmentation and cronyism, and it is certainly not in a position to threaten anyone right now. At best, parties can hope for influence by acting as someone's tool to bash someone else out of power. Thus, Bouteflika is now in charge of the state in a way that none of the other post-coup presidents ever were, and his position is perhaps comparable to that of the late Chadli -- i.e, if he manages to sneak a third mandate, it would take a full-out coup to unseat him. And I think there's a general consensus that Algeria has had enough of those for a while.

So, Bouteflika is now trying to secure that mandate through a referendum, but he already had to postpone it once because of internal opposition -- powerbrokers who are afraid that they're going to be the next ones to go (remember gen. Muhammad Lamari, who suddenly "retired" right after Bouteflika secured a massive shoo-in in the 2004 election, thereby proving who was the boss). That referendum would of course be blatantly illegal and immoral, judged against normal constitutional standards ... but then again, so is the status quo. Bouteflika will have much support from people who aren't otherwise fond of him, simply because they prefer having one dictator with a recognizable face, to seeing that venal crowd of generals getting back in the drivers seat, and starting to fight over the spoils again.


Where all the money comes from and what to do with it

Now, it's already been mentioned that the economy is looking peachy. Or, to be more exact, the economy is still a rotting corpse of post-Socialist, post-civil war mayhem, but it's future is looking peachy. Oil prices are up, gas prices are up, the government is committed to reform, and unemployment and other socioeconomic ills have begun to ebb back since a few years. Money is being spent in a crazy pace, building huge infrastructure projects and salvaging the major cities from the decay they've experienced during the civil war. On top of that, in one bold stroke, Algeria paid off almost all of the foreign debt it had racked up during the botched reforms of the 80s and the civil war, and still managed to hoard billions and billions of dollars in its bulging cash reserves. And sure enough, they bought a whole fleet of Russian fighter jets, setting off an arms race with Morocco, which tried to buy some French fighters to show that they were still in the game -- but of course, being just as poor as they are prestige-conscious, they couldn't pay. In the end, Rabat had to be bailed out by Saudi Arabia, which is always there to help an autocratic monarch in distress. The kingdom was just about to declare victory when, thumbing their nose, Algeria gleefully signed up for a second batch of MiGs.

So, yeah, the Algerian government has more money than it can spend. But one should still remember that Algeria's economic rise is, at this point, still driven almost solely by oil and gas. General economic reforms and liberalizations are moving ahead, but only slowly, and every now and then, even important pieces of legislation are derailed by political manouvering -- such as oil minister Chakib Khelil's darling law on the opening up of the hydrocarbon sector, which was in the end watered down to nothing, after Bouteflika seemingly caved to angry nationalist protest (but who knows what went on in the belly of the beast). The IMF and others complain that the non-hydrocarbon sector of the economy is only now really beginning to grow as quickly as it could, and that much remains to do.

So, the energy sector is now bringing in enormous earnings, and the importance of gas in particular should rise, as Europe is getting ever more panicked over its over-reliance on Russian natural gas for energy. Plenty of contracts are now being struck with southern EU members, and pipelines are shooting up all over the map. Algeria may in fact be overreaching by embracing the Russian proposals for an OPEC-style gas cartel, in that it will lose its possibility to extract favors from the EU as counterweight to Russia (although it will yet have to increase it's portion of the EU imports to do that) and may gain some general western badwill for drawing so close to Russia -- note the connection between hydrocarbon deals and arms sales. Also, some argue that a gas cartel simply wouldn't work the same as OPEC, for technical reasons. But if it does, and the country succeeds in maintaining independence from Russia in such a cartel, Algeria will soon be swimming in political capital.


Algeria's course for the 20th century: Boumédiènism 2.0?

It's all very Boumédiènesque, actually: oil, gas, cartels, Russian arms, economic restructuring and centralizing army rule. The main differences are Bouteflika's considerably more relaxed style of governance, the fact that unlike Boumédiène he doesn't look like Borat and dress like Dracula, and of course the very different content of those economic and political visions.

Where Houari Boumédiène (and, at the time, foreign minister Bouteflika...) was all revolutionary anti-Imperialism and goose-stepping military Socialism, Bouteflika has set his sights on something more similar to an Algerian variant of Gaullism:

[pic: decideurs]

• Externally, it translates into a jealously guarded independence in policy-making, but the commitment to thirdworldism remains (since that is the only field where Algeria has a chance to shine, and even become a top player), even if it is now more realistically engaged, and with no fundamental hangups on the US, France or even Israel. On the contrary, the US is coveted as a potential ally, while France only gets some ritual verbal abuse for being France (and responds in kind), and Algeria has taken a verbally firm but in practice quite moderate stance towards Israel, always careful to toe the Beirut Plan line and firmly supportive of the PLO (the point is to take credit for being a good friend of the Palestinians, while at the same time avoiding rogue state status and missing out on the grand collective peace deal that everyone knows will eventually come).

• Internally, it means a populist-nationalist conception of politics, and a strong state that tries to recreate a sense of identity and pride, to psychologically patch the country together after the traumatic and community-shattering 90s. The economy is to be liberalized, for purely pragmatic reasons (Algeria has decided through trial and error that planned economies suck). But at the same time, the government feels that there's no need to rush it and risk aggravated social unrest, since ample cash is coming in from the hydrocarbon sector to cover for any losses the foot-dragging may cause.

At least that's the plan. If it will work ... well, that depends on what goes on inside the Algerian army, on Algeria's supposed allies, on the oil price, and on Bouteflika's health problems, or lack thereof. And sheer luck ... or lack thereof. But how it all factors into Western Sahara -- well, that's the million dinar question, isn't it?