Mundy in MERIP

I mentioned a Le Monde article by Western Sahara researcher Jacob Mundy a post or so back. Here he is again, with a long new piece in MERIP. It chronicles the peace process from the 1989 agreements to today's political vacuum, and comments on the autonomy plan suggested by the Moroccan government. Perhaps most interestingly, it contains a good summary of Polisario's negotiating tactics: concede to Moroccan demands in order to destabilize their position and earn some goodwill. That has been the case from the very beginning, over the Houston Accords, and all the way up to Baker's first plan in 2001, and his Security Council-endorsed second one in 2003 (although in that last precipitous step, the leadership was prodded along by Algeria).

This one-step-forward-one-step-backwards waltz is probably a sensible strategy for a movement like Polisario, with grand plans and few powerful friends. Movement is everything, attention is next to everything, and international goodwill accounts for the rest. But it is also a position that can last no longer when you've conceded everything but your very raison d'étre -- a referendum on independence -- and are asked to take one more step. Writes Mundy:

After years of making tactical concessions, Western Saharan nationalism has learned a bitter lesson in asymmetric power politics: It does not matter how many compromises the weaker party strikes if the stronger party always asks for more.

True, and an argument that has been made for hardliners and militants within the Sahrawi movement for many years. The international community has proved them right, and deflated the arguments of the more moderate Sahrawi leadership, as their concessions and adherence to the cease-fire have so far only assisted Morocco in its game for time. Mundy goes on to briefly discuss the tensions that are now, as a result, boiling inside Polisario, with powerful pressure from activists for a return to arms, bombs, anything.

You read, and we'll see. For Polisario, the upcoming General Popular Congress this fall will probably make or break the independence movement -- unless there's drastic action in either direction at the Security Council this April.

Linguistic intermission

Time for a short break from politics. Since we're talking of Morocco blogs, you mustn't miss the enchanting Moroccan Vocabulary blog, which teaches Moroccan Dardja -- the country's crackly-sounding Arabic dialect -- at the pace of one word a day. That means that, if you can only master the concept of speaking entirely without vowels (yes, it's the Czech of the Arab world), you'll be perfectly fluent in about a thousand years.

If you're interested in Maghreb languages, you should also check out Jabal al-Lughat, an excellent linguistics blog which regularly features the north African Arabic dialects, plus the region's multitude of equally tongue-twisting Berber languages. It's author, Lameen Souag, has published online and free of charge this great if not completely finished Algerian Dardja grammar. Editors and publishers take note, because with the dire shortage of Algerian Arabic material in English, a finished and expanded version of Souag's grammar belongs on the market.

Historical Moroccan-US relations

The highly recommended Morocco blog Thé à la Menthe has a short post on the history of US-Moroccan relations.

As the Moroccan government never tires of pointing out, the kingdom was the first country in the world to recognize the USA after its liberation from the British Empire, in 1777. American leaders are still grateful, as well they should. Moving on, the following 1786 Treaty of Peace and Friendship was, says Thé à la Menthe, struck almost by accident. Nevertheless, it still holds, making it America's longest-standing unbroken foreign treaty. Score two for the Moroccans.

However, some latter-day bilateral dealings may or may not be regretted today. For more up to date US-Moroccan cooperation, closer to the subject of this blog, I recommend this Le Monde article (in English). Author Jacob Mundy describes the Ford administration's, including the energetic Henry Kissinger's, reaction to King Hassan's decision to seize then-Spanish Sahara in 1975. He quotes the White House records from November 3, 1975, when a singularly bold and fruitful decision was taken:

President: I think the UN should take on more of these problems. God damn, we shouldn’t have to do it all and get a bloody nose.

Kissinger: The UN could do it like West Irian, where they fuzz the “consulting the wishes of the people”, and get out of it.

President: Let’s use the UN route.

And the rest, as we say, is history.

The Ban Ki Moon plan: solve it yourselves.

The United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, March 15, 2007:

Q: Mr. Secretary-General, you met a Moroccan delegation yesterday, and they talked about the proposal to give larger autonomy to the Sahara region, and today Mr. de Villepin, the Prime Minister of France, mentioned this issue as one of the topics that you discussed with him. How encouraged are you about this plan, the Moroccan plan, to move beyond this stalemate and to break the deadlock?

SG: Recently I met and had good discussions with the special envoy of the King of Morocco and also I met representatives of the Polisario and we discussed on how to peacefully resolve Western Sahara issues. I know that still there are no agreements, and the Security Council has not been able to make any decisions on that. I was briefed by the Moroccan delegation on the initiative that King Mohamed VI has made himself, and I hope that with all these initiatives the parties concerned will discuss this matter to find a mutually acceptable resolution on this issue.

Also, here we go:

MAP, Mar. 14, 2007 - The autonomy proposal Morocco is devising for its southern provinces, the Sahara, is a form of self-determination which provides a political solution in line with the international legality, stressed, here Tuesday, the Moroccan justice minister.

Mauritania: first round of presidential elections

A short note on Mauritania's presidential elections, having previously reported on them. For more information on the elections, and some clever speculation on what will happen next, see Head Heeb.

The voting on March 11 went well, fair and free according to observers. Off to second round are Sidi Muhammad Ould Cheikh Abdellahi and Ahmed Ould Daddah. The former is widely seen as -- well, he is -- the ousted regime's candidate, as well as a favorite of the ruling junta, who promises stability and such (his election slogan is "The Reassuring President"). The latter is a half-brother of Mauritania's first president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and went into opposition when he was overthrown in 1978 (slogan: "The Necessary President").

Rivals they may be now, but in fact both served as ministers in old Mokhtar's last government -- brother Ahmed as minister of state for finance, and "Sidioca" as minister of state for the economy -- and both were sent to jail by the CMRN junta that took over. Ahmed Ould Daddah never reconciled with the colonels' regimes that followed, but Abdellahi would become prime minister under Mouaouiya Ould Tayaa (president 1984-2005).

When asked in a free and fair poll, then, Mauritanians voted 24,79% for reassurance, and 20,68% for necessity. Now both presidential hopfuls will begin an intensive two weeks of stitching together coalitions with the defeated candidates and community leaders, in order to gain those last 25-30%.

Final results are below, taken from an Interior Ministry statement, but comments and translation are Western Sahara Info's.

Voter participation

Registered voters: 1134774
Number of voters: 795083
Invalid votes: 50708, or 6,37%
Blank votes: 3309, or 0,41%
Votes given: 741066
Participation: 70,07%

Individual candidates:

• Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdellahi: 183743 votes, thus 24,79% - 2nd round.
  
• Ahmed Ould Daddah: 153242 votes, thus 20,68% - 2nd round.
• Zein Ould Zeidane: 113194 votes, thus 15,27% (1)
• Messaoud Ould Boulkheir: 72611 votes, thus 9,80% (2)
• Ibrahima Mokhtar Sarr: 58818 votes, thus 7,94% (3)
• Saleh Ould Mohamedou Ould Hanenna: 56718 votes, thus 7,65% (4)
• Mohamed Ould Mouloud: 30265 votes, thus 4,08% (5)
• Dehane Ould Ahmed Mahmoud: 15316 votes, thus 2,07%
• Mohamed Ould Cheikhna: 14265 votes, thus 1,92%
• Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah: 12807 votes, thus 1,73% (6)
  
• Ethmane Ould Cheikh Ahmed Ebilmaali: 10874 votes, thus 1,47%
• Ba Mamadou Alassane: 4078 votes, thus 0,55% (7)
• Mohamed Ahmed Ould Babahmed Ould Salihi: 2789 votes, thus 0,38%
• Moulaye El Hacen Ould Jeid: 2536 votes, thus 0,34%
• Chbih Ould Cheikh Malainine: 2117 votes, thus 0,29%. (8)
• Rajel ("Rachid") Mustapha: 1976 votes, thus 0,27%
• Sidi Ould Isselmou Ould Mohamed Dahid: 1804 votes, thus 0,24%
• Isselmou Ould El Moustapha: 1790 votes, thus 0,24%
• Mohamed Ould Mohamed El Mokhtar Ould Towmi: 1470 votes, thus 0,20%
• Mohamedou Ould Ghoulam Ould Sidati: 653 votes, thus 0,09%

(1) A former central bank manager under Ould Tayaa.
(2) A former slave, human rights advocate and activist for Haratin (ex-slave) rights.
(3) Activist for the black African southern population, formerly allied with Messoud Ould Boulkheïr. He was jailed for co-writing the Manifesto of the Oppressed Negro-Mauritanians in 1986.
(4) Involved in the failed 2003 coup, and supported in this election by Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamists.
(5) Leader of the leftist UFP opposition party, where Ahmed Ould Daddah used to be a member.
(6) A former dictator in 1979-84, member of the mainly Sahrawi Laâroussien tribe, who had notoriously poor relations with Morocco.
(7) The election's other black candidate, campaigning for the return of refugees in Senegal.
(8) Despite having pulled out of the race weeks ago, in favor of Ould Heidallah.

CODESA's report for Jun-Dec 2006

Almost missed this. The illegal (need I even point that out?) Sahrawi human rights collective CODESA has released its latest human rights report. It covers the period between June and December 2006, but links to a previous report that covers the first half of the year.

The 25-page document is quite politicized and doesn't hide the pro-independence sympathies of its authors, but it is well worth checking out for anyone interested in the petty details of human rights abuse in Western Sahara. CODESA does a serious job of documenting abuses in the territory (and south Morocco), which certainly isn't an easy task for anyone -- and it's even harder when living there. Indeed, most of their activists have been sent to jail not one but several times. The group's board consists almost only of former prisoners of conscience or "disappeared", the most well-known being Ali Salem Tamek, Aminatou Haidar, Brahim Noumria and Mohamed El Moutaoikil. Most recently, almost the whole group was scooped up by Moroccan security in 2006 and sent to prison, but after Amnesty International protested, they were released by royal amnesty. In its report, Amnesty described them as "instrumental in collecting and disseminating information about human rights violations committed by Moroccan forces".

Connecting the continents

Not sure how this is relevant, but it's too cool to pass up: Morocco and Spain will build a tunnel under the Gibraltar Straits, connecting Africa and Europe. Or at least they'll "put it on the right track", whatever that means:

Morocco and Spain vowed on Tuesday to work together to bore a tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar to link Africa and Europe.

Moroccan experts say the long-mooted 39km rail tunnel would be among the world's most sophisticated engineering works and rival the Channel Tunnel linking England and France.

"We will deploy the necessary effort to achieve this project or at least put it on the right track," Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou told a news conference.

Western Sahara Info thinks this is a much better way to cooperate and spend money than some others.

Meanwhile in Madrid, a firestorm of criticism has broken out among pro-Sahrawi organizations over Zapatero's remarks in Rabat, where he seemed to suggest that the Moroccan autonomy plan should be the starting point for dialogue between Polisario and Morocco. Polisario, of course, believes that UN resolutions should be the starting point. Now the Partido Popular opposition has joined the fray, saying the left should feel ashamed of its government. And the left says it does.

US State Department: human rights 2006

The US State Department has published its annual survey of human rights in the world, covering the year 2006. As usual, it's a combination of excellent, detailed information and statistics, and random pickings from self-described human rights groups of very varying credibility -- from solidly respectable Amnesty International, to all kinds of shady single-statement puppet organizations. There are no comments on the reliability of the many anti-this-or-that-groups that are quoted, and there seems to exist no rule for which claims are picked up on, and which are left out. For example, the SPS reports on Sahrawi independence demonstrations at least a couple of times a month, but the State Department inexplicably singles out just a few of these for mention. Why those? Why not all, why not none, why not some others instead? Same thing with the various Moroccan interior ministry fronts who put out statements about abuse in the Tindouf camps regularly for domestic consumption: some are quoted, some are not. No consistency whatsoever.

But have fun. Here's the report overview, including a list of countries, and here are direct links to Western Sahara, Morocco and (what the heck) Algeria. And by the way, Morocco has already decided that the report amounted to glowing praise. Like last year. Well, like every year. Stay tuned for the Polisario reaction.

In other news: Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz meets Ban Ki Moon today, after having met his Western Sahara envoy Peter van Walsum yesterday. Meanwhile, Ahmed Sbai and Brahim Sabbar (leaders of the banned human rights group ASVDH) plus a few others were sentenced to prison in El Aaiún for forming an "illegal organization" -- but surely they would be much happier in jail if Western Sahara was autonomous.

[pictures: sabbar & sbai]

UPDATE: Amnesty reacts to the jailing of Sabbar and Sbai, saying it believes they are prisoners of conscience and must be released immediately, and noting that the trial took less than an hour. ASVDH reports another jail sentence, the sixth in two days.

Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition

[pic: pinochet, clock ticking.]

That's what you call an unpleasant surprise. Just as prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was wrapping up his visit to Morocco, Spanish media breaks the news that Baltasar Garzón may decide to investigate 31 top-ranking Moroccan security people for various crimes against humanity in Western Sahara. Among them are former regime strongman Driss Basri (now in exile), and present regime strongmen Yassine Mansouri and maj. gen. Hosni Benslimane.

Judge Garzón, if anyone has forgotten, was the man who had the Chilean ex-dictator gen. Augusto Pinochet put under house arrest in Britain, by issuing an arrest order for crimes against Spanish citizens, and demanding his extradition to Spain. The old tyrant protested that he had diplomatic immunity, but to no avail. In the end, he got off the hook only by acting senile, which the British government pretended to believe. Back in Chile, gen. Pinochet miraculously "got better", but couldn't celebrate for too long: from that point on, he was fair game, and the lawsuits started piling up. When he died late last year, some 300 cases were pending. If justice wasn't served in the end, then at least, he died knowing that the people knew. And the situation of others like him, those retired old cold war gentlemen with blood on their hands, had changed dramatically.

Sahrawi victims of the Moroccan army in Western Sahara launched their own complaint before Garzón in September last year, and it is this that the court has now responded to. But very ambiguously so: the court says (contrary to SPS's cheery report) that in order to treat the matter, it'll need more details and precise accusations. So far, a number of Sahrawi and Spanish (and Sahrawi-Spanish) human rights groups have filed information on a total of 542 victims of forced disappearance, most of whom had Spanish identification documents when kidnapped. In total, a massive 1000 pages of text have supposedly been filed, but it's unclear when or if the organizations will be able to provide the requested details. Also, while the Spanish legal system was chewing on the case, Morocco decided to shoot off its own counter-complaint -- upping the bet by sending a pro-monarchy Sahrawi all the way to the International Criminal Court. (No, never mind that the article says International Court of Justice -- the ICJ only accepts cases filed by governments, and while the rulers of Rabat may well want to forget all about it, has already pronounced on the Western Sahara case.) However, this appears to have been just another example of the kingdoms' copycat behaviour to confuse journalists, because Morocco hasn't even joined the ICC.

If the Sahrawi organizations get their act together, literally, and if Judge Garzón takes the case on with his usual energy, it could turn into a serious diplomatic snag for the kingdom's relations with Spain -- not to mention the stress it would cause within the kingdom. Messieurs Benslimane, Mansouri and Basri may even be forced to restrict their holiday plans to non-extraditing countries. Not exactly Carcel Negra, but it's a start.

- - -

UPDATE I: A more detailed post on this can be found on the always excellent Sahara Watch. Read it.
UPDATE II: The case has been accepted by Garzon in Oct. 2007. Story continues here.

CORCAS, CORCAS, CORCAS.

While on the topic of the Internet, I just noticed that Western Sahara Info is the number six hit on Google for "CORCAS". That's odd. And, much more than odd, if the millions of dollars poured into Khellihenna's little career life support can't muster enough online media to beat a blogspot entry out of the game, then...

...man, you've failed.

Moroccan Sahara on the web

The last post was about Polisario sites on the web, provoked by the belated launching of an official Sahrawi Republic homepage. Now let's turn our attention to the other side.

Morocco, of course, has too many "Moroccan Sahara" sites to list. It is a nation of soon-to-be 35 million people, and even if web access for most will mean Internet cafés, of which there are plenty, that's still a fair bit better than the Tindouf camps' two or three study centers of donated old PCs in mudbrick sheds. So there's certainly no lack of privately run pro-annexationist Moroccan sites, even if most of them are just recycling government material. That's also the strategy of the government sites themselves. Mostly mirroring, copying and rewriting each others' content, and that of the Moroccan press, they work in a way not unlike Polisario's official media organs, who also act as an echo chamber to mobilize supporters (and Algeria will then in turn faithfully republish their news through its APS news agency, which is then picked up by the private Algerian press, which is read online by Moroccan reporters, who write angry rebuttals. Then finally it ends up on this blog).

A select few of the officially government-run Moroccan sites follow below:

• MAP (The government news agency. Gives ample proof of the country's debilitating pre-occupation with being pro-occupation. At the time of writing, 9 out of 12 headlines on its English-language Politics page were solely concerned with the Sahara, and of the three remaining, one was principally about it too, even if the word "Sahara" wasn't in the headline. Now, consider the fact that the Sahara, even if a hot issue, holds only some 0,6% of the country's total population ... don't you think the remaining 33 or so million may have a few problems of their own they'd like to see the government attend to? (The site itself is multilingual, looks nice, and for the most part works as promised -- far from its amazingly useless Algerian competitor.)
• Sahara Marocain (Web portal that gathers lots of anti-Polisario material from Moroccan & international media; in French.)
• CORCAS (The Sahrawi face of the Moroccan government; multilingual)
• The Moroccan Foreign Ministry (Staffers of which have now surpassed the US military as most frequent visitors to this blog, so ahlan wa sahlan to ya; in French, Arabic and, they claim, English.)
• Maroc.ma (The government portal; Arabic, French, English.)
• Sahara Online (Web portal launched by CORCAS recently; Spanish, French, Arabic, English.)
  

Then there's a number of semi-official pages who only recycle official material and are inofficially run by some branch of the government, or a lobby group hireling. Funniest one is Western Sahara Online, created to resemble in name and adress the long-established American pro-Polisario site Western Sahara Online, created by a Sahrawi refugee in the US. Both are in English, but that's where the similarities stop.

(Let me just pause for a moment to point out that this is classic Moroccan government. Rabat has been using these copycat tactics since 1975, when it followed Polisario's Ain Ben Tili & Guelta Zemmour gatherings of tribal sheikhs, by summoning its own congress of tribal bigwigs to proclaim allegiance to the King. Miraculously, both congresses, according to their sponsors, involved a majority of the Spanish Yemaa -- a puppet council stuffed with sheikhs. In Polisario's congress, that majority opted to dissolve the Yemaa in favor of the Sahrawi National Council (later to become SADR's parliament); but in Morocco's congress some days later, the not-at-all-dissolved Yemaa voted unanimously for annexing Western Sahara to Morocco... someone else smell a rat? Or two?)

Add to this a plethora of out-of-country target-audience sites and pet organizations run either by Morocco directly, or by Moroccan lobby groups (like the MACP in the US), who are financed by and for all practical purposes part of the Rabat government.

All in all, Morocco clearly has the upper hand in the Internet war, with nicer sites, and much more material in English. Even if Polisario seems to be picking up pace, with the relaunch of a nicer (if still not exactly stunning) SPS page and the above-mentioned SADR thingie, Morocco is accelerating much faster, having both web designers and money. The conclusion must be that Boutef's people are not doing their part here, if they seriously want their Sahrawi protégés to come out on top ... but, on the other hand, maybe it's all a clever ruse to convince us that Algeria is not really a party to the conflict.

The Sahrawi Republic goes online

Front Polisario has, as all regular readers of SPS would know, launched an official site for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. So far it's only in Arabic, and doesn't have much material yet -- and without bothering to go in for closer inspection, some of it also seems to be old stuff. But some of it is new, and even contains actual information, instead of just the usual propaganda rah rah - a load of old Polisario documents and lists of members and representatives in different institutions have been posted, for example. Hopefully more is coming -- not just historical stuff, and not just in Arabic.

That the SADR hasn't had an official site up until now -- it's 2007, Mr. Abdelaziz! -- has long puzzled me. No doubt a serious Polisario propaganda fuckup. The movement is paying dearly for its refusal (or inability, due to economic and know-how constraints?) to engage seriously with Internet propaganda, which is a crucial tool for a non-state actor like the Polisario. Somehow this feels similar to how the Front is suffering for not courting the crucial US government audience. Even if Polisario & Algeria are now beginning to make up for these mistakes, they have lost much valuable time; Morocco is miles ahead on both fronts.

The design of the site itself is very simple, and not very attractive, but it works. At least better than the poor language & style standards of the SPS, and the until-very-recently completely atrocious design of that page. That the Polisario apparently insists on designing their own pages (instead of contracting it out to some PR group, assuming Algeria would want to cough up the dough for that), has its benefits, but also very obvious drawbacks. Some professionalization of the Sahrawi lobbying campaign is direly needed.

The launch follows on the heels of the Moroccan dévoilement of the site Sahara Online on February 24, representing the "southern regions" of Morocco, and containing more or less the same material as all other Moroccan government sites -- like the CORCAS page, from now on folded into the Sahara Online portal web. To the naked eye, it looks much nicer than the SADR site, and is multilingual, but it is equally short on material. And most of the portal remains under construction two weeks after the launch.

Lest my memory fails me, Polisario now has the following official sites online:

• The Sahrawi Republic (as above)
• RASD-TV (Official television channel, Arabic-Spanish)
• National Radio (Web radio transmissions; in Arabic, plus a few hours of Spanish.)
  
• al-Sahraa al-Hurra (Polisario weekly; Arabic)
• SPS (Official news agency, multilingual)
• The SADR embassy in Algiers (Quite a lot of info; Spanish, Arabic).
• SADR Oil & Gas (Sahrawi natural resources for sale; English)
  
• UPES (Writers' and journalists' union; in Arabic)
  
• A couple of amateurish embassy sites, and, at least formerly, the UJSARIO youth wing's site.

In addition to these, there are a number of pages that seem Polisario-run even if they won't say so, and a few independent and in some cases oppositional Sahrawi nationalist sites. They're mostly poor on content and hideously designed -- although it's getting better -- but interesting for their non-party-line material:

• Khat al-Shahid (pro-war & pro-reform opposition faction; Spanish, French, Arabic)
• al-Mustaqbal as-Sahrawi (irregular magazine in the Tindouf camps since 1999, oppositional; Arabic, Spanish)
• ASVDH (independent human rights organization, supportive of self-determination, but not, it seems, a part of the organization; English, French/Spanish, Arabic)
• Various other pro-Polisario or pro-independence sites, human rights groups, online mags, blogs, etc; mostly rather ephemeral.

Then of course, we must not forget ARSO, a hugely useful Swiss solidarity site, even if it's in no way officially Polisario or even run by Sahrawis. But perhaps it is useful for precisely that reason. Take a look at the debate section, for example. Having become a multi-language forum for Sahrawis in Tindouf and the rest of Algeria, as well as in the Moroccan-held territories, and exile elsewhere, it gives a rare (though maybe not so representative) insight into internal Polisario debate. Unfortunately, it has turned into a slugging match for pro- or anti-Abdelaziz people, plus a few old stalwarts that are fighting their 1980s-era feuds with Internet mudslinging. But it is still very interesting for the hot topics touched upon, and for providing a snapshot of Sahrawi priorities: like how oppositional writers will regularly rail against corruption and lack of democracy within Polisario, but also how they (as far as I've seen) have never complained about undue Algerian influence or implied support for Morocco's autonomy schemes. This clearly belies both Polisario propaganda ("Oh, look at our liberal desert democracy!") and Moroccan propaganda ("Polisario is a tool of the Algerian military and les séquestrés love the King!"), and so much the better. Poking holes in their simple-minded propaganda is a service to all involved.

Coming up next: Morocco on the web.

[updated: see comments]