Mauritania coup update - II

Follow-up from the last installment. Mauritania's post-coup crisis continues to simmer. Among the ingredients, in no particular temporal or consequential order:

1. The Democratic Opposition bloc downgrades its support to the HCE junta. Member parties RFD (of deposed president Abdellahi's electoral rival, Ahmed ould Daddah) and AJD/mr (a Southern Peul group led by Ibrahima Sarr) both refuse to sit in the HCE's government under newly appointed Prime Minister Laghdaf, which is significant: the HCE can do without them, but their pro-democracy credentials (however contrived) represent its best chance for regime legitimacy. The parties seem to have different reasons for their refusals, but the RFD's position is clearly related to Daddah's wish to get guarantees for him becoming president. The Democratic Opposition also counts Saleh ould Hanana's Hatem party (which will participate) and MDD (which will not), but they're not as important as RFD and AJD/mr, both of which represent serious chunks of the political class.

[picture: official flag of the islamic banana republic of mauritania]

Not participating in a government does not mean, of course, that these parties are now in active opposition to the HCE. They cautiously backed the coup from the start, and remain open for discussions with the junta. It could very well be that they're just exploiting the junta's precarious position to try to extract concessions from it. More generally, it seems these former civilian opposition activists are belatedly beginning to realize that a military coup means that the military will be in charge, as opposed to, well, themselves.

A couple of deputies have already defected from the HCE's parliemantary majority, but it's a trickle so far.

2. Apart from this bunch of civilian politicians, the National Front for the Defense of Democracy (FNDD) is still going reasonably strong in its anti-coup activities. It is a mismatched but so far relatively cohesive coalition of president Abdellahi's loyal henchmen from the PNDD/Adil (Cleptocrat), arm in arm with Messoud ould Boulkheïr's APP (Nasserist-Haratine), Mohamed ould Maouloud's UFP (Socialist) and Jamil ould Mansour's Tawassoul party (Ikhwani). Rumors of its impending collapse are not in themselves unlikely, but have so far proven to be greatly exaggerated.

3. Col. Vall is back, again. The leader of the country during the junta-led transition of 2005-2007 has apparently returned from language studies in Ireland (!), and is now likely to insert himself into the political mess somehow. There has been much speculation that he will be the junta's presidential candidate, since he's popular and in uniform (and has familial and tribal ties to the HCE top men), but counter-speculation alleges that he's fallen out with the clique around HCE leader Gen. Abdelaziz. To be followed closely.

4. International reactions remain unforgiving, with France and the USA both being resolutely opposed to the HCE. They are joined by regional power Algeria, and economically influential Gulf states such as Qatar, UAR and Saudi Arabia -- the on/off talk about a trigger for the coup having been some shady Gulfie business deals (eh!) comes to mind again, as does the fact that ex-ex-president ould Tayaa is in exile in Qatar. Morocco, Algeria's regional rival, is the most important regional state to back the HCE, whereas Libya, which has been unsuccessfully meddling in the country's politics for many decades, also seems to have grown somewhat supportive of it. A couple of mostly inconsequential West African states also back the HCE, whereas the other neighbours, Senegal, Mali, and the POLISARIO Front, are all wholly noncommittal. POLISARIO's attitude is particularly interesting, since there has been a constant drip of reveleations about Gen. Abdelaziz's ties to Morocco, which are, to say the least, strong.*

5. Legal, political, and other wrangling continues around the Khattou mint el-Boukhari Foundation, which has become the focal point of accusations of corruption against the deposed president.

6. According to the African Union, the president will be released soon. One can't help wonder in return for what. There has been some speculation about finding him a nice place of exile, but who knows. One also can't help to bear in mind his prime minister, Yehia ould Ahmed el-Waghef, who was released sometime after the coup, but then jailed again after joining the FNDD protests.

Summary: The HCE, Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz & Co. are still firmly in power, which is according to normal Mauritanian coup procedure: holding the military and bureaucracy together is what really matters. However, they are not securely in power, and neither internal nor external resistance has subsided, which is terribly abnormal. If the 2005 coup was a test case to see whether democracy could be brought by military intervention, this one is beginning to look like a test case to see whether firm international condemnation and internal protest is enough to stop a military seizure of power in a small country such as Mauritania. One certainly shouldn't count on it, and it's something of a gamble to bet on, but -- and this is the truly new and interesting part -- you can't quite rule it out either.

Tangentially related: The Moor Next Door has started some laudable research in trying to figure out which is the most popular month for Arab coup d'états. Join in, here.

*) According to some, Gen. ould Abdelaziz was in fact involved in assisting the "Gjijimat affair" last year -- an anti-POLISARIO gathering organized in northern Mauritania by supposed dissident Sahrawis, in parallel with POLISARIO's own Tifariti congress, which got enormous airplay in the Moroccan media. The event was followed by the equally stage-managed entry of these Sahrawis into Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, where they were presented to the Moroccan and international media in several government-organized press conferences as Sahrawi civilians having escaped POLISARIO's clutches after captivity and/or brainwashing, and who were now happy to return to the warm embrace of their king. The problem, of course, was that the "returnees" were not Sahrawi at all, but with a few exceptions all Mauritanian. They were led by Hammada ould Derwich, a shady Mauritanian businessman and former port director in Nouadhibou, who has never lived in Tindouf, never called himself Sahrawi, and was never a member of POLISARIO (even if he is a Rguibi tribal member, like much of POLISARIO's leadership, and has apparently been heavily involved with the trade/smuggling circuit in those parts of the desert). This prompted some angry reactions in Mauritania, where the old ghost of Moroccan expansionism -- Rabat claimed Mauritania in its entirety until 1970 -- was reawakened by the absorption of bona fide Mauritanian citizens as Moroccans. Even in Morocco, where, normally, both regime backers and opposition activists will eagerly gobble up the Saharan Kool-Aid, some raised a skeptical eyebrow.

Give me my robe, put on my crown

From the BBC's "Day in Pictures" segment, Aug. 29, 2008:

The Brother Leader, the Guide of the Revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi, is crowned "King of Kings" in a meeting of African royals convened in the Libyan city of Benghazi.

[thanks justin]

Van Walsum is out

Peter van Walsum’s mandate as the personal envoy of the UN secretary-general for Western Sahara has now expired, and it has not been renewed.

POLISARIO’s refusal to negotiate under his supervision, and their stalling techniques, have had effect, and Morocco's autonomy proposal now loses its most important ally. Serious negotiations are not realistically going to resume until the presidential issues in the USA, and perhaps Algeria, have been settled; it's an open question whether or when a new non-temporary envoy will be appointed before that.

Van Walsum fires a parting shot against POLISARIO in El País, similar to earlier ones. It is available in English at the newspaper’s website.

The Maghreb Olympics 2008

In case you were wondering, among the Maghreb states, Tunisia won the Olympics 2008, with one gold medal, and Algeria and Morocco ended in exactly the same spot (of course), with one silver and one bronze each. Libya and Mauritania also had the same result: 0. (Full ranking here.)

Security Council condemns Mauritania's coup

Says the UN Security Council in its Presidential Statement S/PRST /2008/30, August 19, 2008:

- The Security Council condemns the Mauritanian military’s overthrow of the democratically elected Government of Mauritania and welcomes the statements condemning the coup by the African Union, European Union and other members of the international community.
- The Security Council opposes any attempts to change Governments through unconstitutional means.
- The Security Council condemns the actions of the State Council, in particular its move to seize the powers of the presidency.
- The Security Council demands the immediate release of President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdellahi and the restoration of the legitimate, constitutional, democratic institutions immediately.
- The Security Council recognizes the important role played by the African Union as well as the support of regional and international partners, including the United Nations Secretary-General through his Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, and calls on all to assist in restoring constitutional order in Mauritania.
- The Security Council will monitor developments in this situation.

Strong statement, but was that all they could muster with, supposedly, complete US, UK and French backing? A presidential statement is all good and well, but it's no resolution. See also Reuters and Inner City Press.

Murders, plots and friendly hugs

French police has reopened investigations into the death of Ali Mecili, an activist in the appropriately named Algerian opposition party FFS, who was assassinated in 1987. It lacks the extraordinary symbolic power and regime-shaking potential of the ben Barka murder in Morocco, but is otherwise similar and pretty important still: the prime suspect, a high-ranking official in the Algerian foreign ministry, has been arrested. (If Francophone, do read this interview with FFS's legendary leader Hocine Aït Ahmed.)

And while on Algerian murder plots, did Abdelhaqq Laayada, former leader of the GIA terrorist group, just say he was invited to the funeral of Smaïl Lamari, the recently deceased security service strongman? And that he met the éradicateur all star team there, and exchanged hugs and kisses? Oh.

Well, indicative of conspiracy or not, it's also illustrative of the curiously tiny, amoral and supercharged world of the Algerian elite. They massacre each other, then have tea together to talk it over, then switch sides, and then the knives are out again: the Algerian equivalent of an election cycle.

[picture: ali mecili, 1920-1987]

Suicide bomber kills 43 in Algeria

Suicide blast against police recruits in the Algerian town of Issera, close to Boumerdès, kills 43, or something like that. May be the bloodiest single attack since the massacres in the 1990s, although competition is stiff from the GSPC/al-Qaida blasts in December 2007. Not much more to say except this will keep happening for quite some time more -- hopefully, rarely -- and Algeria is going to have to normalize its political climate best it can under these circumstances.

AFP: 43 killed in attack on Algerian police school.
BBC: Bombing kills dozens in Algeria.
Reuters: Algerian Islamist calls on rebels to lay down arms. (Short: Hattab encore.)
APS: Le gouvernement condamne vigoureusement l'attentat des Issers (Boumerdès)
The Canadian Press: A look at the increasingly deadly insurgent attacks in Algeria.

Also see the post over at Poly-Ticks, which discusses the same Jamestown analysis of the state of al-Qaida in the Maghreb, as I brought up here.

Carnegie on the Mauritanian coup

The Carnegie Endowment has whipped together a policy brief on the military coup in Mauritania. Result: not great. It not only fails to bring anything new to the table, but also more or less buys into the junta's war-on-terror-spin, and misses the truly interesting aspects of this coup, that distinguish it from the 2005 one: an unexpectedly strong international condemnation and unprecedented (if now weakening) internal opposition. Further, somewhat sloppy research, and it overlooks the origin of the whole affair: the long, intense army/president rivalry that gradually pushed all other politics aside, starting this spring. Examples:

Earlier last week 48 MPs quit following a vote of noconfidence. [1] The parliamentary deserters—believed to be supported by the coup leaders—were at odds with the Abdallahi government over mounting corruption allegations and perceived linkages to the Taya regime.Some analysis has suggested that the coup leaders’ closeness to the parliamentary deserters likely spurred Abdallahi to fire the generals in the first place. [2]

1. No. A motion of no confidence was launched, but no vote took place.
2. Oh, you think their attempt to kill his presidency had something to do with it? I heard the disagreement was about them liking Leno, he sticking up for Letterman.

And:

The suspended U.S. military assistance programs are likely some of the incentives most appealing to the military-dominated State Council. This suggests that Washington possess useful levers with which to encourage the military to move toward elections.

Encourage, huh. There is nothing the junta would like more than to move toward elections, since the whole point of the coup is to undo the last set of polls. That is precisely why most of the rest of the world, including the USA, has warned it not to proceed towards new elections, but instead reinstate all recently elected officials...

Ah well, I shouldn't be too whiny. It's a decent short summary, and gives a welcome reminder of the fragility of Mauritania as a state and a nation. That is something which is perhaps the primary concern of policymakers everywhere (except of course in Mauritania), as reactions to the coup develop.

Full PDF here: Mauritania’s Coup:Domestic Complexities and International Dilemmas, and text copy here.

Court tout court

Jacob Mundy strikes again, taking you through the International Court of Justice's landmark 1975 verdict on the sovereignty of the Western Sahara. For those of you who want to know who Western Sahara really belongs to, but are too lazy to read more than the summary of the verdict -- the whole case record is at least quadrilingual, and would fill a modest bookshelf -- now, finally, someone has done it for you.

Did the Sahrawi tribes pay tribute to and pray in the name of the Moroccan sultan? Did he appoint their leaders and issue decrees that they followed? Did Hassan I visit his loyal subjects in the Moroccan Sahara in 1882? Did surrounding nations ever recognize Moroccan rule in today's Western Sahara, before Morocco charged in guns blazing in 1975? Or was the territory simply unowned desert, no-one there, up for grabs? And, considering the potentials of a Mohammed Abdelaziz vs. Mohammed Abdelaziz showdown, what about the now long-forgotten Mauritanian claim to the territory?

[picture: you shut up, and you stop swiping colonial territories. next!]

All of them interesting questions, which were analyzed in mindnumbing detail by the ICJ judges and various expert panels. A hint to the answer lies in the fact that

The sixteen judges voted 14 to 2 against Morocco and 15 to 1 against Mauritania. In both cases, the dissenting vote was an ad hoc judge appointed by Morocco under a special ICJ rule. Yet in the case of Morocco, the other dissenting voice felt that the Court should have rejected Morocco’s claims more vehemently.

Mundy's full lecture can be found in an English PDF here, and a Spanish translation is available through here. And should you muster the strength, all of the awful rest that the ICJ read and wrote is linked from this post or, directly, here.

Polisario officially asks for new mediator

Front POLISARIO's Secretary-General Mohamed Abdelaziz now officially demands Peter van Walsum's replacement as mediator, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon.

Full text here, and earlier speculation here.

Meanwhile, in Algeria...

Coups may have upset life in Mauritania, but elsewhere in North Africa, it's about the same. In Liberté Dilem, Algeria's most loved and jailed political cartoonist, riffs off of the arrest of hunger-striking teachers that tried to demonstrate outside Bouteflika's office. Unfortunately, all demonstrations are banned under the emergency laws in Algeria for, you know, anti-terrorist purposes. (Click to enlarge.)

Nobody loves you

Memo to Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz: next coup should wait until after France leaves the rotating EU presidency.

Mauritania : the European Union warns the military junta of the serious risk of isolation in the international arena (August 13, 2008)

The European Union renews in the strongest terms its condemnation of the coup which took place in Mauritania on 6 August 2008. It considers the emergency measures taken by the military leaders who seized power, measures confirmed by the Order of 11 August 2008, in particular that relieving the President of the Republic of his duties, to be completely unlawful.

The European Union warns the military junta of the serious risk of the country’s long-term isolation in the international arena.

It urges the junta to restore the institutional framework that existed before 6 August and calls on it to cooperate immediately with the international community to that end. It renews its support for the efforts made along that path by the African Union in particular. The European Union stands ready to contribute to a solution for the current institutional crisis through dialogue.

Meanwhile, the Algerians have finally taken some sort of a stand on the issue. Their arch-foe Morocco kept a careful silence from official channels but allowed the regime outlet Le Matin to express near-orgasmic happiness over the coup, so while official ambiguity reigns, the Palace's position seems clear. And like clockwork, Algiers now pops up in the opposite trench. First, President Bouteflika snubbed Gen. ould Abdelaziz's envoy, leaving him instead to his minister for Maghrebi and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel. The unreadably official El Moudjahid quotes a Foreign Ministry statement (not online) as saying that Messahel conveyed to the Mauritanian envoy his support for the African Union's expulsion of Mauritania, and, with a perfect poker face, "reiterated, on this occasion, the constant position of Algeria which condemns changes of power in violation of constitutional rules." He doesn't seem to have said anything explicit about putting President Abdellahi back in place, so there's still enough room to backtrack. Still, a clear enough rejection of the coup.

So, while the junta is settling in and striking roots in Mauritania, the international scene looks unpromising, despite the apparent support from Rabat. Algeria, France, the EU, and the USA are now all aligned against Morocco on this one.

Two actors of some importance remain uncommitted: Senegal, with weighty influence in southern Mauritania, and the Polisario Front, which matters in the north. After Algeria took its stance, Polisario could very well follow, but the tribe-and-trade mesh between Tindouf and northern Mauritania is so tight that they may also prefer to shut up and stay out of it for as long as Mauritania's position on W. Sahara is not in danger. Senegal: well, there, like in Tindouf, realistic appraisals about who will rule Nouakchott in the future should determine policy, but Paris's position must matter. Interesting setup.

UPDATE: More on TMND. It appears that Gen. Mohammed ould Ghazouani, the second-biggest fish of the junta, was part of the delegation to Algeria, but the putschists deny having been snubbed by Boutef. Also, Yacine el-Mansouri, boss of Morocco's secret police, has been on an official visit to the junta -- the first by any state. Mauritanian press notes that this constitutes de facto recognition, sort of, while Moroccan papers prefer to note that he was presented with the release of jailed Prime Minister el-Wagf as a reward. It's that famous Moorish hospitality: nobody leaves Nouakchott without a gift-wrapped political prisoner.

Mauritania coup update

The Mauritanian coup has been swamped in Olympics and South Ossetia coverage, but there hasn't been a terrible lot to report anyway. Some stuff worth mentioning, in no particular order, is:

[picture: trying out the new election ballots]

Al-Qaida, in its Algerian/North African apparition, has tried to piggyback on the international media confusion surrounding the coup by calling for Mauritania's transformation into an Islamic Emirate, which sure enough got them some headlines (and created a philosophical problem). But we already knew they wanted that, didn't we? The only real importance of it, is that their press statements have given Gen. Abdelaziz & Co. an excellent opportunity to do their Algerian éradicateur impression again, which is perhaps very important, since they -- for lack of proper ideological reasons -- now seem determined to frame the coup to Westerners as a defensive strike against the Moslem Ayrab menace. The wildly unconvincing argument appears to be that Abdellahi's decision to allow the local Muslim Brotherhood a single pro forma seat in the cabinet makes him the local equivalent of Mulla Omar. Whether the stupid people of the world are buying this horseshit or not is hard to tell, since they're obviously busy taking one side or another in South Ossetia. (For the arguments advanced by the junta inside Mauritania, which make precious little mention of Islamism, see eg. here.)

Race relations: The Saudi pan-Arab paper al-Sharq al-Awsat reports that Abdellahi had plans to organize a tribunal to try people implicated in ethnic cleansing and other racist violence against southern Mauritanian peoples (primarily the Peul minority, but also others), connected to as the gruesome "1989 events," and that this was a trigger cause for the coup. As far as I know, the president had said absolutely nothing about such plans, and while he was active in bringing back 1989 refugees, he seemed to want to sweep the sensitive issues of criminal responsibility and race/power-relations under the carpet -- and probably, no one seriously expected him to do otherwise. Still, the anonymous pro-Abdelaziz source in the article seems to say that Abdellahi planned to use such tribunals as a way of purging the military, and that makes it sound more likely. Whatever the case, the most radical Black nationalist group, the exiled former guerrillas of FLAM, has firmly condemned the coup, and if I'm not misinformed, their relations with Abdellahi had been thawing. Three observations: 1. If this turns out to be true, Abdellahi could become wildly popular with the Black African southern community for doing what no other Moorish leader have even hinted at doing before him, and the putschists would suffer the opposite reaction; 2. He would become correspondingly unpopular in radical Arab nationalist circles and racist groups among the Moorish majority. It's entirely possible that this version is put out by the Abdelaziz gang precisely to rally those groups -- strong in the military -- to the junta's side, not to mention to make everyone with blood on their hands from past persecution step away from Abdellahi; 3. So far, it's way too vague for us to have any reason to think it true, and especially the claims that it would be an international tribunal "like Darfur" sound a bit too much.

Prisoners released: Prime Minister Yahia ould Ahmed el-Wagf has been released, along with other imprisoned Abdellahi cronies, and they immediately got to work organizing protest demonstrations. Clearly, international pressure and attention -- as puny as it has been -- is hugely important here. The president himself stays locked up, however; my guess is they'll want to shunt him off into exile somewhere sooner or later.

International reactions are still pretty stiff, and France takes point, but they're far from activist. With water polo, Ossetian separatism and other hot topics dominating the airwaves right now, there's a high risk of the initial outcry trailing off into a mumble, but it doesn't seem to have happened just yet. Two things are important: 1. Gen. Abdelaziz's talk about elections is now widely rejected, and 2. No one seems inclined to sabre-rattling. Interestingly, oil companies and others who tend to be pretty sober in their estimations seem untroubled by the whole affair. On the other hand, oil & mineral extraction would probably go on whoever is in charge, since the primary reason for wanting to be in charge is to get to skim the profits. Only serious instability would affect the business side of that. As for regional reactions, the expected suspension from the African Union hit on Saturday, whereas the Arab Maghreb Union's mission, sent by the Brother Leader of the Revolution, and the Arab League, both seem rather less interested in taking an anti-coup stand. No shocker. The Moor Next Door has some very interesting gossip on Morocco's position, and has been pondering the views of Algeria and Morocco in other posts too.

Internal reactions, well, all sorts. Assemblée nationale speaker Messoud ould Boulkheïr (sort of a Jumblatt-John Brown combo, if you can imagine it) has said he recognizes no other president than Sidi Mohamed ould el-Cheikh Abdellahi and will work against new elections. On the other hand, 67 out of 95 parliamentarians say they disagree, whether that means they actively back Gen. Abdelaziz or just don't want to be seen supporting his opponents. This seems to show that the junta has expanded its (highly opportunistic) support from the original 48 or so parliamentarians that the army managed to rally before the coup. That, in turn, is perhaps indicative of Mauritanian expectations about the junta's future, even if it is probably even more reflective of the parliamentarians' view of their situation in the present. Also importantly, the High State Council -- yes, that's the junta, if you aren't paying attention -- has added another top soldier to its ranks, and one that had been appointed by Abdellahi as the supposedly loyal replacement for HCE core member Félix Négri at that. I have a very hard time to see how the army could muster a counter-coup now that virtually the entire military elite has taken a seat on the junta, unless a revolt emerges from the lower ranks or the new regime's situation suddenly deteriorates enough due to eg. international pressure to split it apart again. Both things, at present, seem unlikely, although there's at least the chance of the latter happening.

General Vall, the 2005 putsch frontman, is back in Mauritania, or he isn't: a great unknown. Wherever he is, he's keeping his mouth shut, but, improbably enough, all agree that he was until just recently studying English in Ireland. Some agree that he may run for president supported by the military this time, and some others agree that he may not. When just guessing, I tend to believe he isn't in an important position now, nor will he be, or the army would have started sending signals to that effect already. Media handling hasn't been subtle.

The elections issue continues to spread confusion. Former opposition figure Ahmed ould Daddah still backs the coup, clearly hoping to be seated as president, whereas Gen. Abdelaziz hints that he could himself take the presidency in elections, and then immediately denies having said it. Abdellahi's supporters refuse to consider holding new elections at all, and the international community largely backs this position, having approved the last round of votes in which Abdellahi was elected.

-- -- --

Much of the above was brought to my attention by Hannes, Kal, van Kaas, E. M, and others, to whom thanks are due. For more, I direct you to the tremendous coverage on The Moor Next Door. Then check out The Arabist's post on the subject, if you haven't seen it, and Larbi's take on the pro-coup Le Matin editorial. Also, Magharebia investigates Tunisian public opinion on the coup (and on Mauritania's Olympic effort), and Jeune Afrique has a good summary of the coup, and an interesting interview with Gen. Abdelaziz. Here in PDF.

UPDATE: here.

New van Walsum interview

Like the Dutch one, but in Spanish:

The Polisario, which is seeking a referendum on self-determination for the former Spanish colony, which was annexed by Morocco in 1975, has "international law on its side," [the United Nations'] mediator Peter van Walsum, a Dutch diplomat, told the newspaper El Pais.

"But the Security Council is not ready to exercise its authority ... and impose it," said the UN secretary general's envoy on the Western Sahara.

The UN Security Council "must respect international law, but it must also take into account the reality on the ground," as "30 years of weighty legal arguments of the Polisario have had no effect," van Walsum said.

In these circumstances, "the independence of the Western Sahara is not an achievable objective."

That was AFP. Full text in Spanish here.

Bye, Claudius

Away for a few days, and sad to hear upon my return that Mahmoud Darwish has passed away. Not only sad, because he was a great poet, but because of the larger poeto-political implications: behold the ghastly prospect of a Nobel prize for Adonis.

Sarko lays down the law

After some initial hesitation and bad faith on my part, France has now cleared away all lingering doubt about its rejection of the coup in Mauritania.

President Sarkozy has issued a statement surpassing everyone else in raw militancy, saying that France "totally rejects" the coup, that the "legitimate president" Abdellahi must be released as of right now, and that any new elections would be illegitimate. He even threatens the putschists with unspecified actions to be taken against them, in the "hypothetical case that a restoration of constitutional legality isn't rapidly ensured".

That's not a rejection, that's a commitment. This could very well be the beginning of the end for Gen. ould Abdelaziz and his junta.

France against, Morocco for?

Apparently, France has raised its tone and declared that it refuses to recognize the new High State Council in Mauritania; it also demands the release of all imprisoned officials (including the president). Very important. Somewhat less important, but still, Russia also condemns.

[picture: they take the expression "banana republic" very seriously]

On the other hand, for the first time a neighbouring country weighs in, with Morocco seemingly coming out in favor of the coup. Independent papers seem mostly unhappy about it, but an editorial in the semi-official Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb describes the Mauritanian putschists as "patriots attached to the national unity of their country and its stability" and calls the coup a "nationalist and patriotic protest movement" by officers "deceived" by president Abdellahi's "ungratefulness"; and it says these same patriots can count on Morocco. A news piece in the same paper reports that Mauritanians took to the streets in support of the military, which is something not reported by any other media (although several have reported tiny protests, and that major junta-staged demonstrations are planned for today). Le Matin is not strictly an official source, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains quiet, but it seems unthinkable that it would take such a radical position without green light from the Palace. Perhaps those years of schooling in the Moroccan military academy in Meknès for Gen. ould Abdelaziz do mean something after all?

Will be interesting to see Algeria's reaction. The independent press seems generally upset about the whole thing, but so far absolutely nothing from the government (editorialists at the dreary state mouthpiece El Moudjahid are busy praising Bouteflika's investment trips in Algerian provinces) and Polisario also keeps mum. As for Senegal, can't find anything.

In Mauritania, a Front national pour la défense de la démocratie is being formed to oppose the coup, but apparently grouping only civilian parties, not officers: PNDD/Adil, RNRD/Tawassoul, UFP and APP. Respectively: Adil is the deposed president's party of technocrats and corrupt el-Tayaa regime insiders -- less icky now, as most of the latter have defected to the junta; Tawassoul is a reformist-Islamist local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Djemil ould Mansour; UFP is a leftist, longstanding opposition party with a strong anti-militarist bent, led by Mohammed ould Maouloud; and APP is Messoud ould Boulkheïr's party, with its base in the Haratine slave emancipation movement. Notable for its absence is the RFD of presidential second-finisher Ahmed ould Daddah, the largest opposition party, which seems to support the coup.

And we end on a stray thought: what could come to prove significant is the way the junta has begun phrasing its takeover in anti-terrorist and anti-Islamist terms, as an act of regime preservation in the face of the Islamist menace. Clearly, they're not gunning for support among Arabs or even Mauritanians; equally clearly, they want the US and France on board.

Second time as farce

Let's repeat something catchy that Hannes said:

The question is whether there are still forces in the military that prepare resistance. I heard the coup was not fully planned since the president's actions came as a surprise for the generals. However there hasn't been any activity this night. We'll see, but one thing is for sure: The entire time democracy in Mauritania was no more than a farce. And this military putsch is an utter mockery.

About military units still preparing resistance, I wouldn't know of course, but it seems unlikely they could do much, when virtually the entire army top brass is on the junta. Perhaps regional commanders, but even that strikes me as a long shot unless the junta starts to stumble seriously.

[picture: my elite troops did what?]

The part about the coup not being fully planned, however, rings very true. The whole thing smacks of amateurishness, which is surprising considering that ould Abdelaziz has now been doing junta politics for the larger part of his life. The takeover itself seems to have been well-organized and quickly effected, but after that, it's been total confusion so far. First, you have the curious affair of the State Council, the civilian component of which melted away even before it could be installed. Then the lack of effort to produce a credible explanation: the putschists must have understood that the world would not look as forgivingly on a coup against the Arab world's only democratically elected government, such as it was, as it did on a coup against a military dictator of 21 years, back in 2005. Instead, the State Council has produced nothing to sell its coup, focusing instead on revoking the presidential decree that triggered it, i.e. publicly admitting that the coup is only about saving their own sorry asses.

The self-proclaimed head of state, Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz, is now doing damage control, being out in the media proclaiming that it wasn't a coup at all -- he says he was simply forced to put things back on the 2005 track, after the president had taken improper measures (such as firing him) that would harm Mauritania's war on terror. He also says the state of law will be preserved, parliament will remain in place and working, freedom of speech will be protected, and so on. Even the last government of President Abdellahi can stay in place -- although without the arrested Prime Minister el-Wagf and his minister of interior. He promises a transition period of three -- no, six, no wait, three -- months during and after which all will be swell.

This does not look like a man with a plan, if you ask me. Still, that doesn't mean he won't be able to sit out the crisis and clear things up. He knows this stuff, he really does, and if the home front stays reasonably stable, and if the international community lets this pass -- this is the big if, with powerbroker France keeping a pointedly low tone in its condemnations, but most everybody else up in arms for the time being -- he will be fine. Then he can do a rerun of the 2005-2007 transition, only minus the claim that it was to install democracy.

Junta falls apart before being created

ARSO throws in another list of State Council members in comments, which makes much more sense to me:

Outre son président, le général Ould Abdel Aziz, le Haut conseil d'Etat est composé de dix autres membres: le général Mohamed Ould Cheikh Mohamed Ahmed (chef d'état-major des forces armées), le général Felix Negri (chef d'état-major de la garde nationale), le colonel Ahmed Ould Bekrine (chef d'état-major de la gendarmerie) et le colonel Mohamed Ould Cheikh Elhadi (chef de la Sûreté nationale). Sont également membres du conseil, six hauts gradés: le colonel Ghoulam Ould Mahmoud, le colonel Mohamed Ould Meguett, le colonel Mohamed Ould Mohamed Z'Nagui, le colonel Dia Adama Omar, le colonel Hennoune Ould Sidi et le colonel Ahmedou Bamba Ould Baya.

The first list is still subject to discussion in Mauritanian media. Taqadoumy reports that Messoud ould Boulkheïr and Ba Mamadou both refuse to sit on it, while Ahmed ould Daddah is rumored to have set conditions that no member of the army would run (against him) in the upcoming presidential elections -- this may be an attempt to further sap his credibility, but I think that would be giving the junta credit for more tactical skill than it has so far shown. In the end, the military couldn't get a credible civilian component to its junta, the only ones willing to sit on it being their own sockpuppets, and so they appear to have settled for the all-army version reported by ARSO above -- Taqadoumy confirms this list. It will be called the High State Council, and perhaps the similarity to the Algerian HCE of 1992 is not unintended.

About Daddah, Hannes in Mauritania -- who, thankfully, appears to be alive and well -- has this to say:

this is so ridiculous. quite frankly speaking daddah has lost all his credibility now. again he is (excuse my language) being the military's bitch. can I already bet on a president? Ely, who else. (1) He's not "officially" involved in the putsch. (2) People love him (3) He's Abdelaziz's cousin. Any questions.
I also love the official statement of France. While everyone (even Nigeria, hehe) is demanding constitutional and democratic conditions, France demands stability. Many voices say their involved.
Other than that, I feel that many people are upset. The question is whether there are still forces in the military that prepare resistance. I heard the coup was not fully planned since the president's actions came as a surprise for the generals. However there hasn't been any activity this night.
We'll see, but one thing is for sure: The entire time democracy in Mauritania was no more than a farce. And this military putsch is an utter mockery.

Ely being Col. Ely ould Mohammed Vall, the public face of the last coup. He, on the other hand, is reported by Nouri in comments to be in Ireland taking English classes. Which is just weird enough to be believeable.

Mauritanian junta: list of members

CRIDEM and Taqadoumy (referring to al-Jazira) now have a list of members of the new Mauritanian junta (Conseil d'état, or State Council), and it is either shocking or wrong:

• Général Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Président du Conseil, Chef de l'État ;
• Général Mohamed Ould Ghazouany, chef d'État-major de l'Armé Nationale ;
• Général Félix Négri, chef d'État-major de la Garde Nationale ;
• Colonel Ahmed Ould Bekrine, chef d'État-major de la Gendarmerie Nationale ;
• Colonel Mohamed Ould El Hadi, Directeur Général de la Sureté Nationale ;

• Bâ M'baré, Président du Sénat ;
• Messaoud Ould Boulkheïr, Président de l'Assemblée Nationale ;
• Ahmed Ould Daddah, leader de l'Opposition Démocratique ;
• Abdallahi Ould Ely Salem, Président du Conseil Constitutionnel ;
• Mohamed Aly Cherif, Chef du groupe majoritaire à l'Assemblée Nationale.

Five military men, five civilians. Think they will be voting much?

As for the composition: The names of soldiers are not, as far as I can tell, very surprising. Gen. ould Abdelaziz as boss, flanked by the rest of the top brass. President Abdellahi's attempt to fire these men (except ould el-Hadi) was what triggered the coup.

But the civilians... of course the putschists have civilian support. Their puppeteering of the parliament was a first-rate show. Now, just as expected, some 50 parliamentarians -- the same people who brought down the government, old ould el-Tayaa stooges most of them -- have dutifully stated their support for the military intervention. But:

Messoud ould Boulkheïr: As a leader of the country's Haratine (slave and ex-slave) population, he is a bit at odds with everyone, but still has managed to sit in governments both under and after ould el-Tayaa. But while he seems politically and morally agile enough to make the list, there are serious question marks here. Wasn't he until just now supporting the president? And didn't his APP party "unreservedly condemn" the coup and demand the president's reinstatement? This looks fishy.

Ahmed ould Daddah: This is perhaps a more plausible selection, given his enmity with Abdellahi, but still... a close second-finisher in the presidential elections and with a solid base as opposition leader, is he really about to throw out 15 years of hard-earned dissident cred for a temporary advisory seat on someone else's military junta? Bizarrely enough, that seems to be the case: his RFD party refuses to condemn the coup, instead "taking note" of it and blaming everything on the president.

There must be more to this: dare I guess related to coming candidacies in the elections that the junta just promised to hold in six months...?

Communiqué No. 1 [updated]

Someone get me a copy of the Mauritanian junta's Communiqué No. 1, pronto. What sort of two-bit putschist would you have to be to organize a coup d'état in 2008 and not put the No. 1 online? UPDATE: Got it. My God, can't you feel the wind of change blowing?

"Le conseil d'Etat sous la présidence du général Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz décrète que le décret de l'ancien président révoquant le chef d'Etat major de l'armée nationale, le chef d'Etat major particulier du président de la République, le chef d'Etat major de la gendarmerie nationale et le chef d'Etat major de la garde nationale, est nul ".

meaning

"The State Council under the chairmanship of General Mohammed ould Abdelaziz has decreed that the decree of the former president revoking the chief of staff of the national army [Gen. ould Ghazouani], the chief of staff of the president [Gen. ould Abdelaziz], the chief of staff of the Gendarmerie [Col. ould Bekrine], and the chief of staff of the National Guard [Gen. Négri] is null and void."

Such verve, such glowing statecraft. If this piece of political art doesn't bring patriotic young Mauritanians out on the streets in support of the revolution, what ever will.

Mohammed ould Abdelaziz: Curriculum Vitae

Mauritania's head of the State Council -- the newly installed junta -- was born in Akjoujt in western Mauritania in 1956, into a clan of the ouled bou Sbaa tribe. He joined the army in 1977, aged 21, and was sent to military school in Meknès in Morocco, as were many other officers of his generation -- this was when Mauritania was allied to Morocco in trying to occupy the southern half of Western Sahara from 1975 onwards. The war went badly -- very badly -- and the president fell already in 1978. Unsteady junta rule followed. This meant a rapid turnover of higher officers, and ould Abdelaziz rose through the ranks.

During the ould el-Tayaa dictatorship (1984-2005) he served as head of the elite presidential guard (BASEP), which he founded and organized himself. In 2003, he played a major role in cracking an oppositional coup attempt supported by Baathists and Islamists among others, which led to fighting in Nouakchott; in 2004, he helped strike down another alleged coup.

It was as head of BASEP that he and a number of similarly well-placed co-conspirators seized power in in August 2005, when ould el-Tayaa was out of the country. Another ould bou Sbaa henchman for ould el-Tayaa, Col. Ely ould Mohammed Vall, headed the junta, but ould Abdelaziz stayed (mostly) quiet although his influence was widely felt. Vall seems to have voluntarily left politics after the transition to democracy, but ould Abdelaziz and several others did not. (Lesson: look beyond the front man: then Vall, now Abdelaziz.) The political climate improved greatly, but again, rapid shifts on the power-posts in the army and security establishment ensued, as former putschists and the new-old political class fought it out bureaucratically.

It became clear that ould Abdelaziz was becoming locked in a struggle with the increasingly assertive President Abdellahi -- who the junta had helped get elected in 2007, by mobilizing l'ancien régime in his favor -- and along with a few other officers (Gen. Mohammed ould Ghazouani, Félix Négri, etc) he emerged as the main face of an ever more disgruntled military establishment. Social and economic issues and terrorism helped to aggravate the situation, as well as the president's aloof governing style and corrupt environment, and conspiracy theories about impending coups and intrigues mushroomed. The Abdelaziz-Ghazouani clique put increasing pressure on the president after he dismissed the government of Prime Minister ould Zeidane, and installed a new government headed by one of his personal loyalists, Ahmed ould Yahya el-Wagf; by enlisting parliamentary support, the officers swiftly brought that government down, and the president was weakened.

On the morning of August 6, 2008, almost exactly three years after the 2005 coup d'état, ould Abdelaziz was sacked by the president. He immediately responded by seizing power, cancelling his own dismissal, and ... then what? He seems not too sure himself.

Military coup in Mauritania

[picture: gen. mohammed ould abdelaziz, professional putschist]

Breaking:

Mauritanian President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was being held under house arrest in the capital Nouakchott after the presidential guard rounded up the country's civilian leadership.

Yeah, that would be General Mohammed ould Abdelaziz in action. Worst fears confirmed: I didn't imagine it would blow up like this, at least not this fast. It appears the president became desperate and tried to sack the generals, who, even more desperately, struck and seized power.

No point in commenting much, until the dust settles, except on three matters:

1. This blog has been tailing the crisis from the outset. No top level of analysis, perhaps, but it is, I believe, the only English-language blog online to have followed the matter [UPDATE: no but almost, see comments]. Click "mauritania" in the tags, or read the "earlier" links from right to left here.

2. Huge thanks to Hannes/HB in Mauritania, who has kept us updated throughout. Now please stay safe and indoors...

[picture: political debate, mauritania-style]

3. Quick analysis, which I may regret: a tragedy for Mauritanian democracy, on the one hand, but that didn't stand much of a chance anyway; but more importantly, a giant setback for the country's broader chances of political development. While President Abdellahi and his cronies aren't exactly angels, Generals Ghazouani and Abdelaziz represent the very worst military-parasitic element of the Mauritanian regime, and their refusal to let the civilian side of the regime settle down in power threatens to undo it completely in the long run. If the last coup, in August 2005, could be met with cautious understanding by the international community, having unseated President ould el-Tayaa, and eventually with praise as it led to a real transformation, this time around it is different. What happened in 2005 was that a military-personal-tribal dictatorship was overthrown and the chance arrived to replace it with a civilian semi-authoritarian structure that respected most democratic norms most of the time, and which made sensible moves towards national reconciliation, refugee return and economic development; not heaven, but infinitely better. This change is now being reversed. The putschists -- even though they are some of the same people as acted in 2005 -- must be condemned and the result of the coup overturned if possible; Mauritania had a golden opportunity to break its vicious circle, and it is now slipping away.

4. [UPDATE] Seems a National State Council has been formed, with Gen. ould Abdelaziz as chairman, and a Communiqué No. 1 has been issued. There can no longer be any doubt about a fully fledged military takeover. First action of the new junta: to revoke the deposed president's dismissal of ould Abdealziz & Co. (Reuters updates continually.)

5. [UPDATE] Former Prime Minister ould Zeidane said to have been touring Western Europe (yes, France) on behalf of the military since last week. Was Paris in on it? Not unlikely at all, although this is hardly a smoking gun. The lame protests from Le Quai d'Orsay may be, however, saying it's "too early" to analyze the situation and mumbling a generally worded condemnation of military takeovers, without noting that this is one.

6. [UPDATE] Political forces seem to be reacting slowly, with one major exception: UFP, the leftist opposition party briefly in government (until the military forced its resignation), is going all-in with strongly worded statements condemning the coup, which they had been warning was in the making. Well, they've been mostly banned and underground since the 1960s, so I guess everything's really just back to normal.

7. [UPDATE] Nouri has great coverage on The Moor Next Door:

I am also told, by the same source, that after Sidi [tried to] sack Chief of Staff Ghazouani, the new CoS (Col. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Ismail) showed up at Army HQ and informed the guard that he was the Chief of Staff. The guard responded with “tiyer” or “fuck off.” (Moor here.)

8. [UPDATE] World not too pleased. Strong initial stance from the EU against the coup, even angrier from the USA. And when you show up on Nigeria's blacklist, you know you've sunk pretty low:

"Nigeria totally condemns the event that took place today in Mauritania. Nigeria will not recognise any government that did not come to power through constitutional means," President Umaru Yar'Adua told reporters.

9. [UPDATE] But what of the neighbours? Senegal, nothing. Morocco, nothing. Algeria, nothing. Polisario/SADR, nothing. Why? Because they're waiting to figure out who is in charge, and who will win, and what the others are up to.

Last throes, swear to God

[picture: abdelmalek droukdel and his merry men]

Apparently not online, but according to Jamestown:

Restructuring al-Qaeda’s Algerian Insurgency

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the North African branch of al-Qaeda, has been driven to the wall. Despite a new suicide attack that injured 25 on Sunday morning in Tizi Ouzou, Kabylie, the Algerian-based group is facing difficulties that could endanger its very existence (AFP, August 3; for Tizi Ouzou, see Terrorism Focus, April 22). The number of militants is shrinking due to continuous military operations and difficulties in recruiting new volunteers. International anti-terrorism cooperation is also drying up sources of financing.

Since the beginning of 2008, Algerian authorities, with the help of neighboring countries, have arrested or killed more than 200 AQIM members, according to security sources. The great majority of these individuals were affiliated to support networks, while about thirty were active terrorists (Liberté, July 28; L’Expression [Algiers], July 30).

The strategy of the People’s National Army (Armée Nationale Populaire - ANP) to focus mainly on key figures of AQIM has proven largely successful. In February, Halouane Amrane (a.k.a. Handhala) was killed during a military raid in Si Mustapha, Kabylie (Le Jour d’Algérie, February 18). Amrane was AQIM’s main expert in explosives and one of the few instructors in the manufacturing of bombs. Amrane was also responsible for assembling the bombs used in the December 2007 suicide attacks in Algiers. In March, Abou Oussama, an Afghan veteran considered the leader of AQIM’s faction in southern Algeria, was arrested in Mali (L’Expression, March 5). In all, about ten amirs (commanders) have been eliminated since the beginning of the year (Liberté, July 28).

Persistent internal fights for power between competing factions partly explain AQIM’s current crisis, although internal fights are as old as the organization. Nevertheless, feuds sometimes lead to denunciations with grave consequences, such as in the case of Amrane who was allegedly given up to authorities by Adbelmoumène Rachid (a.k.a. Hodheïfa al-Assimi), an AQIM amir from another faction (Liberté, July 28).

Militants have been arrested, killed or have surrendered to authorities in growing numbers, and AQIM is said to be encountering difficulties in filling the vacuum. According to Algerian Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni, AQIM is “not able to recruit anymore” (L’Expression, July 17). The difficulties in recruiting volunteers for the jihad in Algeria, compared to other fronts such as Iraq or Afghanistan, seem to be confirmed in part by the fact that volunteers from neighboring Morocco are more willing to join the battle in Iraq than join the Algerian insurgents (see Terrorism Focus, July 23). There are also indications AQIM has used the Iraqi conflict to attract new recruits who later deserted once they realized that they would fight in Algeria and not in Iraq [1].

It is impossible to estimate the number of Algerian jihadis returning from Iraq at this time. In an interview with the New York Times, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdelwadoud), declared “there is a limited and very small number of the mujahedeen brothers who fought in Iraq that came back and joined us” (New York Times, July 1). At this point, it has become clear that the number of foreign jihadi fighters entering Iraq is in decline. However, it is still unknown whether North African fighters still present in Iraq will decide to stay, go back to their country and join AQIM, or eventually leave for another jihadi battlefield such as Afghanistan or Somalia.

Today, the number of fighters among the ranks of AQIM is estimated to be between 300 and 400, according to recent declarations of the Algerian Interior Minister (L’Expression, July 30). Although some prudence is always necessary with official statistics, these numbers seem to confirm the steady decline of the group, whose strength was estimated at 800 fighters in 2005, and over 500 at the end of 2006.

As a result of its weakening, AQIM has been forced to adapt. First, Abdelmalek Droukdel restructured his organization. Instead of eight geographic zones, he divided Algeria into only four zones: one in the East (including Jijel, Skikda, Constantine, Batna, Khenchela and Tébessa); two in the Center (one including Tipasa, Chlef, Aïn Defla, Berrouaghia and Khemis Miliana, the other including Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdès, Bouira, Béjaïa and M’sila); and a fourth in the Saharan south (L’Expression, May 18). This restructuring indicates both AQIM’s loss of control in certain areas and Droukdel’s search for tighter control of his troops – and more specifically his dissident amirs.

Secondly, Droukdel ordered a redeployment of his fighters. While most activities of the group have traditionally taken place in the Center zones, where the leadership is still thought to hide, Droukdel is attempting to develop a new hub in the East, close to the Tunisian border. According to security sources, AQIM will also redeploy in urban suburbs instead of isolated rural regions (L’Expression, May 18; April 23).

Thirdly, AQIM adapted its tactics to its shrinking capacities and its evolving strategy. With a diminishing number of fighters, AQIM cannot conduct its insurgency in the way Algeria’s powerful Groupement Islamique Armé (GIA) did in the 1990s. Therefore, fewer firefights are observed, while the use of explosives is increasing. The use of suicide operations has become frequent since the former Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) merged with al-Qaeda in 2007 – despite the fact that suicide operations were nonexistent in Algeria before that time. Although often very effective, suicide operations are more a tactic of terror or “propaganda of the deed”, than the work of an insurgent guerrilla group. Moreover, two recent suicide operations, less destructive than planned, demonstrate AQIM’s difficulties in recruiting experienced fighters. On June 4, a teenager suicide bomber blew himself up in the military base of Bordj al-Kiffan, injuring three soldiers, but killing only himself. On July 23, another newly recruited kamikaze drove his motorbike laden with explosives against a military truck, injuring 13, but again killing only himself.

Finally, AQIM seems to be in financial trouble. The U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of four prominent members of AQIM on July 17 after the UN added the men to the list of Bin Laden associates on July 3 (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, HP-1085, July 17). Spanish police arrested eight Algerian men on June 10 and four others on July 1, all of whom are accused of providing financial and logistical support to AQIM. Nevertheless, AQIM was quick to respond to its cash crisis. It has made a business of kidnappings for ransom, which are multiplying in the region.

Algerian operations and international collaboration have led to a strong decline in AQIM’s budget and fighting strength. However, the group has shown an impressive resilience and capacity to adapt. With Algerian security forces struggling to adapt to AQIM’s new structure and tactics, it appears Algeria is entering a new phase of its 16-year-old Islamist insurgency.

Thomas Renard is a consultant and expert on terrorism and insurgencies.

Notes

1.Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, ISS Monograph Series, no.144, June 2008.

Nah, I don't know. They may or may not be correct in their conclusion, but Jamestown and similar terror expert outfits declaring the Algerian insurgency's imminent end or "new phase" or whatnot, is a weekly event rather than groundbreaking research. Further, if you check the sourcing, the article seems strung together on random quotes from the Algerian press more than anything else. The Algerian press, of course, declares GSPC's/AQIM's defeat not weekly, but daily -- not least because writing to the contrary is illegal, and because much of it functions as a secret service PR outlet anyway. And note, for example, the sloppy sourcing for AQIM being in financial trouble: a US Department of Treasury notice of sanctions, and a Spanish police arrest. If AQIM have been basing their financial situation on previously untouched US bank accounts for these guys and on the efforts of twelve charity collectors in Spain, they would be in dire straits indeed, but somehow I doubt it. And then the news that they "responded" by starting to kidnap for ransom -- good try, but that has been a regular feature of the GIA/GSPC revolution since the mid-nineties. Well, even so, good summary of recent events. Just ignore the analysis.

Mauritania's ruling party splits

The PNDD/Adil, President Abdellahi's homemade ruling party, has now formally split, with 25 rebel deputies and 23 senators resigning. They are expected to form a new party sometime soon, presumably along similarly mushy ideological lines.

Serious setback for the president, but an expected one. Colonels in the lead. Hard to see how the present government can stay on.

(Earlier on the Mauritanian crisis: here, here, here, here, here. Thanks to Hannes for the link.)