This blog is no longer active, but I continue to post at the group blog MAGHREB POLITICS REVIEW.

Jul 27, 2008

Wahda camps eradicated

Le Matin, the Moroccan pro-government newspaper, reports that the last parts of the el-Wahda camps in El Aaiún have been destroyed. The el-Wahda, or Unity, camps, were erected in haste in 1991 and the years thereafter, to temporarily house several tens of thousands of Moroccans Sahrawis who were bussed in to stuff voter rolls in the Minurso referendum on Western Sahara's future. Conditions were tough from the outset, and none the happier because people had been brought there on orders of the goverment, uprooted from traditional homes in southern Morocco.

[picture: no more]
As the years dragged on, voter identification efforts eventually excluded most of them from referendum eligibility on the grounds that they had no historical ties to the territory, but for Morocco, everything had been staked on their participation. This had two effects: the Kingdom backtracked on its promise to allow a vote on the territory's future, no longer feeling assured of victory through settlement, and the Wahda camp inhabitants were left to rot in their anything but temporary mud brick slums. Over the years, this did much to aggravate Sahrawi resentments towards the monarchy, but also to cement Sahrawi identity, by forcibly bringing so many together in similar (and similarly cramped and destitute) conditions, and in close contact with both nationalists inside the territory and with the brutal and hostile policing practices common to les provinces du Sud. In effect, what happened was that the monarchy created a second Tindouf, on Moroccan-controlled soil, and got much the same effect, in the form of an explosion of Sahrawi national consciousness. Sahrawis in the Wahda and other camp complexes who had originally had little sympathy for Polisario, began drifting towards pro-independence sentiments, as evidenced by the participation of many in nationalist demonstrations in 1999, 2000 and 2005. Indeed, how anyone could have expected anything else than nationalist rage to grow out of these slums is a mystery only explainable by the enormous capacity for patriotic self-delusion of the Moroccan regime elite whenever the Sahara enters into discussion.

It is therefore both symbolically and perhaps politically significant if these slums have now, as the normally not-too-trustworthy Matin reports, been replaced with more decent living quarters. The paper states that some 11,000 sheds have been destroyed and new housing provided to approximately 40,000 of the camp's inhabitants, as part of a major infrastructure and housing program across Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, which has several such camps.

As parts of a hearts-and-minds strategy in the Sahara, this is solidly sound politics, and something Morocco must regret not having started much earlier. On the other hand, by any other count, it is yet another morbidly wasteful expense on the Sahara conflict (money pours in here for blitz building, but 35 million other citizens are not getting housing...), and it is a case of patching up self-inflicted wounds. The damage in Sahrawi sentiment and popular psychology already done, buying back lost sympathy hardly constitutes net gain -- yet gain it is. But whatever the case, if true, this should mean a little less suffering for a group of people unfairly hostage to a conflict outside of their control, and it is something Sahrawis and Moroccans alike should be able to applaud -- for once, in agreement.

Jul 26, 2008

Violence in Dakhla

Criminal unrest, riots, attacks, and pogroms? The agreed-upon story (almost) is that a lot of people got their heads bashed in in Dakhla recently, and cars were overturned and buildings torched, in a dispute related to fishing on the Western Saharan coast. Sahrawi sources say those attacked were mainly local Sahrawis while those attacking were Moroccan settlers and laborers, and point to police standing back and letting it happen as evidence of state complicity; Moroccan media, on the other hand, portrays it as a dispute between rival groups of Moroccan (whether Sahrawi or not) fishermen mostly about economics. Both could of course be right, as neither economic riots nor settler-on-Sahrawi violence is a stranger to the territory, and frequently related. Anyway, more on One Hump or Two and elsewhere.

Mauritania: crisis continues

Thanks to Hannes, as usual, here is the latest in the unfolding Mauritanian regime crisis. As he guessed earlier, the cabinet makeover did not stop the crisis, and the internal rebellion in President Abdellahi's PNDD/Adil party continues, fanned by generals Ghazouani and Abdelaziz. Things seem to be getting personal, in that the president is now himself targeted, instead of just his government and prime minister. Ingredients:

- Moves to open investigations against the president for corruption.
- Persistent rumorsthat the PNDD/Adil rebels may formally secede to form a new party.
- Continuing spats over the possibly unsound businesses of the president's wife.

Unrelated: About 4000 black Africans have returned to the Mauritanian south, in the president's program of refugee return after the 1989 events. However, predictably, it's not always easy to fit them back into lands that have long since been taken over by others. Also, somewhat worrying, the trend towards increasing press freedom -- but for lack of outside interest, Mauritania now easily rivals Lebanon as the Arab world's press freedom pioneer -- faces a road bump, with two journalists brought to court.

Jul 22, 2008

Algeria mediates Mali deal

Algeria has mediated a new deal between the government of Mali and Touareg rebels in the country's north. Not the first time this happens: these rebels are a breakaway faction who wouldn't accept former peace agreements; an ongoing story. The agreement seems to roll along the usual lines, of more resources to the north, army pay for former rebels, less government interference with their tribal and regional dealings, permanenting the discreet Algerian role in the region, and, certainly, strategic cash handouts to all concerned by Algiers. (See earlier posts on this.)

[picture: everybody back to being chums]
The new agreement, if it holds, is important not only for the stability of Mali and other Touareg zones, but also in the context of:

(a) Anti-terror stuff, since these areas are where the southern wing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is implanted (and where most of Algeria's Marlboro smokes come from).

(b) Algeria's growing regional assertiveness -- itself a result of post-war stability, the oil & gas windfall, and the neo-Boumédiènist tendencies of Bouteflika's presidency. Libya made an attempt to mediate the conflict, Qadhafi always interested in getting a foot into whatever tribal stirrings might be about. It failed, but went on long enough to see Algeria sulk terribly about interference in what may be technically Malian soil, but which Algiers seems to regard as essentially its private fief. This is related to (a), and trade and smuggling -- the situation in northern Mali is, in the eyes of Algeria, way too important to be left to the Malians...

Importantly, though, the not-quite-separate Touareg rebellion in Niger sputters on, for reasons of its own, and will continue to destabilize any settlement in Mali. However, that movement, the MNJ, might need some media training: they just went on an interview on al-Jazira and declared their love for the United States. Rookie move.

Islamists pick new leader in Morocco

To briefly note that Morocco's largest Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), has elected a new leader. The PJD originally grew out of more radical student groups and cultural associations, some associated with armed militancy, but in forming Morocco's first legal Islamist party, they have significantly tempered their message. Today, the party is considered close to the Muslim Brotherhood, and aims to replicate the successes of the AKP in Turkey. (Which, on the other hand, is now struggling against a military-backed move to ban it...)

While clearly in opposition, the PJD takes care not to seriously confront the system, despite it being a public secret that they, for reasons of orthodoxy, oppose the king's role as Commander of the Faithful; criticism is also muted on other sensitive issues. For this reason, the PJD sometimes ridiculed by more radical voices as the in-house Islamists of the monarch, and even non-Islamist observers have worried that their submissiveness to the monarchy may ultimately make them lose face, and throw their electorate in more radical and less organized hands. The party membership seems far more rigid in its opposition than its flexible public faces. While Islamo-liberal tendencies seem to be firmly in charge of the party leadership, there exists a significant radical faction -- headed by men like Casablanca parliamentarian Mustapha Ramid -- which is both more outspoken in its opposition to the regime, and more socially conservative.

[picture: abdelilah benkirane, new PJD leader]
The new leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, is considered a representative of the more moderate factions, as is his outgoing predecessor, Saadeddine Othmane. Othmane also ran to continue his five-year leadership of the party, but lost to Benkirane 684-495 in its general congress. Presumably, this is related to the party's poor showing in the Moroccan elections last year, when instead of emerging as largest party, which was widely expected, it finished second after the nationalist Istiqlal, a domesticated former opposition party.

Jul 21, 2008

Hydrocarbons and the inner self

Two articles:

  • On his blog, US energy analyst Jeff Vail posts an article from The Oil Drum about Moroccan-Algerian tensions, terrorism and Western Sahara, against the background of the resource question -- oil and gas in Algeria, and phosphates in Morocco and Western Sahara.
  • Jeroen van Bergeijk travels from Casablanca through southern Morocco and Western Sahara, in search of something else than pot-smoking backpackers. Success is mixed.

Jul 19, 2008

Sahrawi poetry

Last post for today, promise: you need to read this great Global Voices post by Renata Avila on Sahrawi poetry. More generally, you should be clicking onto Global Voices Western Sahara often for the latest, because so far, they've been very good, and comments are flooding in. Both the standard mudslinging and more thoughtful debate, so everyone gets their fill.

Pot, meet settle

Your weekly reading assignment: "Settling to Win: State Expansion in Post Colonial Times in Western Sahara and Beyond." Ehud Eiran, a Ph. D. candidate from Brandeis University, analyzes Morocco's use of settlers in Western Sahara in a recent paper for the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Centre in Israel, comparing and contrasting it with, among other things, Israel's own use of settlers in the West Bank.

Looks very interesting, but watch out, because it's PDF.

Angela in Algiers

Over at The Moor Next Door, Nouri has been ably and triply posting on German Chancellor Merkel's recent visit to Abu Combover, and some other Algeria-related affairs. You know, arms purchases, terrorism, gas, Touaregs, natural disasters, constitutional manipulation, the standard stuff.

Read: Ein, Zwei, Drei.

Mauritania's new government

Sorry for the patchy follow-up on this, but if you're reading comments, you have Hannes/HB keeping up. Reuters reports that Mauritania's new government has arrived, after being forced to resign by a military-inspired parliamentary rebellion. It is again headed by Yehia ould Ahmed el-Wagf, but now without the UFP and Tawassoul parties -- the two opposition stalwarts brought into Wagf's otherwise apparatchik-staffed government for the first time in the country's history. Apart from that, quite limited changes, although one should dutifully note new ministers of the interior and of oil (while the defense minister stays). Contrary to what Reuters claims, the Haratine-based APP remains in government, while the ex-ruling PRDR apparently bowed out after (again) being offered a single seat.

Hannes says word is that this government isn't expected to last long, which suggests that the parliamentary insurgents, and les colonels, may have wanted more far-reaching changes, related to other disputes or to the overall power balance between the president and the parliament, and, by extension, the military establishment. Nonetheless, the no-confidence deputies seem appeased, for now. Perhaps awaiting further orders...

[picture: yehia ould ahmed el-wagf, hanger-on]
This is the new government line-up:

Chef de l’Etat, M. Sidi Mohamed OULD CHEIKH ABDALLAHI
Gouvernement du dimanche 15 juillet 2008


Premier Ministre, M. Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf
Ministre de la Justice : Ahmedou Tidjane Bal
Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération : Dr. Abdallahi Hassen Ben Hmeyda
Ministre de la Défense nationale : Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamed Lemine
Ministre de l’Intérieur : Mohamed Ould R’zeizim
Ministre de l’Economie et des Finances : Sidi Ould Tah
Ministre de l’éducation nationale : Mohamed Ould Amar
Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique : Hemida Ould Ahmed Taleb
Ministre des Affaires islamiques et de l’Enseignement originel : Yahya Ould Sid’el Moustaph
Ministre de l’emploi, de l’insertion et de la formation professionnelle : Mohamed Lemine Ould Nati
Ministre de la Santé : Camara Bakary Harouna
Ministre du Pétrole et des Mines : Baba Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed
Ministre des Pêches : Sy Adama
Ministre du Commerce et de l’Industrie : Selma Mint Teguedi
Ministre de l’Artisanat et du Tourisme : Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khlil
Ministre de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire : Yahya Ould Kebd
Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage : Correra Issagha
Ministre de l’Equipement, de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat : Mohamed Ould Bilal
Ministre des Transports : Ely Ould Mohamed Lemine Ould Haimoud
Ministre de l’Hydraulique et de l’Energie : Mohamed Ould Bahiya
Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication : Abdellahi Salem Ould El Moualla
Ministre de la Fonction publique : Moustapha Ould Hamoud
Ministre de la Promotion féminine, de l’Enfance et de la Famille : Fatimetou Mint Khattri
Ministre chargé des Relations avec le Parlement et la Société civile : Lemrabott Ould Bennahi
Ministre chargé de la Jeunesse et des Sports : Mohamed Ould Borbosse
Ministre délégué auprès du Premier Ministre, chargé de l’Environnement : Abdellahi Ould Dahi
Ministre déléguée auprès du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération, chargée du Maghreb arabe : Mekfoula Mint Agatt
Ministre délégué auprès du Ministre de l’Economie et des Finances, charge du Budget : Sid’ahmed Ould Raiss
Secrétaire d’Etat chargé des Mauritaniens à l’étranger : Mohamed Ould Mohamedou
Secrétaire d’Etat chargée Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication : Aicha Val Mint Michel Verges
Secrétaire Général du gouvernement : Ba Abdoulaye Mamadou

A very useful analysis of the new government in terms of region and tribe is found here, and a similar break-down for the former government is here.

Jul 14, 2008

More links

Still no time to do this properly, so you'll have to read for yourselves:

  • The Mediterranean Union summit has now been held in Paris, to much pomp and circumstance, although the purpose remains vague. After considerable coaxing, President Bouteflika of Algeria decided to go, while King Mohammed VI of Morocco sent his brother carrying some lame excuse. Some Moroccans are annoyed, but in all frankness, in this case, the Sarkozy government's slobbering over Bouteflika, contrasted with the shrug that accompanied M6's absence, probably had less to do with any preference for Algeria, or even for its gas/oil millions, than with the fact that Morocco has been cooperative all along, whereas Bouteflika threatened to try and undermine the summit by being absent as a point of principle -- therefore, he was needed, while the king could send a representative instead, and no one would mind.
  • Ibn Kafka compares the prerogatives of the Algerian president and the Moroccan king, and pokes fun at the Algerian press as it turns hallucinatory over Western Sahara.
  • At 'Aqoul, The Lounsbury checks how the money flows in the Maghreb, and discusses this very interesting NYT article about al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and the accompanying first-ever interview with its leader Abdelmalek Droukdal (a.k.a. Abu Musaab Abdelouadoud), which I had somehow missed.
  • Terrorism problems not being an Algerian preserve, this AP article has an interesting update on the situation in Morocco.
  • Also, the Vatican suddenly grumbles about the 1996 massacre of the Algerian Trappist monks, which may or may not send a cold shiver down some general's spine.
  • Finally, commendably, Global Voices Online have started tracking and translating Western Saharan blogs from French, Arabic, Spanish and whatever else it may be, into English. This question being what it is, furious debate immediately erupted in comments between people claiming that their opponents are agents of hostile intelligence services.

Jul 9, 2008

Link Mix

Read:

  • The North Africa Journal's editor-in-chief Arezki Daoudi outlines the prospects of a new US presidency for the Maghreb countries, and sees changes ahead. Smart stuff:
Although many analysts argued that recent American policy toward the Maghreb was meant to chip away European influence on the region, this assessment is farther from the truth and accepting it would be giving far too much credit for the White House and the State Department. I would argue that an American policy toward the Maghreb simply does not exist. In fact, the declining influence of Europe, although returning with a vengeance more recently, was simply the result of Europeans own disengagement from the Maghreb. The Americans have simply squandered the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the Europeans as they implemented stringent protectionist and anti-immigration policies.

  • The intermittent Mr. Chasli of Western Sahara Endgame is back, crusading/jihading, as per your preference, against yet another lobbyist web villain. Here he explains why the Moroccan autonomy proposal -- whether good or bad -- is not a "compromise," and lets slip a little something about his own experience with the Western Sahara dossier in the UN. We are intrigued.
  • Matthew Hogan of 'Aqoul dissects the ups and downs of foreign investment in the Maghreb countries, setting off the usual suspects in comments. Also on 'Aqoul, some back-and-forth on Algeria, Islamism and Berbers between me and Shaheen chez Lounsbury.

Jul 4, 2008

HB: our man, or woman, in Mauritania

Your's truly is travelling around various hot and sandy countries right now, and I will have only the rare opportunity for posting. This is unfortunate, given the interesting events in Mauritania: the new government was just forced to resign, after military pressures on parliament threatened to unleash a vote-of-no-confidence.

Fortunately, Western Sahara Info's ever-expanding network of anonymous enthusiasts for obscure Maghrebi conflicts has acquired an on-the-scene correspondent in Nouakchott: commenter HB is keeping us updated as events progress over here. A big thank you to him or her!

Jul 2, 2008

Tragedy hits Iowan Emirate

[picture: north main street, elkader, iowa.]
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria's ongoing fascination with a Midwest American rural town, pop. 1,465, reaches unprecedented heights, as Elkader, Iowa, is hit by serious flooding:

Elkader receives $150,000 in flood relief from Algeria

Pat McTaggart

ELKADER, Iowa - Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has presented the city of Elkader with a gift of $150,000. The donation from the country of Algeria to the Clayton County Disaster Relief Committee is to assist exclusively in the recovery of the citizens of Elkader as they put their community back together.
President Bouteflika also sent a message to the people of Elkader, the first time Elkader has received a message directly from a Head of State.
"We grieve with all the families of Elkader who have suddenly become homeless or have lost their livelihoods and express our deep sympathy as well as our admiration for the way that it is facing adversity with the pioneer spirit of dedicated volunteers and of community solidarity," Bouteflika wrote in his message.
Emir Abdelkader was the chivalrous leader of Algeria (1832-47) whose love for freedom inspired the Founding Fathers of Elkader to give his name to their community.

Elkader updates are pretty regularly found in Algerian national newspapers, and for all their own problems with poverty, refugees, dictatorship, and al-Qaida terrorism, people never seem to tire of news about life up in Iowa, where someone has named a tiny little town after their hero. I don't know if it's more entertaining, in a man-bites-dog-way, or more sad, as a sign of Algeria's desperate quest for history and community, but no matter what, I find it charmingly weird.

To the people of Elkader, best of luck.

Jul 1, 2008

Sahrawis in the Socialist International

UPES reports that Front POLISARIO has been granted the status as observer member in the Socialist International. The Socialist International contains 159 parties from around the world, being the by far largest cooperative body for political parties in the world. The UJSARIO, Polisario's youth organization, was already involved with the International's youth wing IUSY (and with any other international organization they could join), but POLISARIO had so far, to the best of my knowledge, neither sought nor received status as observing members.

The advantage for POLISARIO is twofold. First, it provides a formal point of contact with a whole lot of major political parties, many of which are in power. Second, this should once and for all debunk Morocco's nonsense about Polisario being a Marxist-Leninist post-Soviet puppet (and/or closet Islamists), because the Socialist International is not the same as the Third, Fourth or any other communist international. On the other hand, it may narrow the movement's appeal to potential liberal or conservative supporters abroad -- although if that was a factor for them, they would presumably have been more concerned about the communist rumors bandied around by Morocco.

Among the members of the Socialist International are the Nordic social democratic parties, Germany's SDP, the French Parti socialiste, Britain's Labour (and Israel's), and Spain's PSOE, plus a number of former liberation movements in Africa, such as FRELIMO, ANC, MPLA, and others. The Algerian Kabyle opposition party FFS is a member, while in Mauritania Ahmed ould Daddah's RFD holds observer status. In Morocco, as mentioned above, the Socialist International is represented by the USFP, which is in government -- and according to UPES, they were the only party to vote against POLISARIO's observer status.

Cabinet crisis in Mauritania: what, why, and who.

The Mauritanian parliament has now formally launched a motion of no-confidence in the two-month old government of Yahia ould Ahmed el-Wagf. To make the proposal itself required only 32 MPs -- they got 39 -- but to fell the government takes a majority of the 95 parliamentarians for that, i.e. 48 votes. In response, President Sidi Mohamed ould el-Cheikh Abdellahi has threatened to dissolve parliament, which would send Mauritania into a serious political crisis just a year after its ostensible democratization. The vote is planned for Wednesday.

As previously mentioned, this proposal appears to be inspired by military strongmen Col. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz and Col. Mohamed el-Ghazouani. These two figures are at the center of the group that performed the 2005 coup against President el-Tayaa, which during and after the transitional phase 2005-2007 has seen considerable infighting, reflected in a rapid hemorraghing of higher officers and constant reshuffles in the army hierarchy. Today, they're widely considered the power behind the throne, somewhat like the generals and secret service heads in Algeria.

This present crisis also seems to have something in common with Algeria, in that President Abdellahi appears to have tried to do le Bouteflika: to bolster his own standing within the bureaucracy to the extent where he would no longer be forced to rely on the colonels. However, he has been forced to move very carefully, since his own base is constructed on the remains of the old el-Tayaa regime, in which these military men played a paramount role.

The president has gathered his own supporters into a new party called the PNDD-Adil, organized and led by el-Wagf. Still, for the first year of his mandate, he relied on his post-election Prime Minister Zeine ould Zeidane. Ould Zeidane, a former governor of the Central Bank and despite his slick reformist image a serious regime insider, also ran in the 2007 presidential elections, finishing third. He was then considered by some to have the support of the deposed president's Smasside tribe, even if he is not himself a member of it, with all of the financial and political influence that tribe had acquired during el-Tayaa's 21 year rule. (The core members of the coup all issued from the ouled bou Sbaa, a once-great warrior tribe which was crushed by Reguibat rivals in the 19th century and now more devotes itself to trading, mainly being present in northern Mauritania and Morocco.)

Zeidane was abruptly and unceremoniously fired on May 6, and the president's own man, el-Wagf, appointed head of the new government. He stuffed it full of his own PNDD-Adil members, but, interestingly enough, also managed to attract a couple of hardcore opposition groups which have never before been allowed into a Mauritanian government: the socialist UFP and the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Tawassoul Party (PNRD). The PNDD-Adil component of the government, however -- 24 out of 35 ministers -- was full of former el-Tayaa stalwarts, to the extent that the UFD and PRDR were at blushing pains to explain their participation.

What happened the last month was that criticism grew against the new government both from the opposition and from the military and its allies within the regime. Recently, a large chunk of PNDD-Adil defected, and a number of its parliamentarians have declared that they will vote to withdraw confidence from el-Wagf. The resulting lineup is somewhat compromising for all sides:

  • On the President's and Prime Minister's side, you have about half of the PNDD-Adil, including a lot of hoary old faces from the el-Tayaa dictatorship. There's also the APP of Messaoud ould Boulkheïr, a Nasserist anti-slavery party (yes) which has long wallowed between opposition and collaboration with whatever powers might be, and there's the UFD, with its long record of principled opposition to el-Tayaa and previous dictatorships; no obvious friends of the military. This bloc blames the crisis on the army, claiming that the two colonels and their allies are trying to subvert Mauritania's emerging democracy, and they invoke the president's right to dissolve parliament in defense of ... parliamentarianism.

    • Opposite, we find the other half of PNDD-Adil's ancien régime, the gleam of officers' epaulettes all too visible in she shadows behind. But here, too, stands a major part of the opposition, in the shape of the RFD party and its leader Ahmed ould Daddah -- half-brother of Mauritania's first president, and a former prisoner-of-conscience under el-Tayaa. The anti-Wagf bloc blames the president for having failed to resolve the country's economical and social ills, for growing political unrest, for mismanaging and possibly stealing oil resources, and for bringing back corrupt and tainted apparatchiks from the el-Tayaa years through the el-Wagf government. This last charge has some credibility coming from ould Daddah, but his military and parliamentary allies-of-convenience could hardly repeat it with a straight face.

    Party discipline being nonexistent and side-switching a Mauritanian fine art, it is very difficult to predict how this will end. The PNDD-Adil has 50 of 95 seats in parliament, but it is now split down the middle, with 29 of its MPs having signed the motion of no-confidence. If these figures stick -- a big if -- that leaves el-Wagf with 21 loyalists, to whom he should theoretically be able to add the votes of UFP, APP and a few others. But so far, only the UFP has been really outspoken in their defense of el-Wagf, attacking the two colonels by name and qualifying the vote as a sort of civilian coup d'état.

    In contrast, the anti-government bloc should be able to count on the 29 PNDD-Adil rebels, as well as the 17 parliamentarians of ould Daddah's RFD, for a sum of 46 -- and then there are a couple of minor parties which should bring them over the 48-member mark. But on the one hand, it's not clear that any party will be able to hold together its party line, and any anti-Wagf coalition can easily splinter over who they want instead. On the other hand, the balance tilts in favor of no-confidence, and a lot of government supporters seem to be hedging their bets and preparing to pick the side of the winner at the last moment. Then again, should that happen, there is the president's threat to dissolve parliament -- and the possibility that the vote will be delayed to sort out all these uncertainties.

    So, whatever happens, or doesn't happen, it's going to be a close call. On the one hand, therefore, it all looks terribly divisive, disruptive and clearly unhealthy for Mauritanian politics; in a worst-case scenario of either kind, the central pillar of Mauritanian politics, the presidency, could emerged fatally weakened or delegitimized. While Mauritanians were clearly hoping for more, international observers have been quite positive about Abdellahi's time in power, and should he be strapped down by the military and opposition forces, or weaken himself by lashing out in authoritarian style, the reform and reconciliation projects he has initiated would clearly be at risk. But on the other hand, it's a lot more exciting to watch a country where parliamentary votes matter, than to spend one's time staring at the ossified dictatorships in Morocco, Algeria, or all the way out eastwards. Surely, that must count for something.