Dressing up the dead

Let's just say it: the UN secretary-general's personal envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, looks set to go down in history as the worst UN mediator in the history of the conflict. Not that anyone else has been particularly successful, given that the conflict remains unsolved after 33 years. But van Walsum isn't only failing in his mission: while on the post, he has overseen the systematic dismantling of the framework so carefully constructed by the UN over these decades, on which the ceasefire is hinged. The UN's role and power of initative has deteriorated to virtually none at all, and the peace process itself has been emptied of all content. This should be of concern to both Morocco and Polisario (and Algeria), and to all those who do not wish to see the conflict spin out of UN hands.

[picture: peter van walsum]

If we look back a bit, the UN as an organization had real influence after the 1991 ceasefire, when the whole battle moved into Minurso and the referendum process. Sure, there were all sorts of pressures from the big powers (read US and France) and neither the secretary-general nor Minurso could accomplish much without their approval. But at least the debate took place inside the UN framework, on UN terms, and it was the UN that acted as referee. Erik Jensen's memoir of his years in Minurso is dull stuff for anyone not seriously interested in the issue, but the short summary is this: Morocco and Polisario both behaved like paranoid schizophrenics, obstructing every step of the peace plan, and at least one of them had foreign backing to do it; but despite slow progress, there was progress, and we did get them to make actual deals.

Now, this is no longer the case. The Manhasset negotiations are a joke, not taken seriously by anyone involved. All important developments take place outside of the UN, in bilateral relations between Morocco and France, Morocco and the USA, Algeria and the USA, etcetera; and perhaps on playing fields such as the EU and the African Union. These decisions are then reflected in the compromises crafted in the Security Council, which will occasionally lean to and fro, but invariably tend to support the continued stalemate. The UN's only remaining tools for independent action are (1.) Minurso and (2.) whatever negotiation initiatives the secretary-general and his envoy decide to come up with. Minurso, of course, is not very relevant anymore: it has been stripped of all tasks except that of apolitical ceasefire watchdog. As for creative diplomacy, there's the secretary-general's reports, but they contain absolutely nothing of value. And then there's van Walsum's periodic forays into the region, and his own reports: his chance to make a difference. But how does he use those precious opportunities? Let's hear it from the man himself:

Chahid El Hafed (Refugee Camps), 09/02/2008 (SPS) The personal envoy of the UN secretary-general for the Sahara, Mr. Peter Van Walsum, declared on Saturday in the Saharawi refugee camps, after a meeting with the president of the [Sahrawi] republic, Mohamed Abdelaziz, that the "positions of the parties are still very far apart" and that he has "no new plan to exit from this stalemate". [He] added that "it is not meaningful to propose something which will necessarily be rejected by one of the parties"...

That's it, that's all. That's his plan. The parties do not agree, and there's zero likelihood they ever will -- and yet we must not confront either one outright, in the hope of to forcing a change in its position.

There you have it: the quiet admission that the UN has surrendered all influence over the process. The key year was 2006, when the recently appointed van Walsum suggested that the UN should "take a step back" from the process, thereby implicitly dropping 15+ years of painstakingly negotiated agreements, and Annan agreed to recommend this to the Security Council. It has voluntarily reduced its own (already limited) role to waiting for an intervention by the USA or France, or perhaps some drastic political cataclysm in Morocco or Algeria. This can't even be properly qualified as sham peace process, because there's no hidden agenda to it -- there's simply no agenda at all, except to stave off war, keep the Minurso op rolling and the pointless reports and resolutions flowing. Like some strange cult, where only the rituals remain and no one is quite sure why they're doing these complicated ceremonial dances, except they have a vague sensation that the heavens will come crashing down if they don't.

Alright, very colorful -- but what can he do, you may ask? Not a whole lot, for sure. The balance of power is what it is, and there will be no sudden breakthroughs whatever he decides to write in his reports or say to the media. But there are at least some things that he could do, and would do, if he was serious about this mission, and if the UN as a whole was serious about it.

One very simple move would be to openly address the deteriorating human rights situation: recommend openly that Minurso be granted the mandate to station observer teams for human rights in both the refugee camps and the Moroccan-controlled territories. If one or both of the parties decides to refuse this, let them carry the blame; if it is stopped in the Security Council (by France), then let them carry the blame, and keep trying.

Another thing is to recommend some other form of arbitration. Why not recommend that the issue be put back before the International Court? Since both parties claim to have support of the Court's last verdict, in 1975, they should be glad to see that happen; if it turns out they're afraid of a final verdict, let them try to explain that in public.

A third way of putting pressure on the parties would be to challenge their own narratives, by simply taking them up on their own propaganda. For example: recommend the Security Council to order a headcount of all Western Saharans, whether in Tindouf or in the Moroccan-controlled territories or abroad, and make the results public. Or simply ask for the Minurso voter lists to be made public, so everyone can see what way the referendum was going. Or ask for an open corridor between the refugee camps and the Moroccan-held territories, with guaranteed right of return to both sides. Or ask the Security Council to order internationally reviewed opinion polls on all sides of the berm, to see what Sahrawis really want. Or start distributing blame for the slow progress of the confidence-building measures: be frank about who is obstructing what, to shame them into action. The possibilities are limitless, and they all seem to require only one simple thing -- being open and honest about what's going on, and talking creatively about how to find solutions instead of waiting for them to occur deus ex machina.

Hey, now, you might be saying: this is fantasy. There's no way that some of those proposals could pass Security Council scrutiny, and no way that they could even be in his reports. Van Walsum isn't interested in sticking his neck out, he's a 74-year old man just passing time in a comfortable sunset post until he decides to retire; to actually try to crack the Sahara stalemate simply isn't in his job description. And you would be right.

Peter Van Walsum's job is not to mediate, and not to make a difference, and not even to preserve the influence of the UN -- his job is simply to be in the job. It is to issue a report every now and then, to poke and pull the peace process, kick its legs, to make it move a little, twitch a little, so people won't notice that it's been dead for years already, and so they will think that things are still safely in the caring hands of the United Nations.

But Peter, it's starting to smell.