UN SC resolution, as expected. [updated]

Full text here. No news, so no comment.

[picture: john bolton, pointing fingers]

UPDATE: No, still no comment. But do read the Inner City Press, because there you'll find not only videos from the press conferences, but also an interesting excerpt from John Bolton's new book, where he apparently devotes some three pages to Western Sahara. In it, he attacks the Bush administration's new stance as anti-, or at least un-democratic, and blames it on the dastardly Mr. Kenilworth. (The article's author, Matthew Russell Lee, is also a name that turns up just about everywhere: it was he who wrote about the corruption scandal that tainted a certain Philippe Elghouayel.)

Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition, Part II [updated]

Continued from Part I, and see also Sahara Watch:

[picture: no extradition, no coup d'état, capisce?]

International Herald Tribune, Oct. 30, 2007, published this AP release:

A leading Spanish anti-terrorism judge is to open an inquest into suspected atrocities committed against North African Saharawi people, a court statement said Tuesday.

The offenses, which include genocide, assassination, injury and torture, are believed to have taken place in the mid-1970s, when Spain withdrew from its former colony of Western Sahara, a statement by National Court judge Baltasar Garzon said.

Spain abandoned the territory following the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 and Morocco then invaded.

"An attempt at genocide did happen and this inquest is important because the Saharawi people ask for justice," said Mohamed Sidati, Polisario Front Minister-Delegate for Europe. The Polisario Front supports self-determination for the Saharawi people.

Garzon is to probe whether sufficient evidence exists to prosecute 13 Moroccan citizens suspected of having carried out crimes during and after the territorial annexation.

"It's time the Saharawi people's fate was finally talked about," said Jose Taboada, a support group spokesman.

Spain's so-called universal justice principle — established by the National Court in 1998 — allows courts here the legal right to prosecute crimes alleged to have been committed in other countries.

Garzon used it in a vain attempt to try former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for genocide and other crimes in his country. Britain, which had arrested Pinochet in London on a Spanish warrant, declined to extradite Pinochet, citing his poor health.

The principle, part of a growing body of international law, also underpinned a trial in Madrid that convicted Imad Yarkas, a suspected al-Qaida cell leader.

Yarkas was sentenced to 27 years in prison for conspiracy and heading a terrorist organization linked with the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

Garzon has called witnesses to begin giving evidence on Dec. 11-12, the statement said.

Several previous inquests into suspected crimes against the Saharawi people have been shelved for lack of evidence said Maria Jose Fisac, a lawyer linked to Saharawi legal cases.

And there you go. A few comments. First, the most spectacular charge, that of genocide, probably will not stick. Even in the unlikely event that one found evidence of genocide (or more likely, attempted genocide) in some part of Western Sahara during the invasion, the court will still need to prove intent on the part of the responsible authorities, as well as establish a chain of command that links the accused with the soldiers doing the actual bombing, kidnapping and shooting. None of that is realistically possible as long as the Moroccan government side refuses to testify, which it will do whether guilty or not. (This is precisely why was so difficult to convict extradited Serbian war criminals, even after it had been established that genocide did take place in Srebrenica: the prosecutors found it exceedingly hard to prove that an order for mass killings had been communicated and understood from top to bottom.)

However, the less newsworthy charges of murder, torture and kidnappings are not at all as hard to prove. There's tons of evidence of atrocities in the Western Sahara -- thanks to Sahrawi activists, as well as Amnesty International and other human rights groups -- and there are plenty of witnesses and victims who are already abroad, in Spain, France and of course Algeria and Mauritania, and so can't be prevented to come to testify. That makes these seemingly less important charges even more troubling for the accused and their regime in Morocco. After all, a single murder is quite enough to convict a single murderer, and even if the court would convict only one minor figure, say a local police commander, the Moroccan government will be in a very delicate position. If it ignores the case and refuses to extradite him, it goes on record as protecting a murderer, and may face a protracted battle with Spanish justice. But if it complies, even worse: that would be taken as acknowledgement in principle that its rule in Western Sahara was installed and perpetuated through atrocious methods, and also that its officials and employees are accessible to foreign justice in the future. But of course, that's provided the investigations go as far as to trial, and nothing seems less certain right now.

On a side note, this is turning out to be general Hosni Benslimane's worst week in quite some time. Here he is, the highest-ranking general in the Moroccan army and a true pillar of the Makhzen ruling class, with his name smeared by an international genocide investigation. Then, adding injury to insult, a French judge decided just the other day to demand his arrest and extradition via Interpol, claiming he was involved in the kidnap and murder of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka, a JFK-style national trauma in Morocco that has been unsolved since 1965. These foreigners just don't have the proper respect for a man in uniform. (Full details and legal analysis of the Ben Barka case at Ibn Kafka's, in French.)

-- -- --

UPDATE: If you needed any further proof that this is a sensitive area for the gentlemen in charge in Morocco, here's plenty. The Moroccan government has publicly denounced Spain for crossing the "red lines" in their most brotherly relationship, and just recalled its ambassador from Madrid for "consultations". In addition to that, it suddenly remembered the country's old claims on Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish city-enclaves on the Moroccan coast, which were quietly and conveniently forgotten when Spain lined up behind Morocco's autonomy plan.

[picture: another apt metaphor involving the color red]

Now, there's a lesson in governmental anatomy: political amnesia is best cured by blunt force trauma to the head of the security establishment.

Much ado about nothing

Below is an interesting, unusually good though not flawless, report on the upcoming Security Council resolution, scheduled for October 31. Not much new, it seems, but the very fact that the Council nations are set to repeat their last battle is interesting. The US, France and the UK line up against -- well, basically the Third World, headed by South Africa, possibly including Russia, and with China on the sidelines. The big prize: some pointless marginal wording, with no legal meaning.

[picture: guys, would you hurry up, please?]

West, nonaligned states disagree over Sahara plans

Fri 26 Oct 2007, 19:01 GMT By Patrick Worsnip

UNITED NATIONS, Oct 26 (Reuters) - Western and non-aligned countries disagreed on Friday over rival plans for Western Sahara as the U.N. Security Council sought to spur Morocco and the territory's independence movement to negotiate seriously.

Morocco, which annexed the former Spanish colony of 260,000 people after Madrid's troops pulled out in 1975, has offered it autonomy but the Polisario Front movement is calling for a referendum with full independence as one option.

Well, Polisario and every single approved and signed peace plan, plus the latest Security Council-sponsored peace initiative (the Baker Plan), plus the entire mandate for the UN's peace-keeping mission -- but yes, Polisario. Carry on.

As the Security Council began discussions on renewing the mandate of U.N. peacekeepers in phosphate-rich Sahara, South Africa protested that a U.S. draft resolution openly favored Rabat's proposals over those of Algeria-based Polisario. A copy of the draft obtained by Reuters welcomes the "serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward" but merely "takes note of" Polisario's proposal.

If this is accurate, it is interesting and a bit puzzling that they won't push for a more meaningful change in the text. The Secretary-General just recently interpreted exactly this sort of wording (which was already there in the last resolution) as meaning that both plans must necessarily be discussed, however unequally they are described. That they would still spend their efforts fighting for exactly the same kind of for-show-endorsement seems more psychological warfare than actual politics. Why would the US involve itself in such petty battles, when it presumably can throw some weight around in the Council to effect real changes?

What this effectively leads to, is that South Africa and other fans of international law are spurred to fight a risk-free battle: either they manage to change the text after the US went public about it, inflicting some notable credibility loss on Morocco's great-power allies, or they don't, in which case nothing at all changes. If anyone can explain the logic to me, the comment section is all yours.

Both plans were submitted in April to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, prompting the Security Council to call on the two sides to hold talks. Two rounds were held near New York in June and August, with little progress.

"Unfortunately there's still a desperate attempt by some of the countries that support Morocco to try and make it sound like the Moroccan proposal is the answer," South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo told reporters.

"We have made it very clear that ... we want the parties to negotiate based on the two plans that were presented," he added, describing favoring the Moroccan plan as a "waste of time" that jeopardized the negotiations.

Morocco's main allies on the council are the United States and France, but Kumalo said a majority of the 15 council members called for balance in the resolution.

Western countries argue, however, that Morocco has moved from demanding that Sahara be fully integrated into its territory to agreeing to wide-ranging autonomy, while Polisario has continued to insist on an independence option.

"We have to recognize that the fact that the Moroccans came forward with this plan -- it was a new plan whereas the Polisario plan was basically their old plan -- in a sense that injected at least a momentum," one Western diplomat said.

Much-needed momentum, too, after Morocco torpedoed two successive Security Council-sponsored peace plans, wasting 16 years of the UN's efforts ... but that's for another story, apparently.

WALL OF SAND

No country recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, where a 1,500-km (940-mile) wall of sand separates Moroccan and Polisario forces.

While France is a long-standing ally of Morocco, the United States has taken Rabat's side more recently. Analysts say it wants the Sahara dispute resolved soon to aid its fight against Islamic militancy in North Africa and believes the autonomy plan offers the best solution.

Not to mention that a couple of hundred million dollars of Moroccan lobbying efforts in Washington have succeeded in completely turning the tables on Polisario, which still doesn't enjoy any serious Algerian backing where it matters -- on Capitol Hill. Right now, Morocco is pocketing an ever-increasing number of Congress members simply because there is no countervailing force: no big money to challenge them (despite the Algerian oil jackpot), and no media scrutiny whatever position they take.

And nothing wrong with that. It is how the game is played, and Morocco is simply a better player than Algeria, while Polisario are way to small & poor to compete on their own.

The council's resolution is expected to renew the mandate of some 200 U.N. military observers in the desert territory, when it expires on Wednesday, for another six months.

It is also expected to call on Morocco and the Polisario to make fresh efforts to resolve their dispute through "substantive negotiations."

A recent report by Ban said the talks so far had been disappointing, with each side sticking to "rigid positions." "It cannot really be maintained that the parties have entered into negotiations," it said.

Ban's report said each side should accept that it could at least discuss the other's proposal without that implying that it was abandoning its own.

Again, this last suggestion is the only new element since April, when the plans were presented and the resolution adopted. Not much, but that's what they're pinning their hopes on, or claiming to pin their hopes on. Absent the public optimism, at least one side is perfectly happy with having this drag on until the end of time; the other side is equally content with having the talks continue until they see who succeeds the chimp in charge in the White House, and will decide on further action then.

No date or venue has been announced for the next round of talks. Diplomats said Polisario had agreed to a proposal by U.N. mediator Peter van Walsum for the second week in November but that Morocco wanted to wait until its new government, unveiled on Oct. 15, was endorsed by parliament. They said late November or early December now looked more likely.

I thought they had agreed on Geneva? Apparently not.

UN Secretary-General's report: same old

The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has released a new report on the situtation in Western Sahara, and it's even lamer than what Kofi Annan used to produce. The short version is, as usual, that there has been absolutely no progress. He admits that there is virtually no hope of a voluntary mutual agreement, but, lacking the will to confront either party, argues that they should be given more time to squander. The only moderately interesting paragraphs are these:

[A]s these fundamental positions [of Morocco and Polisario] were mutually exclusive, they prevented each party from seriously discussing the other party’s proposal. As a result, the parties did, indeed, express their views and even interacted with one another, but they mainly did so by rejecting the views of the other party, and there was hardly any exchange that could in earnest be characterized as negotiations.

Although the fact that two meetings have taken place is a cause for satisfaction, my Personal Envoy is concerned at the deficient implementation of a unanimously adopted Security Council resolution that at the time of its adoption was hailed as a breakthrough in dealing with the question of Western Sahara. In the above-mentioned communiqué issued after the second meeting, the parties acknowledged that the current status quo was unacceptable, but while up to now that qualification always referred to the dilemma of either negotiations or status quo, we now risk entering a protracted stage of negotiations and status quo.

Oh, no really? We are shocked, shocked. And perplexed, because who could conceivably want negotiations to drag on forever?

It is true that the resolution is more elaborate about the Moroccan proposal than about that of
the Frente Polisario, but what matters in the end is that the Security Council has taken note of both proposals in the same resolution in which it has called upon parties to enter into negotiations. Consequently, both proposals are on the agenda and must be discussed.

This would seem a veiled rebuke of Morocco's position, which has increasingly moved towards claiming that their proposal is the only one meriting discussion. On the other hand, it doesn't mean much as long as there is "no exchange that could in earnest be characterized as negotiations".

In a half-hearted attempt to adress that point -- the core problem -- Ban Ki-moon further suggests that Morocco and Polisario should start off discussing their respective proposals under the understanding that they have accepted nothing (i.e, a variant of van Walsum's old approach, which was last stated in the curious affair of the magical mystery report). This means that Polisario should give constructive opinions on the Moroccan autonomy proposal even while remaining committed to a self-determination referendum, and that Morocco should also constructively discuss post-independence arrangements for Western Sahara, even while remaining opposed to anything but autonomy. The hope is that this would help unlock the psychological blocks, and entice Polisario into thinking seriously about autonomy. (And, theoretically, Morocco about independence; but that part is mostly for formal symmetry.)

Also, he is unusually elaborate on human rights, referring to the beatings of Sahrawi students in Morocco; complains that the funding for family visits between the camps hasn't been provided and that the program risks being cut off; and that the next step in confidence-building measures can now start, involving a non-political seminar on Hassaniyya culture between Sahrawis from the two sides.

Other stuff:

• No .eh for the Sahrawis: ICANN decided to not decide anything.
• Sparring at the UN human rights council, over its politically inspired refusal to release the 2006 report on Western Sahara. (Leaked version here.) [correction. see comments.]
  
• Continued Koalagate madness at Will's.
• A French judge requests the extradition of five Moroccans in the 1965 Ben Barka disappearance, including Makhzen mainstay and top-ranking army general Hosni Benslimane.
• French PM Sarkozy visits Morocco, restates Chirac's position and supports autonomy for Western Sahara.
• An interesting Global Voices interview with Bouba, the Moroccan-Sahrawi-Amazigh blogger.
  
• ASVDH leaders acquitted of new charges, but still in jail.
  
• Morocco again demands a full census of Sahrawis in Tindouf.
  
• More Sahrawi-whacking in the territories, now of a particularly distasteful kind.
  
• Awaiting the full RSF reports, the Algerian government keeps hounding journalists.

October SC meeting: no surprises

The Security Council Report has published an analysis of the prospects for October 31st, when the Security Council will convene to decide on the extension of Minurso. I'm sure you can guess the result, but read it anyway. Here's the meat, but there are a couple of links and interesting comments in the rest of it:

Options
Council options include:

• remaining silent on the negotiations when it renews MINURSO;
• encouraging the next round of negotiations in general terms; and
• addressing more specifically the desirability of additional confidence-building measures.

It could also consider:

• a call on member states to contribute financially to the confidence building measures (especially since UNHCR in September signaled financial difficulties for this programme); and
• expressing concern for the situation of human rights in Western Sahara, and perhaps including a human rights mandate for MINUSRO.

Key Issues
At this stage, the main issue is whether the Council should actively comment on the substantive issues. A related issue is whether it would be productive or unproductive to apply further pressure to the parties to start negotiating the substance of how to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

To clarify, the part about additional confidence-building measures was supported by Polisario last time around, but opposed by Morocco. Morocco also wants to move to substance on negotiations, interpreting this to be a step towards discussing (only) its autonomy plan, while Polisario will do that only on condition that all proposals remain on the table for discussion, including most particularly, of course, their own.

The human rights mandate for Minurso is a longstanding Polisario demand, the point of which is to give Minurso the right and duty to station human rights monitors both in the refugee camps and in the Moroccan-controlled zones, and let them publicize what they find. This is anathema for Morocco (take a wild guess why), and was duly slapped down by France on the kingdom's behalf when it entered Council discussions last. Even the US, which is otherwise firmly in the king's camp these days, apparently felt uneasy about what's going down in the territories, but Le Quai d'Orsay showed no such squeamishness, and single-handedly stopped the proposal by threatening to veto it.

So, the best guess is that it won't happen this time either. And on the negotiations front, same thing there -- same thing as always, barring actual political developments, or a show of force somewhere. The next round of Morocco-Polisario talks is expected soon in Geneva, instead of Manhasset, NY, but apart from the venue, don't expect much else to change.

Over at Will's place, however, there's all the action you could wish for. Think Koalas, slavery, shady lobbyist fronts, and Libyan Green Book-fanatics, and you haven't heard the half of it. In less than 48 hours, the Western Sahara boy wonder has all but imploded one of the Rabat-Washington lobby's ubiquitous "human rights groups" by making all four members of its advisory board flee in horror, one by one, when they realized what they'd put their names on.

RSF Press Freedom Index

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has released its 2007 edition of their Press Freedom Index. These rankings may not always be the most scientific way to describe politics, but they sure are fun. While the full reports are not out yet, the Maghreb ranking is as follows:

• Mauritania: 50 (up 27)
• Morocco: 106 (down 9)
• Algeria: 123 (up 3)
• Tunisia: 145 (up 3)
• Libya: 155 (down 3)
  

The total number of countries and territories ranked is 169, a slot held by Eritrea in cutthroat competition with North Korea. The Nordic countries, headed by Iceland, crowd the other end of the list, along with other European nations.

Annoyingly, Western Sahara remains fully included in the Moroccan score. Moroccans may like it that way, but it contrasts sharply with how Israel and the USA are treated. In those cases, both are awarded separate categories for their actions outside of recognized national territory, even when they (like Morocco) argue that it in fact is national territory, as does Israel in annexed East Jerusalem. Apart from the potential political implications, treating Morocco differently creates a double distortion of the score table: it pulls down a Moroccan result that should be better (consider how many of Morocco's recent press abuses have stemmed from Western Sahara), and at the same time fails to accurately depict the difficulties in reporting from Western Sahara (which are libyanesque).

Why the RSF treats extra-territorial press abuse differently for different countries is a mystery in itself: until recently, it would not even draw a line between Western Sahara and Morocco on its map (now they have paintbrushed one in, somewhat north of where it should be), but not for not being aware of the conflict. I've been told that even a few national (non-French) RSF branches have reacted and asked for this to be corrected -- or if not, explained -- but to no avail. Readers are free to speculate on why this is so.

Anyway, Morocco, alone among Maghreb countries, gets special mention in the report summary this year. Echoing earlier criticisms, the RSF decries the press freedom backslide in the country this last year:

. . . Morocco’s journalists have in the past 12 months been the target of repeated attacks for which they were not prepared. Confiscation of newspaper issues, temporary closures of newspapers, summonses for questioning, imprisonment and severe sentences will leave lasting scars on the journalistic community, which is now very mistrustful of the government’s promises of reform.

Still, Mauritania's press freedom improvements seem more interesting to me, considering that the country was stuck at a miserable 138th place just two years ago. See what a little military coup can do?
[picture: solomonic justice à la RSF: morocco gets a slice of the sahara, and the sahara gets a slice of morocco]

Polisario congress approaches

2007 really was election year. First Mauritania, then Algeria, then Morocco, and now last and quite possibly least, Polisario and the Sahrawi Republic. The XII General Popular Congress is approaching fast, but not everyone is happy with the situation inside Polisario, or visavi Morocco. In fact, it seems no one is happy, but all are split over what to do about it.

[picture: mohamed abdelaziz in tifariti, at the 2003 gpc]

On the one hand, you have members of the Khat al-Shahid faction, who have said that this GPC is an absolute last opportunity to set internal reforms in motion, or they'll break with the leadership for good; and you have critics like this gentleman, who sharply criticizes ad hoc decisionmaking and corruption, but does so inside Polisario's institutional framework. On the other hand, the Polisario web seems geared towards acknowledging some errors and mistakes -- without naming names -- but at the same time stresses how far the movement has come and what a bad idea it would be to start messing up their institutions at this very critical juncture in the history of the Sahrawi people. There's certainly a grain of truth in that, but after 34 years of those very critical junctures, an internal shakeup is badly overdue. The last major power shift took place in 1988, in very unpleasant circumstances, and if the next one is to be any less gory, congress elections would be a good way to go about it.

To help release some of the steam, ARSO's opinion section has now expanded into a new blog, Sahara Opinions, where Sahrawis can air their views in the run-up to the congress. Most posts in the forum are in Spanish, some in French; some are pro-Abdelaziz and some are anti-Abdelaziz, but all are pro-independence. The fact that these debates have to be carried out through the Internet, however, is a sad testament to the lack of effective internal dialogue in the movement.

Feed the kids, please

[picture: sahrawi girls in tindouf sitting on a load of EU aid]

Meanwhile, the UN is pleading and pleading for food aid to the Sahrawi (and Mauritanian) refugees, but as usual there's zero reaction. Whether that's just donor fatigue or, as Polisario claims, a means of political pressure, shall be left for others to judge. But if history is any guide, Algeria will eventually chip in to prevent starvation, and the EU will belatedly choke up a few million euros to address its guilty conscience. And Sahrawis will make do with what little they get, for what else can they do? Such is the on-going international disgrace that is the Sahrawi refugee question.

To boldly go where no king has gone before

[picture: in the environs of assa, but not necessarily the royal landrover]

On the other side of the wall, same old, same old. But also, M6 is expected to make a trip down south, into Sahrawi territory, though it's unclear whether he'll actually be inside Moroccan-held Western Sahara. Says Tel Quel:

Sahara. The King wants to reassure

The upcoming week, Mohammed VI will undertake his fourth official tour of the South after his enthronement, to inaugurate new touristic projects. According to local sources, the Sovereign will use his visit to make a detour to Tata and Assa Zag, towns located less than 50 kilometers from the Wall, where the King has never officially set foot before. "Mohammed VI wants to reassure foreign investors, in response to repeated Polisario provocations, by proving to them through his physical presence, that this region is as secure as it could possibly be", says a source knowledgeable of Saharan affairs.

A coincidence, now that preparations are underway for a Polisario Congress just across the Berm? Maybe or maybe not. But since all sides insist that they are just going about their daily business in their proper territory, we'll leave it at that.

Oh, right, and there's a new government.

Amnesty appeals for Sabbar & Sbai

[picture: brahim sabbar, secretary-general of the sahrawi human rights group ASVDH]

The ASVDH leaders Brahim Sabbar and Ahmad Sbai remain imprisoned for human rights-work in Western Sahara, like many others. Amnesty International has repeatedly drawn attention to their case, and now does so again, when it seems that they will be kept behind bars even longer -- this time, because they have "offended the magistrates". Also affected are four other Sahrawis, Ahmed Salem Ahmeidat, Mohamed Lehbib Gasmi, El-Hafed Toubali and Abdessalam Loumadi.

Amnesty International is concerned that two Sahrawi human rights defenders, Brahim Sabbar and Ahmed Sbai, may be sentenced to further prison terms after they appeared in court on 8 October 2007 charged with “offending magistrates.” Both men are already serving prison terms imposed after they were convicted at a previous trial of “belonging to an unauthorized organisation” and “inciting violent protests.” Amnesty International considers them possible prisoners of conscience, held on account of their peaceful activities as human rights defenders and advocates of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. [...]

According to reports, the five defendants were insulted and spat at by police officers in a police van after their expulsion from the court. [...]

Brahim Sabbar and Ahmed Sbai are both members of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State, which monitors and documents current allegations of human rights violations by the Moroccan authorities and demands justice for the Sahrawis who were victims of enforced disappearance in previous decades. Brahim Sabbar was himself subjected to enforced disappearance from 1981 until his release in 1991. The Association has been unable to register officially due to politically-motivated administrative obstacles. [like CODESA - WSI]

Read the whole statement.

Arms race update

I've posted earlier about Morocco's attempts to purchase French Rafale fighter jets. This followed on the heels of Algeria's oil-fuelled $7 billion acquisition of Russian weaponry last year -- a mammoth buy that included a variety of tanks, radars and anti-air material, but most notably an entire modern air force to add to the the 70s-era MiG:s that are now in use, which were already thought to outweigh the Moroccan force. (And then they asked for seconds.) All in all, a delicate little arms race at a point where both states really ought to spend their money more wisely -- at least Morocco, since Algeria's is now making so much oil & gas money it doesn't even fit in the generals' pockets anymore.

[picture: the funky logo of the royal moroccan air force]

The Algerian rulers, and their rulers, could have any number of reasons to do this, not least that fifteen years of counter-insurgency really has worn down the country's conventional military capacity, and that it is awash in cash and on the rise generally -- as well as the opportunity it creats for the men in power to help themselves to a bit of bakshish off the top of the bill. But there also seems to be an element of Reaganite arms racing involved. Algeria knows very well that Morocco can't keep up, but is under political pressure to try anyway. Otherwise, it risks being reduced to military insignificance compared to its neighbour, and to lose accordingly in influence with outside supporters (USA, France), when Algeria emerges as the Maghrebi security hegemon. Whether such a scheme will work is another matter, considering the gross inefficiency of the Algerian system, but as far as permanent rivalry goes, it's a decent if costly long-term plan. It would also constrain Morocco's freedom of action in regard to Western Sahara, while giving Algeria increased bullying-room that it could use to Polisario's benefit, instead of just holding the fort. Another little-talked-about factor is Libya, which is making the same kind of money, and also spends much of it on guns -- not necessarily something Algeria is entirely comfortable with.

[picture: algerian air force: yes, it's a lot bigger]

Anyway, the story back then was that Saudi Arabia was prepared to foot the bill for Morocco's airforce upgrade, in a beautiful show of king-to-king solidarity (and reminiscent of earlier guns-for-wahhabis deals). But then the Guardian of the Two Holies got cold feet: as it turns out, modern fighter jets are really very expensive.

Now it seems that Morocco is eyeing an American offer of F-16:s instead, mainly, and understandably so, because they are cheaper. (There are important financial needs to attend to, you recall.) However, large arms purchases also tend to mix with political considerations, and there could very well be an element of courtship for the US arms industry involved here -- especially since that is an industry not so far removed from the Bush dynasty and its supporters. We'll see what happens.

Born in blood

The El Aaiún-based human rights organization CODESA, led by Sahrawi pro-independence luminaries such as Ali Salem Tamek and Aminatou Haidar, has announced the holding of a constitutive congress, to formally legitimize the organization in accordance with Moroccan law. As could have been expected, this was frustrated by the authorities, who refused to receive their documents and then threatened the owner of the venue for the congress to kick them out. The meeting is therefore temporarily adjourned, but count on another attempt soon enough: finding a suitable congress hall will presumably not prove a huge problem for a people so proud of their traditional tents and vast, uninhabited deserts.

[picture: for the dead letter office: some CODESA registration paperwork]

The point of this exercise is not so much to gain the kind permission of the Moroccan authorities, but rather to work within the law and refuse them an opportunity to crack down and put members away in jail, as regularly happens. It also puts the Moroccan public discourse to the test, that Sahrawis enjoy the same civil liberties as everyone else -- to the extent anyone does -- and should be content with their lot as Moroccan citizens.

[picture: aminatou haidar in her blood-soaked melhfa after torture in 2005. she was then arrested on arrival to the hospital.]

As anyone interested in the issue knows -- and Freedom House amply demonstrates -- they do not. Morocco has progessed considerably since the "years of lead", but in Western Sahara, the old game is still on. Not only are the elections in Western Sahara a complete sham, unlike in Morocco proper, where they are just a half-sham; a Sahrawi activist can also count on far harsher treatment and virtually no support from Moroccan civil society. At present, for example, seven members of the big Moroccan human rights organization AMDH are imprisoned for somehow verbally "undermining the monarchy", to the great and completely justified indignation of most human rights-minded Moroccans (as well as the present author). At the same time, however, Sahrawi protesters have been beaten and abused, and handed down senteces of one, two, three or even ten years, in flagrantly fraudulent trials, with nary a peep from anyone except other Sahrawis.* Regardless of what explains this attitude -- fear of the authorities, hatred of the "separatists", lack of knowledge due to media self-censorship -- it means that Sahrawis watch their friends and families brutalized and locked up, and find that the high-minded Moroccan rhetoric about Sahrawi-Moroccan unity and brotherhood isn't worth a dirham when push comes to shove.

[picture: ali salem tamek, taken sometime between jail sentences]

The results are predictably self-defeating for Morocco, and has midwifed an entirely self-sustaining Sahrawi resistance mentality, which appears to have brought even many previously pro-Rabat Sahrawis in Morocco's uncontested southern end around to Polisario's point of view. The most recent wave of nationalism is led by the generation of Sahrawi refuseniks that graduated in 1991 from the academies of Qalaat Mgouna or Lekhal, to name but a few of king Hassan's torture dungeons, and to which both Tamek and Haidar belong. Even more than marked by their experiences, they are made by them: if you wonder why so many of these activists seem to wear glasses, it's not a fashion statement, but because they had their eyesight damaged by being blindfolded for years on end; if you wonder how they got to know each other, it was in jail; and if you wonder how they can have so much free time to campaign for self-determination, it's because they've all been fired from their jobs. It's a familiar story of how repression breeds resistance, which breeds repression, and on it goes.

This emerging Sahrawi leadership in the Moroccan-held territories is a generation lost to Rabat: their experience of Morocco is certainly not that of brotherhood and national unity, but of violence, marginalization and destruction, and they view their Sahrawiness not in light of the official discourse of multicultural Morocco, but as forged in resistance and repression. And the youth aren't all that different. Popular Sahrawi history and national pride has been carried on the shoulders of those who fought and died for it, not by Khellihenna Ould Errachid and the other Sahrawi middlemen of what remains and will remain undiluted royal and army rule, regardless of the chatter about autonomy. It is certainly no coincidence that CODESA holds its congress in memory of one of these "national martyrs" -- El Hafez Hamma Mbarek, a tradesman from Smara who was "disappeared" by the Royal Gendarmerie in 1976.**

[picture: el hafez hamma mbarek, 1937 - 1976?]

But the Moroccan authorities persist in shutting off all legal and nonviolent routes for Sahrawi protest. In 2004, the Saharan branch of the Forum for Truth and Justice, a Moroccan human rights organization, was dissolved and its members jailed (among them Tamek), while other branches were left in place. Another Sahrawi human rights group, ASVDH, has been refused permission to work. Most if its leadership, including Brahim Sabbar and Ahmed Sbai, are in jail for "belonging to an illegal organization" among other thought crimes.

[picture: interior of lekhal, the black prison, in el aaiún.]

So, CODESA's quest for a place in the Moroccan association registers seems not just doomed to fail, but practically suicidal too. But what are the alternatives? And besides, both Tamek and Haidar has won such wide international recognition -- they are being showered with minor human rights awards, and more and more often nominated for bigger ones -- that the government will have to think twice before jailing them again, and the same goes for some of the other activists. But the smaller fry can expect retribution: even if the Moroccan government can't find the place for a single Sahrawi human rights organization, there'll always be plenty of room in the Black Prison of El Aaiún. And on it goes.

-- -- --

(*) A Moroccan exception is the tiny far-left Nahdj Dimouqrati party, which has made support of Sahrawis a point of doctrine. While they may or may not be enthousiastic about the possibility of Western Sahara's independence, they vocally support self-determination as part of international law, and were treated to an unbelieavable amount of state violence for that in the 1970s and 80s (then in their previous, illegal incarnation, as Ilal Amam). The leadership is today dominated by scarred veterans of Moroccan prisons and exile, with plenty of martyr mourning for those who never made it out alive.

As for Sahrawi protesters, the record holder is of course Polisario's secretary-general Mohamed Abdelaziz, who has probably sent more protest letters to his UN homologue than any other now living person.

(**) In total, according to FIDH, up to 1,500 Sahrawi civilians were still "disappeared" in the year 2000, while the Sahrawi rights group AFAPREDESA sticks to a list of some 450 documented still-missing cases, even if they admit that many more probably exist. Most of them were taken in the early years of the occupation, but the practice continued into the 1990s. Some were eventually released (like Aminatou Haidar or Brahim Sabbar), others declared dead after a few decades, and still others quietly left to exile after escaping prison. Several thousands more were arrested for shorter periods of time; Polisario claims even higher figures, while Morocco says no one is still disappeared, and is believed by exactly as many.

Considering how the Sahrawi population in Western Sahara and southern Morocco around 1980 can not have been far higher than 40-50,000 or so (and the male population, which took the brunt of the onslaught, half of that), the proportions that these numbers add up to are truly staggering. Include the war dead and the still unaccounted for Sahrawi POWs, as well as the fact that Sahrawi families are very large, and you will realize that virtually every Sahrawi family was decimated by the violence, just as they all have family members in the Tindouf camps. Sahrawi society remains profoundly shellshocked by the brutality of those years, and this goes a long way towards explaining why Polisario remains insistent that what happened in 1975 was not merely an occupation, it was genocide. It also, heartbreakingly, means that many Sahrawis remain convinced that their relatives are still lingering in some underground jail somewhere, reason be damned, and fight this battle not first for independence, but to free or at least learn the fate of their loved ones.

Master of my domain

Western Sahara may remain under Moroccan control for a while more, and the cease-fire looks robust enough, but in the war of symbolic attrition, Polisario just opened a new front. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, their government-in-exile, has made a bid for control over the .eh Internet top level domain reserved for Western Sahara on the grounds that they are the only interested party: if Western Sahara some day becomes part of Morocco, it will also share Morocco's own web domain, .ma. But, as expected, Morocco has lobbied back with a counter-claim of its own, to prevent this from happening. This has led to the embarrassing situation that .eh is the only geographic domain still without an owner. At stake is of course more than the two letters: the battle for the domain is also a way of courting an important, but often overlooked PR asset -- the nerds. Or, more to the point, people who'll be ruling the world in a couple of years.

[picture: the computer i blog from]

For more, see dot-EH, a new campaign site about the issue, and of course Will. Personally, I'm a computer jargon illiterate, to the point that I've until now been calling the domain tags "end letters", so I won't be of much help to anyone. Learning more about these things seems a truly Sisyphean task, since computer science probably evolves at about the same speed as computers -- as you might have guessed, I prefer to specialize in reliably stagnant situations. So as for the SADR's chances, you tell me.

(More on the Internet presences of Morocco and Polisario, respectively, here and here.)

Freedom House 2007 - the Maghreb

Moving on from Western Sahara, here's a short overview of Freedom House's scores for the rest of the Maghreb governments. As before, 1 is best, 7 is worst, and the first figure is Political Rights, second is Civil Rights. And as before, my oh my, they're a sorry bunch of autocrats.

• Mauritania: 5 / 4

Mauritania is up from 6 /4, following the 2005 coup, but the free elections held in 2006-07 were not in time to register in the results. So, barring disaster, the country should do considerably better next year. However, the post-coup transition has so intrigued the report writers, that they have dedicated a special Countries at the Crossroads report to Mauritania, providing a more detailed breakdown of that country's scores and human rights situation. Problems in Mauritania include an opaque ruling structure, entrenched corruption, systematic racial-tribal discrimination, and, worst of all, the fact that tens of thousands of Mauritanians are still kept in slavery.

[picture: more of that, please]

• Western Sahara: 7 / 6
  

No change, and a charter member of the Worst of the Worst list. Problems include police brutality and torture, and a total absence of governing structures reflecting political reality, i.e. non-loyalist Sahrawis being barred from all political influence and the country still effectively remaining under military occupation. The government line that Western Sahara is an integral, normal part of Morocco is undermined by how the Sahara's score is considerably and consistently worse than that of Morocco proper, pointing to the fact that while Morocco has progressed since the 1990s, Western Sahara remains an interior ministry fiefdom. (See last post.)

[picture: love and harmony in the southern provinces]

• Morocco: 5 / 4

No change. With a score indicating a badly repressive government, Morocco yet remains at the forefront of Maghrebi democratization, which unfortunately says more about Maghrebi democratization than about Morocco. Problems include the fact that the king, who despite the constitution remains virtually all-powerful, isn't subject to elections or any political scrutiny. There are also complaints of police brutality and torture especially against suspected Islamist radicals and Sahrawi nationalists, as well as the royal personality cult and constraints on press freedom. (Luckily for Morocco, these scores do not include Western Sahara, but they do include Sahrawi-populated areas of Morocco.)

[picture: even he can't change the royal dress code]

• Algeria: 6 / 5

No change in the numbers here either, but recognizing that there are changes taking place at the level of political structure -- even if unfortunately not in the human rights situation -- Freedom House has written a Countries at the Crossroads report here too, with more detailed analysis. Problems include a non-reponsive and intrigue-ridden government in which a despotically inclined president and a mafia-style military elite uneasily share power, as well as systematic abuses in the fight against the residual Islamist insurgency since the 1990s. Most of the vast human rights abuses and disappearances that occurred in the mid-90s remain unaccounted for, and new amnesty laws have had the entirely intentional side effect of banning independent attempts to investigate them.

[picture: thumbs up for a third term!]

• Tunisia: 6 / 5

No change. Steady and stable, unlike its flamboyantly violent neighbours, but rigidly autocratic on the political level. State-enforced secularism has come at the price of, well, state-enforcement. Problems include personality cult, interior ministry espionage, torture and other abuses. Positive aspects like strong womens' rights essentially rest on police surveillance and veil bans, and the media has been reduced to government-run cheerleading for the police state.

[picture: with a PR campaign like this, how could he not win the election with 94.5%?]

• Libya: 7 / 7

Yes! The Dear Brother Leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, aces both categories with a full seven for maximum repression, and joins Western Sahara among the Worst of the Worst. One of the world's most totalitarian countries, in stiff competition with North Korea, Burma and Turkmenistan, Libya remains the Maghreb's basket case extraordinaire. Problems include a gullible Western press, a cynical Western political class, and Qadhafi's deteriorating sense of fashion.

[picture: the elton john of modern tyranny]

[correction: a slight misunderstanding here. the
countries at the crossroads reports mentioned
are new, but the general scores are from freedom
in the world, which was issued earlier this year]

Freedom House 2007 Report - Western Sahara

[picture: GUSboss. got bad press, had to change his uniform]

The American democracy-rating institute Freedom House has released its 2007 survey. As always, scores are measured in two categories (political and civil rights, the first being strictly voting procedures and freedom of speech things, as well as political stability, while the second includes things like civic equality and religious freedom). Scores range from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Western Sahara under Moroccan administration ranks near the absolute bottom, with a 7/6 score, as it always has. It is also featured regularly in the Worst of the Worst reports issued by Freedom House, which pinpoints the twenty most politically repressed countries and territories in the world. Some excerpts from the new 2007 survey:

Moroccan authorities organize local elections and ensure that leaders of the Sahrawi independence movement are excluded from both local leadership and representation in the Moroccan parliament.

Morocco’s constitution guarantees press freedom but, in practice, little exists in Western Sahara. Although there were fewer reported instances of government interference with press access to Western Sahara in 2006, Moroccan authorities continue to exercise control over who enters and reports on the region. The restrictions are particularly evident when there are local riots or demonstrations against Moroccan rule. Moroccan and international reporters are subject to expulsion or detention if the government objects to their work or they enter the region without permission. [...]

Moroccan officials restrict the ability of Sahrawis to form political organizations or assemble in public places. Demonstrations and riots are a regular occurrence in Western Sahara’s towns and villages, and Moroccan authorities often arrest those involved. In October 2006, the Moroccan government disbanded the Groupements Urbains de la Surete (GUS), a security force formed in 2004 that was accused of human rights violations during riots and demonstrations in Laayoune in 2005. The force’s 5,000 members would be reassigned to other security units. [...]

Particularly during the 1961–99 reign of Morocco’s King Hassan II, the current king’s father, Sahrawis who opposed the regime were summarily detained, killed, tortured, and “disappeared.” While thousands of Moroccan dissidents suffered under Hassan’s rule, Sahrawis who defied him faced even harsher scrutiny. While the political situation is different today, Sahrawis who oppose Morocco’s sovereignty are still detained, and torture has not ceased under King Muhammad.

International human rights groups have for decades criticized the behavior of Moroccan authorities in Western Sahara. A September 2006 report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was highly critical of Morocco’s record in the territory. The report was intended to be distributed only to Algeria, Morocco, and the Polisario, but was leaked to the press in October. Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission, founded in 2004 to examine government abuses under Hassan, did not hold scheduled public hearings in Western Sahara. Few Sahrawis had the opportunity to testify publicly before the commission.

[correction: a slight misunderstanding here. the
countries at the crossroads reports mentioned
in the next post are new, but the quote here comes
from freedom in the world, issued earlier this year]