Maghreb minaret measuring contest

So, now it's official: Algeria will build the world's third largest mosque, after the ones in Mekka and Medina. Plunked down in the hitherto low-key bay of Algiers, it will take 120,000 faithful, in addition to sporting the world's highest minaret -- a whopping 300 meters. Building will start in 2009 and it is to be inaugurated in 2013, although if the Algiers metro construction* is any guide, that will be more like 2050.

Coincidentally, the Algiers mosque will overshadow the Hassan II mosque in Casablanca, whose minaret, as of now the world's highest, has been a 210-meter thorn in the Algerian government's side for years.

So that's money well spent, considering how Algeria has no social problems to speak of. On the other hand, I guess it's better than another arms race. Oh, well, boys will be boys.

[picture: soon to be the second-highest in the world]

*) begun in 1981, and soon to open -- I swear!

Language & identity in North Africa

While on the topic of North Africans and language, I found this old post from The Blogger Formerly Known As Cat in Rabat (it's an excerpt from a novel by A. B. Yehoshua*):

Four languages mingle in Algerian life, leading to a chaotic identity:

First there is the Berber, the indigenous language of the Maghreb, spoken by close to a third of the population.

Second there is North African Arabic, known to every Algerian. These two languages are oral media not used for writing, even though Berber once had a written form.

The two written languages of Algeria are French and classical literary Arabic. Neither, however, is a modern tongue. Both are in effect foreign languages. Classical Arabic comes with Islamization and French with Western colonialism. The first arrived as a sacred tongue, the second as a secular one. [...]

The complexity of the situation is problematic for every Algerian. Fully living an Algerian identity means knowing four languages, being at home in four cultures, and adapting to four different psychological standpoints.

Practically speaking, only 10 percent of the population of Algeria is proficient in all four languages. Such a small group is unable to bring about an integration of four different worlds. And even if such an integration were possible, it would be inaccessible to the majority of Algerians.

... and so we have a situation in which different sectors of social activity, having no common language, remain totally distinct. Classical Arabic is the language of religion. French is used for economic, administrative, and scientific purposes. North African Arabic and Berber are spoken in the street and in the family. This is the great curse of the Algerian identity. It's not that such an identity doesn't exist, but that it is linguistically fragmented beyond any possibility of synthesis.

There, wham. A bit schematic of course, but it puts in words something really important. As The Blogger Presently Known As La Gatita Gringa points out, it of course applies not only to Algeria, but also to Morocco, and to a lesser degree, to other countries in the region, and to much of the rest of the postcolonial world. One could comment much further on this, and on how futile any attempt to force a monolithic national identity on the Maghreb nations must be, but instead, I'm just going to look up Yehoshua's novel to see if the rest is as good as this. (If you feel the need for a somewhat contrived Western Sahara angle, think Hassaniya, Moroccan Dardja, French, Spanish and classical Arabic, and the added intensity of language politics -- but if not, just let it sink in.)

- - -

* The Israeli writer, that is. Of tangential interest, his mother is Moroccan, so he's not without a Maghreb background himself.

Better late than never (updated)

[picture: a non-tamazight copy, presumably]

The "Berber question" remains a touchy subject in a North Africa still marked by the Arabization frenzy of the 1960s, 70s and 80s, which in a sort of post-colonial backlash went far beyond cultural self-assertion to tilt over in intolerance for non-Arab minorities. Berber (or Amazigh) identity was not just ignored, but sometimes harshly repressed by the governments. It remains so in some quarters -- yes, Libya, we're looking at you -- but fortunately, both Algeria and Morocco have by now both come a long way since the 70s. Much work remains to be done, however, and here's a hint of how much:

Holy Qu’ran translated into Tamazight
Tizi-Ouzou – The Berber-speaking Muslims will shortly be able to read the Holy Qu’ran in their mother tongue, Tamazight, in its Kabylian variant transcribed in Arabic characters, thanks to the translation carried out by Si Hadj Mohand Mohand Tayeb, a member of the Religious Affairs’ Scientific Council in the province of Tizi- Ouzou (103-km east of Algiers). The author said, while presenting his work to APS, that it was the complete translation of the Meanings of Qu’ran, entirely completed in its 60 parts (ahzab), of which a copy to be edited was deposited, through the Religious Affairs Ministry, at King Fahd's complex for the "Mashaf Echarif" edition, in Saudi Arabia. [APS]

Now to be exact, it's not the first Tamazight Qur'an, but the first one in the Kabyle dialect. But since Berbers have been in Kabylie for a couple of thousand years, and have been Muslims since the 7th century, I'd say that was about damned time.

UPDATE 22/9: Bouba makes an interesting point in comments, namely that the translation is from Arabic into
Kabyle Tamazight with Arabic letters -- so is it just arabization in sheep's clothing? You decide.
UPDATE 2/10: Linguist Lameen Souag finally sets the record straight at his blog, Jabal al-Lughat. Read!

MMS & FLN: abstentionism in Morocco and Algeria

Issandr El Amrani at The Arabist has pointed to an interesting article on vote-buying in Morocco's elections. The original is in French, but here's his translation of a key paragraph:

In fact, it is sociological absentionism — that of the masses of social marginals — that has been most amplified between 2002 and 2007, in close correlation with the withdrawal of the social and political lockdown [of former security practices], in cities much more than in the countryside (respectively 30% and 43% participation rates). On the one hand, these populations have much less to fear from security forces if they do not vote. On the other, the introduction of the single ballot makes controlling vote-buying much more expensive [for vote-buyers]: one must have the means of buying enough camera-phones to enable the voter to prove that he has fulfilled his part of the bargain! It is therefore more difficult to exchange the votes of the “poor” for money. From now on, they have little to gain or win in such a transaction.

So there's a valuable lesson: while high oil prices tend to undermine democracy, high cell-phone prices work the other way around. But let's not forget that the Moroccan elections were not the only polls in the neighbourhood to leave voters indifferent:

What is most notorious about Algeria’s May 17, 2007 parliamentary elections is the fact that they were boycotted by almost 65% of the electorate, a historical threshold never crossed since independence. [... The] Algerian Government relies on political clientelism and the distribution of political and material favours (rent). However, the formula that turned the National People’s Assembly (NPA) into a rubberstamp chamber, devoid of any prerogative of debate and parliamentary control, also turned the lower house of parliament into an instrument of co-option, and a place where gain from rent accrue and privileges to deputies abound. Pushed to the limit by Bouteflika’s presidential style of government, this governance system set in motion a perverted process: the moral and political de-legitimisation of the NPA. By refusing to set up a party system that brings different social groups closer together and represents the interests of parties to conflict, this political game of parliamentary electioneering without representation leaves the voter with only one option, now that loyalty has been eroded and the right to be heard blocked: defection. This is, at the core, the obvious manifestation of the political representation crisis that has besets the Algerian political system since the collapse of “revolutionary legitimacy” in October 1988.

Good analysis by Mohammed Hachemaoui. Read more of it at the Arab Reform Initiative.

Finally, another reason that Algerian democracy has failed: not everyone is up to date on this "voting" thing:

Khat al-Shahid threatens to break with Polisario

[picture: polisario's emblem says "liberty, democracy, unity", but so far there's only rifles and flags.]

More Polisario dissident news. Will tipped me off to this:

Communiqué

After wide consultation between [male and female] activists of Khat Achahid [or Khat al-Shahid] about the most recent events relating to the Western Sahara conflict, the Coordination Committee has held a meeting to study the ideas and suggestions which it has received.

Concerning the process of direct negotiations, the Committee has - despite Khat Achahid's absolute conviction that direct negotiations constitute the only road to a solution of the conflict - considered the results of the two rounds at Manhasset disappointing for the Sahrawis, because Polisario has explicitly accepted the autonomy as a possible option for the self-determination of the Sahrawi People.[1]

Confirming the pertinence of our recommendations and our warning, Morocco managed to include Sahrawi elements favoring the occupier's views in its delegation, thus distorting the nature of the negotiations by transforming them to negotiations between Sahrawis.[2]

In this context, Khat Achahid reminds [the reader] that the essence of the Western Sahara conflict is Sovereignty, and that only the Sahrawi People has the right to decide on this matter, and that the leadership of Polisario has an obligation to defend it [i.e, Sovereignty], and that it does not - under any pretext - have neither the legitimacy or the authority to put it at stake. As far as the referendum that the present leadership demands, it cannot be considered an objective by and in itself, but only a means of realizing the objectives of the Sahrawi People, and if it takes place, it must conform to the critera established by the UN, and accepted by the two parties.[3]

Concerning the 12th congress of the Polisario Front and the internal situation, Khat Achahid, in total conformity with the dissatisfaction reigning in the camps and in the diaspora, considers the first decisions of the Preparatory Commission[4] is nothing but another version of the preparatory methods of previous congresses, which consisted in decreeing a state of alert and martial law during the preparatory period of each congress. Methods, of which the first signs have been the decision to stop the issuing and renovation of passports, as well as the freezing of visa demands, something which has caused dire consequences, and considerable damages in the Sahrawi diaspora.[5]

Khat Achahid denounces this flagrant violation of the rights of liberty of movement of Sahrawi refugees, and, in the same context, condemns the arbitrary measures consisting in the retention of of passports of all Sahrawis returning from travelling abroad, and exhorts the suppression of this injust and unjustified measure. Regarding this, Khat Achahid has adressed a letter to the Algerian state, in its quality of issuing authority for the passports.

Khat Achahid considers that the creation of the Preparatory Commission for the 12th Congress is formalization of the recreation of the established power through the old scenarios based on the presentation and choice of the same person at the top of the pyramid of power, as the center of the taking of all decisions.

Khat Achahid reminds the members of the Preparatory Commission of their great responsibility before the Sahrawi People, and invite them to seize this historic moment to reform that which can be reformed and change that which must change, in conformity with the noble aspirations of the Sahrawi People.

For Khat Achahid the Congress will either constitute an honest evaluation, capable of constructing a total and definitive rupture with the reigning corruption, the irresponsible practices and the improvised decisions, by means of a complete program to traverse the coming stage with firmness, or it will be a simple paus for perpetuating Mohamed Abdelaziz's succession of himself at the summit of corruption and of improvisation. And all of this depends on the sincerity and responsibility of the Preparatory Commission.

Based on the above, Khat Achahid has decided to grant a grace period to the Polisario Front which ends at the closure of the Congress, and if the results of the latter haven't taken in consideration the detailed demands for reform in its [i.e, Khat Achahid's] political program[6], Khat Achahid will announce its definitive political break with the Polisario Front and continue its efforts to find a just solution of the Western Sahara conflict which guarantees the self-determination of the Sahrawi People.

The Coordination Committee
Wilaya El Ayoune: September 12, 2007
The Sahrawi refugee camps

WSI FOOTNOTES:

[picture: second-longest serving president in the arab world]

[1] Now, unless Khat Achahid knows something we don't, this isn't quite true. Polisario has long agreed to include autonomy as an option on a referendum ballot (with independence and full integration into Morocco as the other two), but as far as is known, it made no further concessions on this at the Manhasset talks.

[2] A reference to Khellihenna Ould Errachid and other pro-Rabat Sahrawis who were included as "advisory" members of the delegation. See here.

[3] This would seem to be an attack on Polisario's reluctant acceptance "in principle" of the UN-endorsed Baker Plan in 2003 (Morocco refused). It allowed Moroccan settlers to vote in the Western Sahara's independence referendum, even when outnumbering indigenous voters. Khat Achahid's reference to the UN criteria is in support of the Settlement Plan of 1991, further detailed in the Houston Accords of 1997, where Morocco and Polisario agreed that only people with a historical presence in the territory should vote -- a definition matching the reference in international law to "the people of the territory", as opposed to Sahrawis in general or people who moved in after the annexation. The voter rolls that this produced, with some 85,000 UN-approved voters presented after a lengthy identification process in 1999-2000, were refused by Morocco. Realizing it would probably lose, the kingdom backed away from the referendum altogether in the years to come. Polisario's cautious acceptance of the Baker Plan was formalized by the XI General Popular Congress in Tifariti, in 2003, but at that point it was already a fait accompli, and the leadership earned much scorn for taking such a momentous decision with no popular consultation.

[4] An appointed body tasked with preparing October's XII General Popular Congress, which notably included an important longtime dissident. It would seem that this is a controlled way of broadening popular support for the Congress, or some sort of inclusiveness if not exactly democratization. One shouldn't be very optimistic considering the undemocratic nature of the system, but the fact that Khat Achahid bothers to appeal to the members of the Commission indicate that they, at least, have some hope that it could, ideally, bring about actual change.

[5] Rumour has it that Khat Achahid is essentially diaspora-based, although far from totally. I wouldn't know.

[6] The program can be found in Arabic here (pdf), but the French and Spanish versions no longer seem available via Khat Achahid's website following an ill-conceived redesign.

[unofficial translation from the french original by WSI]

King of the Poor

Forbes has listed thee world's richest royals. Number one is, as usual, the filthy-rich sultan of Brunei, while her highness Elizabeth II doesn't even make it to the top ten. But at number seven, a familiar face, plus indications that the Forbes people need to practice their roman numerals:

No. 7

King Mohammed IV
King/Morocco
$2 billion
Age: 44

Nicknamed "king of the poor" for efforts to alleviate poverty and improve human rights. Palace's reported operating budget exceeds $960,000 a day; much of it spent on clothes and car repairs.

Earlier on the same subject, in The Guardian: "Once he was known as the King of the Poor, but when Morocco's King Mohamed VI arrived in the Western Saharan town of Dajla last week he needed four Hercules transport aircraft to carry the sumptuous trappings of his royal household." So, that's the King of the Poor. As for the Poor of the King, see here and here. And here.

Bomber's ballot

Short note about what's going to be a long story: the gruesome al-Qaida attacks in Algeria have been followed by state-sponsored demonstrations across the country condemning terrorism. Good, in itself -- but it is blatantly obvious that le pouvoir is mobilizing to exploit the opportunity. The state media has gone into high-gear in its twinning of Bouteflika and "national reconciliation", and called for more of the latter in what is clearly a prequel for demanding more of the former. The demonstrations seem to have been at least as much pro-Bouteflika as anti-bin Ladin.

[picture: on the campaign trail]

The issue at stake, of course, is Boutef's attempt to rewrite the constitution and secure himself a third mandate before his current one, which was supposed to be the second and last, expires. He tried already last year, but then postponed the planned referendum after running into resistance from unnamed power brokers. Certainly the death of regime linchpin, and (at least formerly) crucial Bouteflika supporter, Smaïl Lamari now adds greatly to the confusion.

Algerian newspapers are already positioning themselves for and against by their reporting, according to their political views and sponsors, and it is evident that a serious intra-regime power struggle is heating up. Welcome back to the war of the clans.

More Moroccan election links (and other random stuff)

Please click these links to learn useful things about Morocco and Western Sahara:

• `AQOUL. The Lounsbury, the web's most brutal Mid-East debater (and one of the most interesting), gathers up `Aquol's coverage of the Moroccan elections, by Ibn Kafka and himself.
• IBN KAFKA. Analysis galore, but in French.
• THE ARABIST. Moroccan journalist Issandr El Amrani posts at length on the elections.
• AL-MIR'ÂT. Click to play a BBC radio show featuring, among others, the 'Red Prince' Moulay Hicham, a controversial Moroccan royal who lives in permanent semi-dissidence in the USA.
• WESTERN SAHARA INFO. Yes, this blog, if you haven't already read the posts.
• MAP. Istiqlal says it refuses to govern in coalition with the mainstream Islamist PJD. This would leave the Islamists completely outside the government, which is probably not great news for those who want to keep PJD a well-groomed and pro-system party.
• AMINA TALHIMET. She thinks it's a generation thing. (French.)
  
• ...OR DOES IT EXPLODE? Well that is the question, isn't it. An al-Jazeera English clip showcases a bit of Moroccan diversity by interviewing three political activists, all women, one Jewish, one Islamist, and one under police surveillance.
  
• EATBEES. Unhappy with the elections.
  
• NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (pdf). The statement of the observer mission to Morocco's election. From what I gather, not one single foreign observer went to the Western Sahara, so there are no news on how the amazingly miraculous turnout there came about. (If, for some reason, you doubt what this guy said.)
  
• WESTERN SAHARA ENDGAME. Not really on the elections, but nonetheless: Chasli continues to assault PR stooge Edward Gabriel.
• ONE HUMP OR TWO. Also not on the elections, but I forgot to link to this before. Will reminds us: if you're into police brutality -- or, on the contrary, convinced that no such thing exists in the Saharan Provinces -- you ought to see this plug for Carlos González's upcoming documentary, Children of the Clouds. (Suggested alternative title, Nine Minutes of Nightstick.)
• UPES. Okay, third strike and I'm out: this paper by professor Eduardo Trillo de Martín-Pinillos isn't about the elections either. But it is about the issue of formal sovereignty over Western Sahara, and the curious fact that it is still legally considered to rest with Spain.
• FINALLY, no link at all. But if you should happen to live near a library or any other institution which has the good taste to keep copies of the Journal of Modern Africa Studies, then you should march down to read the latest opus of Western Sahara specialist Jacob Mundy (earlier posts & links to his stuff here). His piece in the June 2007 issue, "Performing the Nation, Pre-Figuring the State: The Western Saharan Refugees Thirty Years Later" is brilliant, and provides some of that much-needed analysis of Polisario's internal dynamics.

[thanks to laroussi for tipping me off to some of the links]

Western Sahara Info: Deep Throat of the Maghreb

Have you heard about Sahel Intelligence magazine? Well, neither had I. But they certainly have heard about Western Sahara Info...

Western Sahara Info -- Aug 28, 2007:

Unlike Basri, "Smaïn" Lamari, as he was also known, was neither retired nor in exile. He was at the time of his death, this Monday, probably one of the three most powerful men in Algeria, with the other two being president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the head of the spy services, Mohamed "Toufik" Médiène -- and not necessarily in that order.

Sahel Intelligence analyst Jorge Mathias -- Sep 03, 2007:

Unlike Basri, Lamari was neither retired nor in exile. He was at the time of his death, probably one of the three most powerful men in Algeria, with the other two being president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the head of the intelligence services, Mohamed "Toufik" Médiène.

Western Sahara Info -- Aug 28, 2007:

They also remained very much out of the public eye. The picture seen here is one of the few ever published of Smaïl Lamari, who for years remained a faceless power behind the scenes in Algerian politics.

Sahel Intelligence analyst Jorge Mathias -- Sep 03, 2007:

He remained very much out of the public eye and for years he was a faceless power behind the scenes in Algerian politics.

All right. But who are these people, you say? In their own words -- we read at Sahel Intelligence,"About Us":

Sahel Intelligence is a weekly strategic magazine of analysis on the Sahel region, published by GIC (Global Intelligence Company) [...] Supplied with more than 500 media in real time, the Sahel-Intelligence.com publishes each week a confidential journal, fruit of research, analyses, and information collected from a network of correspondents which extends to more than 10 countries in the Sahel region [...] Global Intelligence Company is composed of analysts who are, for the majority, former diplomats, soldiers, members of ONG having already operated in the region, and having thus a thorough knowledge of the ground. During the past years, researchers of GIC have developed a significant network of relations with a number of dignitaries in the countries of the Sahel.

Right. Also, during the past years, some of these "former diplomats, soldiers, and members of ONG" apparently made sure to bookmark http://w-sahara.blogspot.com. And why shouldn't they? After skimming some of their Maghreb intelligence, I've come to the conclusion that the more they copy-paste, the better for everyone. In fact, I recommend them to swipe my Touareg material too, if they haven't already.

[picture: jorge mathias, on an undercover mission with his laptop]

The Very, Very, Very Moroccan Sahara

Preliminary results from the Moroccan elections are in, after a completely transparent polling process -- and who could have guessed?

The minister made it clear that although the turnout was only 37%, that is 5 million and 700 thousand voters out of the 15,510,505 eligible ones, it can be considered as “normal” in comparison with the average rate in different countries.

He noted that the turnout was higher in the Moroccan Southern provinces (Sahara) where it reached up to 62% in the province of Oued Eddahab (formerly known as Rio de Oro). Such a turnout, he explained, is a clear evidence of the Southern populations’ commitment to their “Moroccanity” and their involvement in the democratic process under way in the Kingdom.

Not only are the Sahrawis Moroccan, they are nearly 70% more Moroccan than Moroccans themselves!

[picture: yes, the guy on the right is also moroccan]

Link dump: mostly Moroccan elections

The Moroccan polls are closed and votes are being counted. [UPDATE: preliminary results are in] While waiting for a clearer picture & more time to post, here's a couple of links to keep you occupied:

[picture: via bakchich]

• The Big Question, how the house Islamist PJD would do, is nearing an answer. Good but not great, according to preliminary results. [UPDATE: surprisingly and rather suspiciously, despite being widely considered the largest party, they polled second after the nationalist Istiqlal party]
  

• However, overall turnout was miserably low, just like in the Algerian elections -- a total of 41% of the registered voters participated, which makes just below a third of the entire voting-age population. The regime thought this "normal", of course, but Maghreb voters seem to be very much in agreement: if their self-appointed rulers want sham elections, they can do the voting themselves. [UPDATE: participation rate lowered to 37%]
  

• Sharp Moroccan commentator Ibn Kafka posts about the elections in French on his own blog and in English on `Aqoul.

• Some election propaganda of the parties can be found scanned and analysed at La tractothèque (in French).
  

• Poverty and corruption will affect any election result, and this is no less the case in Morocco. Reuters reported well on how this works in rural Morocco, where royal favorite Fouad Ali El Himma was campaigning for a seat in parliament (earlier comment here); see also their view of the mood in the shantytowns. An al-Jazeera English report on Moroccan street children also helps to frame the socio-economic factor.
  

• The Youtube Saga continues. Here's a brief report on the Editor's Weblog on Internet activism for free speech in Morocco.

• The Minurso's Western Sahara confidence building measures, i.e. family exchanges and phone calls between Sahrawis on the two sides, are in danger of being cut because foreign donors won't pay. A minimal sum for a major humanitarian initiative, that is also helping to create civil society contacts over the two sides of the berm, but no none bothers to pay. Sad.

• On the Touareg uprising in Niger and Mali, that I've written about before: a BBC background.

• Algeria has had two nasty suicide attacks in a couple of days, one in Batna and apparently directed at the president (but he was nowhere near) and another in Dellys against naval barracks. Attacks and military-Islamist skirmishes happen in Algeria at least once a week, and are normally confined to certain districts (mountainous areas of Kabylia, essentially). But suicide attacks in populated areas have until recently been extremely rare, and many tie them to the GSPC's conversion into a local branch of al-Qaida, speculating that more extremist factions of the leadership have seized control.

RSF: 'Fear and self-censorship reign'

[pictures: time to pick your public persona]

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has sent a letter to king Mohamed VI in the run-up to the Moroccan elections. The hopeful and cautiously positive tone that the organization has consistently employed towards Morocco since the king's enthronement in 1999, has now for the first time vanished completely. It's a sign of something more than just the RSF's outrage at the press crackdowns of the past year: it's the first cold chills of a honey-moon coming to end.

The world's politicians and media has referred to Mohamed VI as Morocco's "young king" for more than eight years now. Still in 2007 people will occasionally label him the "new king". One can understand why, of course: his first years were truly impressive in their rapid opening-up of Hassan II's four-decade long, paranoid and archaic one-man rule. So, by the standards his daddy set, M6 is both young and new.

But by any other standard, he is not: as the years passed, this young king lost his boyish charm, to become the Macauley Culkin of reformer kings. And in the end, there's really nothing that wrecks your reformist image as much as being a dictator. In the words of the RSF:

Since you became king, no fewer than 34 news media have been censored and 20 journalists have been given prison sentences under the press law, the criminal code or the anti-terrorist law. [ . . . ]

We would like to sound the alarm. Morocco is on a dangerous slope. And you are responsible for this. The imprisonment of journalists, which we thought was a thing of the past, is once again a reality. More and more issues of newspapers are being seized. One grotesque trial follows another. Fear and self-censorship reign. The forward march that you advocated has come to a complete halt. [ . . . ]

You keep repeating that you are the guarantor of the constitution and of collective and individual freedoms, so it is up to you to ensure that Morocco finally takes the road of reform that has been promised for so many years.

At this moment in their history, the Moroccan media could move suddenly in either direction, for better or for worse. Their destiny is in your hands. You have the power and, we dare to hope, the desire to protect this profession, to work on behalf of its emancipation and to help to break down the barriers holding back its development. The key to this, before anything else, is reform of the laws governing the work of the press. The self-censorship that continues to prevail is a direct result of the refusal by those running the country, under your authority, to decriminalize press offences.

Morocco’s journalists have helped enormously to write this new chapter of the kingdom’s history that your years in power represent. You cannot continue to allow them to be treated with such contempt. You must act.

Respectfully,

Robert Ménard
Reporters Without Borders secretary-general

Major Polisario dissident returns

[2007-09-17: post re-edited for accuracy]

One of the most prominent defectors from the Polisario Front, a long-time critic of secretary-general Mohamed Abdelaziz and a hardliner on Morocco, now seems to have returned to the organization after eight years of estrangement from it.

[picture: not forgotten. sahrawi woman holding a portrait of el ouali mustafa sayyed]

Baba Mustafa Sayyed, brother of the Front's semi-legendary first leader El Ouali Mustafa Sayyed, dropped out of the Sahrawi organization in 1998*, after 25 years in its upper echelons. While resident in Canada as the Front's official spokesman, he sought asylum from what he claimed was political persecution within Polisario, and described the organization as being "in an advanced state of decay" under the "mediocre" leadership of Mohamed Abdelaziz. But unlike other prominent defectors like Lahbib and Hadrami, who both cast their lot with Morocco -- and were lavishly rewarded for it -- he remained a staunch Sahrawi nationalist. His prolific writings on the ARSO opinion forum (in French) seem divided about equally between reliving the good old days of factional quarrel, and railing against Moroccan occupation and Polisario's appeasement of it. For good measure, he also shook his fist at the Khat al-Shahid oppositional faction which claims the mantle of his fallen brother; despite their pro-war posture, he deemed them soft on occupation. But now Baba Sayyed seems to have made his peace with the Polisario establishment, decay and all.
[picture: the late el ouali mustafa sayyed, brother of baba]
In April this year, he declared that he will suspend his criticism of the Polisario leadership, both because friends had told him he was being unfair, and because he had become convinced that closing ranks against the Moroccan occupation ("which will forever remain the true enemy") was now necessary -- partly because of these appointments, it seems. Instead, after an eight-year absence, he would be returning to the refugee camps in Tindouf. On his return, he was swiftly brought back into the corridors of power by a presidential appointment to the preparatory committee for the Polisario Front's XII General Popular Congress, and other perks, resulting in some unpleasant flak at his old forum of choice.

[picture: the very old guard. from left to right, brahim ghali, mohamed abdelaziz, el bachir mustafa sayyed, just over 20 years ago]

The GPC, a giant summit mixing directly and indirectly elected officials from the refugee camps, with delegates from the military, youth, women and other factions of Polisario, serves as the organization's supreme decision-making body, and it is there that all high-level staff is elected (or, as the case has often been, re-elected). The next one, number twelve, will be convened in Tifariti (on Polisario's side of the berm in Western Sahara) in October, after a one-year postponement. Postponing the normally triannual GPC for one year, and one year only, is within the rights of the National Secretariat, the governing body which runs everyday business. But it was apparently badly received by malcontent members of the organization, who saw it as a sign that no further political opening was forthcoming, despite increasing protest and fissures provoked by Abdelaziz's less-than-transparent ruling style. One should certainly expect the secretary-general (and RASD president) to be reelected by a wide margin, whatever the other arrangements at the congress -- but absent some other form of political reform or shake-ups in the power structure, then "decay" may very well be the proper word for Polisario's organizational state.

[picture: brahim ghali, today polisario's top rep in spain]

How Baba Sayyed's return to the embrace of the sec-gen is to be interpreted remains a mystery, but having both the surviving brothers of El Ouali back in the organization's top ranks must certainly mean something for its supporters. And for its opponents, the return of such an intransigent hardliner may be no less of a signal.
[picture (above): mohamed abdelaziz today, comfortably seated in the presidential office]
[picture (below): the other brother, el bachir mustafa sayyed, on a bad hair day]

* ) His other brother, El Bachir Mustafa Sayyed,
did not, contrary to Moroccan claims. Rather, he
remains a top-level leader in the organization, and
is presently minister of education for the Sahrawi
republic.

Good news every day

Welcome, kids -- now please turn off your cell phones and get seated. Today's lecture will examine the uniquely self-sufficient eco-system of the North African state media, as a possible model for how to cut down on energy-wasting investigative journalism, in the face of increasing global celebrity gossip.

While the phenomenon of the press-as-echo-chamber is thriving in all the states of the Maghreb, as well as among the region's political parties and certain, ahem, independence movements, nowhere are these self-supporting news-production mechanisms as visible to the naked eye, as they are in the official Moroccan discourse on Western Sahara.

[picture: cool towards the independent press, that is]

Consider the following sample:

1. Realizing that the question of the Sahara is far too important for la foule to get involved, the Moroccan regime bans all dissident voices, and orders its state press to restrict itself to reporting any and all instances of international support for the government's strategy.
2. Former US diplomat Edward M. Gabriel is hired as a registered lobbyist to publicize the autonomy proposal that the Moroccan foreign ministry is presently pimping. He does so by pleading in US news outlets, repeatedly quoting the Moroccan state media's traditional propaganda lingo ad verbatim, but without mentioning who his employer is.
   
3. Back in Morocco, the state news agency immediately headlines with "Sahara issue: Morocco's autonomy proposal 'realistic solution', US diplomat". Still no mention of who pays for his opinions.
   
4. Return to point 1.

As you can see, a perfectly self-supporting system for news production, further enhanced by systematic repetition online. For other examples, see:

• International Federation for Autonomy in the Sahara
• Families of Sahrawi Victims of Repression in Tindouf Camps (PASVERTI)
• Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS)
  
• Frederick Vreeland
  
• European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) and Claude Moniquet

UPDATE: The Gabriel article has now been amended to disclose that "Edward M. Gabriel is a former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco and a consultant to the Moroccan government" -- such is the awesome power of the Western Sahara blogosphere.

The refugee children

One of the most depressing aspects of the Western Sahara conflict is the situation of children growing up in the refugee camps, with virtually no hope for a decent future. After thirty-two years, whole generations have lived their entire lives there in the dusty camps of Tindouf, in exile and conditions of half-starvation, whether in war or peace. Among the few bright spots of the lives of these children are the annual trips abroad organized by various solidarity organizations, mainly in Spain, but also other countries, like France, Italy, Switzerland, the USA, and (other parts of) Algeria. Between them, they bring nearly ten thousand Sahrawi kids over the Mediterranean each year, to spend the summer with host families and escape the Saharan heat for a couple of weeks or months. Because of the small size of the refugee community, almost all today's Sahrawi refugee children have had this opportunity, often more than once. For them, it's an opportunity to leave the desert, and experience forests, cities, lakes, the sea and other things they've only heard about before, to spend time with European kids their age, practice their Spanish, and perhaps to get summer schooling or medical treatment.

Published on the ARSO opinions page, a Sahrawi who grew up in the Moroccan-controlled territories writes about his experience working with Sahrawi children from the refugee camps, who spend their summers with a French scout association (hasty translation by WSI). One is of course free to disagree with his support for an independent Western Sahara, but whatever side one supports in this conflict, if any, it gives some valuable insight into the life of Sahrawi refugee children, and the importance of these brief escapes abroad:

Two months of freedom for exiled children

by Tayab Bougraimez

By a Sahrawi who grew up in the occupied zones of Western Sahara, and who presently lives in France. A Sahrawi who, before passing every summer with the French boy and girl scouts of the Paul Emile Victor de Loon-Plage group, had never had any contact with his compatriots in the refugee camps of Tindouf.

Moments spent, every year, with my little Sahrawi brothers and my comrades, the scouts, are unique and unforgettable. They are moments of freedom and happiness.

Today, like every year, when seeing the smiles on the faces of little Sahrawis, it gives me incredible joy and great pride. These little refugees have the occasion to know, to discover and practice so many new activities, like the pool, the beach, the river, and many maritime activities like the canoe, the boat, and the pedal-boat, and to pass pleasant days in the beautiful regions of France. They often picnic together with our French boy- and girlfriends. And, not to forget, the roller, and the impressive days full of adventure, for all, in Bagatelle Park.

Myself, sometimes as interpreter and companion, but also as brother and friend of these little children, I feel the innocence in their words and the love in their hearts.

This unique experience is not unimportant, as I am often reminded of. Like when Taoufa compares France with the camps, and she tells me, with an unhappy look, that “the difference between these two countries, it’s like I put my left hand in the water, and my right hand in the fire”. Or when Badabada, nine years old, who doesn’t hide his joy and happiness in receiving his second present in nine years of his life, says “my first gift, that’s my trip to France, and my second gift, that’s the beautiful mountain bike that I got, not to mention the presents that our father Christian and the whole big family of scouts keeps giving us every day”.

I’m proud of these little children, who are already beginning to know some French phrases, like bonjour, ça va, merci, je t’aime, comment tu t’appelles [1], and who know all the first names of the members of the group. They have a thirst for knowledge, for discovery. These children robbed of happiness and of their childhood, love to discover our way of life, a world of freedom.

Many children who live in peace and know liberty, dream of having a castle, a nice car, lots of toys, a swimming pool … while the Sahrawi children dream only of one thing, which is to grow up in their land (Western Sahara), free and independent.

All this hurts me, touches me, because I see the childhood of my Sahrawi brethren, spoilt, lost and with a dark future. I suffer in particular when I see their drawings, where one sees nothing except tents, camels, sand and a flag, the one that their families are hoping for since 30 years.

One day I asked the same question to a young Sahrawi and a [French] boy scout: “what do you want to work with in the future?”. Thibault answered that he wanted to become an engineer to construct playgrounds and football stadiums, while Bachir, he wanted to become a soldier to liberate and protect his country. I was speechless. One cannot and one must not stay insensitive hearing such words coming from the mouth of an eight-year old.

Thirty years ago, the battles began, and it is already thirty years that my people has been suffering and divided, all this with no reaction from the world. They know the problem, they see it, but do nothing.

Right now, manifestations and violence is taking place in the occupied zones, which are fighting their own battle. The world can thus see the real face of the Moroccan government, which is lynching Sahrawi students, imprisoning journalists and intellectuals because they have dared to side with or speak of the Sahrawi problem openly. They dare talk and dream of peace, their will to be free and independent on their land.

Give us your hand,

Reach out to us,

For a better tomorrow,

For everyone!

-- Tayeb Bougraimez 02.09.07

[1] Hello, how are you, thank you, I love you, what's your name.

Re: urgent investment proposal

Ech Chorouk El Youmi has discovered another plot against the Popular Republic:

African networks send e-mails to cheat Algerians
on Saturday, September 01 @ 19:00:00 CDT
Algeria’s security services have warned against e-mails that contain information about rich heirs looking for someone who can deal with huge sums of money in return for commission. [...]

Consider yourself warned! And African networks, beware: despite the death of Mr. Lamari, the ever-vigilant men of the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité are on to your evil schemes. But it doesn't end there: can you guess who also got hit?

Azawad watch

I mentioned in passing the growing Touareg unrest in northern Niger, back in May (and the Head Heeb had the nuts and bolts of it). It seems now that it has evolved into a rather serious rebellion, which by necessity will come to involve Algeria, since it takes place right at its south-east border, and probably to some extent across it too. And there's also the connection to increasing trouble on Algeria's south-western border, with Mali.

[picture: algerian touareg]

Not that this is in any way, shape or form related to the Western Sahara question, but once this blog started following Touareg affairs -- or at least keeping a lazy eye on them -- there's no stopping it. And it is significant, in one way: it is closely tied to the role Algeria is trying to carve out for itself as a Major Power of the western Sahara and Sahel states, something which in itself has implications for its relationship with Morocco and in Western Sahara, and with others who affect that issue, such as the US and France. Certainly, if Algeria gains leverage in a region that the US attaches such great attention to, that will affect other aspects of its diplomacy (how is another matter).

Mali 2006: Pax Algeriana
[picture: it's easy when you're big in kidal]
Last year, remember, Algeria was involved in negotiating a peace agreement between Mali and its northern Touaregs, through what seemed like rather heavy-handed diplomacy. The final treaty legalized the revolutionaries of the Alliance démocratique du 23 mai pour changement as a sort of special-status commando units, supposed to act against "all foreign forces" in the borderlands where Algeria's GSPC/al-Qaida had been hiding out. That is, they were essentially, and nota bene willingly, turned into an Algerian proxy. The strategy seems to have been reasonably successful: not only did it stop the nascent Kidali rebellion, Algeria has also been making headway against the al-Qaida units in the south, after the Touareg demonstrated their intent by starting a couple of skirmishes with the Islamists. The southern GSPC front has long been run by its (in-)famous "emir", Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and is perhaps more smuggling racket than al-Qaida venture. However, there are recurring rumors about negotiations with Belmokhtar for his surrender under Bouteflika's amnesty deal, and one of his top liutenants recently gave up his arms and came in from the cold. El Khabar would have us believe that Belmokhtar himself has now also opted for the quiet life, but simultaneously points to the messy tribal character of politics in the deep Sahara, with splinter groups among the Touareg rebels lining up against the state again, and, say some, with the GSPC. Led by one Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, formerly a big shot in the Alliance démocratique, and with support from the Touareg rebels in Niger, they have been at odds with the central government and the treaty for some time. Now they have been joined by a top leader of the ex-rebellion in Mali: Hassan Fagaga, the former lieutenant-colonel in the Malian army whose defection set off the Alliance démocratique uprising, and who was supposed to head the "special commandoes" created to do Algeria's bidding in the borderlands. There is a real risk that the peace deal could break apart because of this, and skirmishing has already started. The Alliance démocratique mainstream, or whatever remains of it, has disavowed any ties to the Niger uprising and asked Nigérien Touaregs to mind their own business, but confusion evidently reigns in the Malian Touareg ranks.

Niger 2007: The Atomic Touareg

In neighbouring Niger, a Mouvement des nigériens pour la justice (MNJ) has been set up by Touareg malcontents to claim a bigger slice of the pie -- or the cake, perhaps. Northern Niger is doing well off yellowcake uranium extraction (yes, that yellowcake), and the Touraeg do not feel they're getting their share. Armed rebellion is the only thing that seems to have worked for them in the past, due to the character of Nigérien politics, so that's what they're at again. After Bahanga's faction of the former Alliance démocratique struck a pact with the MNJ, they seem hellbent on restarting the Kidali troubles, as an extension of the revolt in Niger.

[picture: poker face]

I noted before that Algeria, flying high on oil, gas and relative peace, has been aiming to cement its role as a regional power under Bouteflika. It could well be interested in strengthening its influence in Niger too, as a sort of reprise of the Malian deal -- and even if the GSPC is not as acute a problem there, they have been moving in the territories. Then again, there are more pressing problems at home to think of. However, even if it did not want to, Algeria may in fact be forced to involve itself: the lack of a real border between Mali's and Niger's Touareg groups means that the 2006 peace accords in Mali, and by extension Algeria's arrangements in its south-western border regions (and its political standing), could hinge on peace in Niger as well.

Don't push, there's bedouins for everybody

[picture: count me in!]

To complicate things further, it is far from clear what exactly is going on in Niger. Apart from the usual social and economic grievances of the under-developed Touareg north, and willy-nilly repression from their cleptocratic government, there have been persistent accusations from the Nigérien rulers that French mining companies are somehow involved in stoking the uprising, to put pressure on the government in trade negotiations. (And of course, every rebel's best friend, the Dear Brother Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, who recently declared himself tribal chief of all Touaregs, had to get in on a corner as well: he is now suing Nigérien newspapers for reporting his support of the uprising. Sound familiar?)

Is this all just scapegoating or does it hold a grain of truth? Or both? Also, there's the larger picture of global warming slowly unraveling the pastoralist-farmer balance through the whole Sahel, and of arms, refugees and political chaos drifting in all the way from Darfur, presently the black hole of the eastern Sahara.

All in all, as good a demonstration as any of how interlocked the conflicts of the Sahara are -- and then I haven't even mentioned Algeria's own Touareg minority -- which, some say, col. Qadhafi has quietly been urging to form an independent state. If the fighting continues to heat up, and if Algeria isn't too busy working out succession issues in its military-political hierarchy, expect increased involvement in both Mali and Niger, as those two conflicts are slowly merging into one. With important leaders of the former Touareg rebellion in Mali back fighting the state, partly, it seems, because what happened in Niger, Algeria's peace deal now seems all but dead unless order is restored quickly. It remains to see if the Touareg insurgents may draw the remaining Islamist militants in southern Algeria into their orbit; Algeria will certainly want to crack down to prevent that. But how, if the revolt in Niger continues to seep across the border with Mali?

To be continued, I'm sure.

[updated to include the defection of hassan fagaga]