This blog is no longer active, but I continue to post at the group blog MAGHREB POLITICS REVIEW.

Sep 30, 2008

Polisario Confidential goes to Washington

Polisario Confidential, as you may or may not know, is one of the ten or so sites that were thrown online by the Moroccan government about a year back, to get some anti-Polisario web buzz going. Given the relatively lax interest of Moroccan bloggers in the Sahara issue, it seems to be a pretty smart strategy. Hiring a webmaster and paying domain names is not very expensive, and it helps muddle the Polisario argument by creating a constant barrage of accusations they are forced to defend against. For example, it doesn't matter how many times the child-slavery-on-Cuba-nonsense is debunked, because (a) most Moroccans will never find out, given that their media does not report it, and (b) most foreigners, being new to the issue, don't know that it has been debunked. The same goes with accusations of Polisario and al-Qaida collaboration, or Polisario being a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group, or the Tindouf camps being concentration camps, and similar over-the-top mudslinging. It's classic shotgun tactics: fire away wildly, and something is likely to hit.

Most of these sites share the same material, all are registered at the same place and appeared at approximately the same time, and they all, most notably, insist that they have VERY TOP SECRET INSIDER INFORMATION. The general idea is that people googling about for information, hopefully journalists, will pick up some scare quotes and run with them. Since so few people outside the region knows much about the conflict, planting a few seeds like that can pay off handsomely in global media coverage. It would seem that strategy is working pretty well. Since Polisario doesn't have a website of its own, Polisario Confidential has by now reached # 3 in a standard English-language Google search for "polisario", beaten only by the unbeatable Wikipedia.

The only real problem seems to be one of execution: apparently it is impossible, just impossible, to hire a moderately competent writer for the job, despite the plethora of talented Moroccans out there. As evidence, and because it is likely to change, I here reproduce Polisario Confidential's latest newsflash in facsimile:

Exclusif : les communicants payés par Alger déploient la nouvelle stratégie du Front Polisario Ecrit par Khalid Ibrahim Khaled 27-09-2008
Alors que Washington, par la voix de « Condi » Rice, vient de réitérer le soutien américain à une forme d’autonomie pour régler le conflit du Sahara Occidental, les conseillers en communication du Front Polisario se sont réunis à New York en milieu de semaine avec leurs clients dans un célèbre restaurant de la « grande pomme », et ont décidé de dérouler une nouvelle stratégie. Au cœur de ces discussions, auxquelles a participé un adjoint du représentant permanent algérien auprès des Nations Unies -étant donné que c’est Alger qui signe les chèques des « consultants »-, la volonté de mouiller absolument le Maroc dans le récent coup d’état en Mauritanie, afin de le faire apparaître comme un « parrain régional ». Cette stratégie n’est cependant pas totalement au goût des « sponsors » algériens du Front Polisario, qui craignent que ces accusations systématiques, bien que fantaisistes, ne contribuent qu’à forger l’image d’un Maroc extrêmement puissant, et ne fassent de l’ombre à l’hôte du palais de la Mouradia, extrêmement soucieux de son image. En réalité, cette nouvelle stratégie de communication, théorisée par les communicants américains et anglais sous contrat avec l’état algérien, reflète la certaine fébrilité dans laquelle se trouve le front Polisario suite à la démission de Peter Van Walsum. En effet, tant que le diplomate hollandais était en poste, il constituait la tête de turc de la guérilla, celui à blâmer pour les soutiens qui s’amenuisent, et le ralliement des grandes puissances au plan d’autonomie marocain. En perdant son « meilleur ennemi », le Front Polisario se retrouve maintenant dans la position de devoir inventer un rôle au Maroc dans les bouleversements récents en Mauritanie, quitte à mettre en péril les liens qu’il entretient lui-même avec les nouveaux maîtres de Nouakchott…
This "exclusive" report, then, pretends to have information on a secret meeting between the Polisario leadership and Algeria-paid image consultants in a fancy restaurant in New York, where a new and nefarious strategy to tarnish the good name of Morocco was drawn up, presumably whilst consuming large amounts of alcohol and childrens' blood en plein Ramadan. The strategy consists in insinuating that the regime in Rabat is supportive of the recent coup in Mauritania -- something which obviously only a deranged hater of all things Moroccan would do.

This doesn't sound very plausible to begin with, but okay. Now, however, note the photograph that Polisario Confidential magically managed to snap of the secret meeting: Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz poses with one of the consultants, eyes masked with a black stripe. It was filed as "abdelaziz_consultant.jpg," leaving little room to wonder who the guy to the right is: obviously one of the oil-paid Algerian public relations agents.

Unfortunately enough, a lot of the people likely to read Polisario Confidential -- we're not that many -- are also likely to read One Hump or Two, the very funny Western Sahara blog by US university student Will Sommer. That, in turn, means that they are quite likely to recognize the "consultant" as, precisely, Will Sommer. He took this photo of himself and Mohamed Abdelaziz while visiting a reception in Washington last spring with a friend, and posted it as seen to the right (without the eye masking) under the heading "How I met President Abdelaziz," on March 17, 2007.

Priceless! As Will recently wrote, "Whatever Morocco is paying the spies who run Polisario Confidential, it is too much."

As for me, I'm getting just the right amount of Algerian oil millions to be able to afford a Blogger account in support of the UN line on self-determination for the Sahara ... But should a better offer appear, I guess I might yet come to discover the merits of unilateral autonomy. Just saying.

Algerian link dump


The elections in Algeria are drawing closer. Some good reading on that and on what's related:

Scenarios for the Presidential Election, Mustafa Saidji, Carnegie. A good, short summary of likely developments.

Algeria's Least Bloody Ramadan, News 24. In your darkest hour, statistics shine a light.

Bouteflika and Civil-Military Relations, Rachid Tlemcani, Carnegie. Another good, brief summary, from last year.

Demilitarizing Algeria, Hugh Roberts, Carnegie. Required reading on Bouteflikaism. (PDF)

Fearsome Lawiza and the Comb-Over That Won't Quit, The Moor Next Door. On Hanoune.

Le Président qui cache la forêt, Le Quotidien d'Oran. The lamentations of an Algerian democrat.

Algeria Curbs Dismay Foreign Investors
, Reuters. Foreign ownership restricted to 49%, out of the blue. But who needs a functioning economy while oil prices are high?

Ramadan moubarak!

Sep 23, 2008

Preaching pointless ultraviolence to the choir

[picture: AQIM LARP]
Abdelmalik Droukdel, proud owner of the local al-Qaida franchise, speaks to the Mauritanian people to explain his point of view, immediately after beheading twelve captured Mauritanian conscripts to prepare the audience:

"Unite around the jihad that is the only alternative power to the apostate regimes that dominate over our lands," Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), said in an audio speech posted on Sunday on Islamist militant websites, the SITE Intelligence Group said.

Abdul Wadud blasted the regimes in Mauritania, Algeria and other North African countries, charging that Mauritania has become "a nest of foreign intelligence" topped by Israel's Mossad.

"Mauritania... has become a nest of foreign intelligence, at its forefront the Mossad, and has become a station of crusader colonial ambition," he said, according to a SITE transcript.

"History will continue to mention that this is the first Arab country, outside of the Tawq (Arab nations surrounding Israel), that recognised the state of Israel and exchanged ambassadors with it," he said.

A nest of foreign intelligence? Why of course -- legions stand ready on the dusty streets of Nouakchott, ready to plunge their poisoned imperial daggers into the heart of Islam, as clearly laid out in the Mauritania section of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Yes! And any minute now, Jewish settlers will start pouring into Adrar and the Hodh ... although, hilltops being absent, they will have to erect their cancerous colonial spy-nests at suitable hardscrabble plains, and, well, the lack of trees and such may yet thwart their scheme to turn the city of Nouadhibou into a Black Lodge of cosmopolitan Freemasonry.

Oh well. Thing is there are people who believe this tripe, and a bit more of them than one would like to think. It is important to recall that they, not you, are his target audience. Because, you see, the thing with a terrorist communiqué is not to appeal to the masses, as commonly but erroneously believed: it is to appeal to the fringes. Droukdel's new recruits will be found among young men already deep in his own Islamist-paranoic mindset, not in the comfortably numb political center, and that is why pointing out the sheer craziness of his statement is not really an argument at all.

Especially potent here, of course, is the charge about the Mauritanian government having political connections with Israel -- it being true and all. This is not the place and time to whine about how Washington has shoved a profoundly pointless Israeli embassy down the collective Mauritanian throat as a prerequisite for its aid and support, but, let us just note in passing that it is counterproductive idiocy. It doesn't advance the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one iota, but it does hand Islamist loons the silver bullet of Mauritanian politics.

On the other hand, chopping up surrendered Muslim soldiers during Ramadan is most emphatically not how you win hearts and minds -- not in Mauritania, not elsewhere -- and it will be hard to convince anyone otherwise, no matter how many times you remind them that Mossad rules the world. AQIM, being the bastard child of the GIA, has a long and proud tradition of alienating its own base by senseless violence, and it seems they're still not quite done with it.


Related stuff:
  • Al-Qaida central on the same topic.
  • The Moor Next Door: 1, 2.
  • And I still urge you to read Adrian's piece on Saharan terrorism/rebellion/criminality.
  • The USA freezes Millennium Change funding because of the coup. That's approximately $400 million lost to Mauritania, or about an entire year's worth of government revenue. Frankly, that's one hell of a whipping for a country this size. However, it is also a double-edged sword, because (1.) Abdelaziz's coup is judged in Mauritania by his capacity to deliver on all the economic stuff he castigated the overthrown Abdellahi for, and while he never stood much of a chance of doing significantly better anyway, this should put a nail in that coffin. On the other hand (2.) the FNDD opposition is highly vulnerable to charges by the junta, that they strenuously deny, that they are inciting foreigners to impose sanctions on the people of Mauritania.
  • Washington also refuses the new foreign minister a visa, presumably meaning he can no longer lecture at Harvard.
  • Long interview with Mohammed ould Maouloud, leader of the UFP opposition party (in French). Most interesting is how Maouloud, who is a hardliner within the FNDD, hints at how a compromise could look on their terms:
"Il faut que la junte renonce aux pouvoirs politiques et à ses ambitions politiques et que le président Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi et son gouvernement soient restaurés, ce qui marquera l’échec du putschisme. Par contre nous devons chercher pour le règlement de cette crise militaire, toutes les voies qui s’appliquent sur cette solution entre les partis en cause.

Maintenant il y a la crise politique qui oppose les acteurs politiques, ça c’est le jeu normal de l’institution ; on était dans ce jeu en apparence jusqu’à la fin de la session parlementaire passée. Ceux qui s’opposent au Président de la république avaient tous les moyens constitutionnels de continuer à le combattre ; c’est l’ingérence de l’armée qui a faussé le débat politique et le jeu politique. Si l’armée se retire, en ce moment la controverse politique peut trouver une solution entre les différents protagonistes politiques qui vont se rendre compte qu’il y a eu un tremblement de terre, qu’il y a eu beaucoup de dégâts, qu’il faut restaurer le système démocratique. Dans cette perspective et dans un esprit de responsabilité et de compromis, il serait envisageable d’évaluer toutes les options et de choisir celle qui est la plus avantageuse pour l’union nationale, pour la stabilité du pays et pour le renforcement de la démocratie."
(Short version: if the president is first reinstated, then we can try through normal channels to find a working arrangement between the political currents, including those presently backing the putschists -- implicitly, perhaps including a change in the presidency. But it is unacceptable and in fact impossible to attempt a compromise while the constitutional situation and electoral legitimacy remains suspended by the military.)

Sep 21, 2008

Mauritanian soldiers murdered

The 12 Mauritanian soldiers snatched by al-Qaida in the recent ambush in Mauritania, have been found -- mutilated and decapitated.

Reuters has more. Note incessant GWOT spin by the junta. Their "we had to oust the president to defeat terrorism" line is so phony as to make your ears hurt, but they're sticking to it with some success.

[thanks to justin & van kaas]

Sep 18, 2008

AQIM communiqué, Sep. 17, 2008.

This is the statement from al-Qaida in the Maghreb presently circulating in Mauritanian media after the Tourine attack, in full. Translation is mine, so you might need to double-check, done from the Arabic original at Sahara Media:

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Declaration regarding the attack operation of Zouërate in northern Mauritania [1.]

In the name of God and glory to his prophet

The bold Moudjahidin, protectors of a breach in noble Islam
, have presented a victory to the faith of God and his prophet, by carrying out a new attack in the city of Zouërate in northern Mauritania against those who obey the Jews and who have turned from God and his prophet, and who have opened the chaste land of the Mourabitoun [2.] to the enemies of Islam and the Muslims and the American unbelievers and their servants, the haters of Islam and its people; and who carried out the arrest and the torture of the steadfast Moudjahidin, and who are loyal to the pig-Jews... [3.]

And by Gods grace, the brigades of Moujahidin following the Emir of the Sahara, Yahia Jouadi, set an ambush for the army of unbelief and apostasy, that managed to take 12 soldiers prisoner, including a commander by the rank of Captain, and to seize a large quantity of equipment and military matériel, including three cross-country cars, while the remainder of Gods enemies escaped, fleeing their failure and defeat.

This has been made possible by God, as the response to the infidel activities of the army of apostasy in Mauritania and its idols, and it will not be the last by the will of God; and to the imprisonment of the Moudjahidin, may God break their chains. [4.]

The al-Qaida Organization in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb
Abdelmalik Droukdal (Abou Mousaab Abdelwadoud)
Ramadan 15, 1429 H.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

[1.] Zouërate is the town closest to Tourine, where the assault happened. It's a mining town of economic importance to Mauritania, nowadays with a significant Sahrawi population who have moved out from the Tindouf refugee camps.
[2.] Meaning Mauritania. The Mourabitoun was an Islamic medieval movement that emerged in Mauritania and went on to found a dynasty in modern-day Morocco; an obvious local role-model for today's jihadists.
[3.] Zing! (But am I getting this right? Arabic: "mouwalaa el-yahoud el-khanazir".)
[4.] Something is grammatically amiss with this whole parapgrah.

The Monty Pythonesque lingo is all theirs.

Also note that the soldiers are alleged to be taken prisoners, not killed as initially reported. This is also what international and Mauritanian media has begun to talk about. It could be based on this statement, but I did read somewhere that army units returning to Tourine could not find bodies or equipment, even while there was blood on the scene. Finally, let's keep in mind that so far this is just something someone posted on a website -- not authenticated as an AQIM statement.

UPDATE: slight correction, and see this.

Adrian and the Emirs

Adrian has put up a great walkthrough of the Saharan terrorism circus at Arab Media Shack, which I highly recommend you to read. (I register a slight disagreement in comments, but that doesn't mean I don't think it's an excellent text.) His thesis on Touareg troubles in Niger & Mali, which I haven't quite finished yet, is also really good.

That said, I should admit that I'm not quite à jour with al-Qaida leader struggles. Adrian pointed out that there have been rumors of Mokhtar Belmokhtar stepping back, being replaced by Yahia Jouadi as leader in the south. Now a communiqé supposedly from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, ex-GSPC) attributes the recent attack in Mauritania to this latter commander, labeling him the Emir of the Sahara. Either they're split threeways in some amicable division of labor, or Jouadi has moved up front (or some organizationally fuzzy combination of the two); but it seems reasonably clear that Belmokhtar, for whatever reason, is no longer the Emir of AQIM's southern branch. I wish to apologize to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Yahia Jouadi and Abdelmalek Droukdel, and their families, for any damage or inconvenience my statements may have caused.

Sep 17, 2008

Touareg politics unveiled

Well, what do you know -- commenter Adrian turns out to have a blog with lots of interesting stuff on the Touareg rebellions in Mali & Niger. He also has a meaty thesis on the whole thing, available in PDF. Read! Learn!

Sep 15, 2008

On the Mauritanian al-Qaida strike

Here they come!


NOUAKCHOTT, Mauritania (AP) — Suspected al-Qaida militants killed 12 Mauritanian soldiers Monday, two senior officials said. The attack, which came after the terror group promised to avenge the country's recent coup, was the worst suffered by the military in three years.

Assailants ambushed an army unit patrolling the desert in Tourine, about 530 miles north of Nouakchott, a lieutenant-colonel told The Associated Press. The same account also was given by a senior official in the presidency. Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the media.

About two dozen soldiers in four vehicles were on a routine patrol when their convoy was raked with machine gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades, the lieutenant-colonel said. Three of the vehicles were destroyed, and a fourth managed to return to base with 10 soldiers aboard. Among the dead was the captain who had led the patrol.

1. If the above info checks out, this is the third major operation by jihadis in Mauritania in three years. The previous two were the 2005 assault on the military base at Lemgheiti, which killed 15 soldiers, and the Christmas 2007 murder of a French family. Apart from this, there have been some minor plots and shootouts. Three in three years, not an awesome track record, but by launching full-scale ambushes against the regular army, al-Qaida proves it can muster at least some capacity for real guerrilla warfare, rather than just terrorist bombings.
[picture: zouërate region, northern mauritania]
2. This is in the north of the country, in a desolate Saharan region with, shall we say, somewhat lax standards of law-enforcement. This is in large part a legacy of the Western Sahara conflict, which has effectively deprived Mauritania of whatever control it could plausibly exercise over its long, northern border. The Moroccan berm even cuts through northern Mauritania in the corner north of Bir Mohgrein, and Polisario military units move freely throughout the area with no regard for borders -- and the same goes for civilian Tindouf dwellers, traders, Bedouins, smugglers and others, also from Algeria and Mali. The Nouakchott government has resigned itself to this state of affairs, and securing the border properly won't be done, and can't be done, until the conflict is over. In the meantime, it will be very difficult to apply necessary pressure on al-Qaida/GSPC or similar groups if they manage to implant themselves well enough in the smuggling business, as it would seem they already have. What could help a lot is a formal framework for Algeria-Mauritania-Polisario-Mali policing, since these parties are already on friendly terms with each other, while Morocco is somewhat disconnected from the whole thing (by the berm). But, for political reasons, that wouldn't sit at all well with Rabat -- and one should keep in mind that high army/state officials with all of the above (including both Polisario and Morocco, I am compelled to say) seem to have business interests at stake here.
[picture: a portrait of the terrorist as a young man -- mokhtar belmokhtar]
3. The al-Qaida/GSPC group that is involved here is the southern/Saharan wing that is headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a.k.a. Belaaouar (real name Khaled Aboul-Abbas). It consists both of northerners (mainly Algerians, but also some Moroccans, Libyans and Tunisians) and locals, moving in the tribal border regions straddled by multi-national Touareg and Moors, and it has a fairly distinct identity within the larger GSPC framework. Belmokhtar has had sympathetic contacts with al-Qaida even before the GSPC leadership was accepted as part of the group, but, at the same time, he seems far less dedicated to spectacular terrorist stunts thas his colleagues/superiors up in the Kabylie. One example is the two kidnapped German tourists, who were picked up in Tunisia and spirited into the Algerian south in February this year. They haven't been killed (yet) and the kidnappers so far seem intent on extracting a high ransom rather than proving their gruesome political point. In fact, Belmokhtar's activities are mostly centered on smuggling and taxing trade routes, and opinions differ on whether he's really a radical Islamist terrorist or a cynical crime baron. I'd argue they aren't mutually exclusive. (Related: Mali's Touareg uprising & US military assistance.)
[picture: belmokhtar's boys]

4. As you can see above (and in an unquoted later segment of the AP dispatch), there are claims that al-Qaida has decided to launch this holy war "in retaliation" for the coup d'état in Mauritania in August. This, now apparently an established fact for the Associated Press, is solely based on how someone at Reuters interpreted a communiqué issued by al-Qaida right after the coup, in which they made the usual calls for overthrowing local regimes, including that recently established in Mauritania. The timing & framing was of course intentional, and they did get a lot of headlines by latching on to the news of the coup, but there was absolutely nothing new about them wanting to destroy an "infidel" regime in Mauritania. The 2005 attack on Lemgheiti, which Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for, predates both of Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz's two coups (Aug. 2005, Aug 2008), and so does the flood of blood-curling anti-regime communiqués by al-Qaida and their affiliates. Their so-called Jihad has nothing to do with who rules Nouakchott. Still, the new Mauritanian regime will not be eager to correct this, since they are pinning their hopes of international recognition following the coup on a claim to be fighting Islamism. That so many manage to miss this transparent trick, and insist on taking both putschists and jihadists at their word, is far beyond gullible: it is completely failed journalism.

Sep 10, 2008

Christopher W. S. Ross new UN special rep for W. Sahara



A new special representative of the UN secretary-general has been appointed to follow Peter van Walsum. Not Warren Christopher, but Christopher W. S. Ross, a former ambassador to Algeria 1988-1991, i.e. the period of the cease-fire agreement and the Moroccan-Algerian thaw.

Sounds like a highly qualified guy, who, according to his bio, is an Arabic speaker with loads of Maghreb experience -- but it remains a mystery what the otherwise very appropriate initials W. S. stand for.

Sep 9, 2008

Free Mohamed Erraji!

Another Moroccan blogger has been sentenced to jail. This time, an article criticizing King Mohammed VI's social policies landed Mohamed Erraji two years in prison within 72 hours of it being posted online.

As you can see to the left, there's already a support website. Further, Larbi, the dean of Moroccan blogdom, has a post up on the matter and a French translation of the crime itself, while the invaluable crew at Global Voices has already translated it into English.

Enjoy, and please ensure maximum spread!

UPDATE: Mohamed Erraji freed, Sep. 17, 2008.

Sep 8, 2008

Warren Christopher next UN rep for Western Sahara?

UPDATE: No. Please ignore this whole post.

Peter van Walsum's mandate as the special representative of the UN secretary-general for Western Sahara (now: SRSG) has, as you know, recently ended. It was not prolonged, most likely because of the protests from the Polisario Front over his politically charged statements on the realism, or lack thereof, of demanding independence for the Western Sahara.

So the speculation begins as to who will succeed him. I've previously opined that the Manhasset negotiations process, or any replacement for it, will not restart seriously -- to the extent it ever was serious -- until the issues of presidential succession in the US, and maybe Algeria, are settled. (In Algeria, it seems to have come a long way already.) This is because the US is the only major power truly involved in Western Sahara that may realistically change or vary its policy on the issue.

Of the Security Council's five permanent members, France is also mightily into the Maghreb, but so inflexibly pro-Moroccan on Western Sahara that it cannot really exert influence over developments there (the general idea being that this position buys influence with Morocco in other fields, plus that Paris doesn't want to see an independent Western Sahara pop up as a Spanish-Algerian fiefdom right in their North African heartland). The UK keeps out or follows Washington's lead, coupled with some nods to rump-EU sensibilities. China is strictly uninvolved, so far, while Russia occasionally leans on the others on behalf of its military client Algeria, but also doesn't want to spoil relations with Morocco, and so generally avoids getting snared in this pointless tangle. But the US has, in fact, recently changed its policies quite drastically, by coming out in favor of Morocco's bid to secure the territory as an autonomous province without the required self-determination vote. It is a Bush-era policy, or even late Bush-era policy, which is somewhat likely but not certain to stick with a new president (and which, in its timing, could perhaps also be a bit arms sales-related). Condoleezza Rice's curiously low-key statements when visiting Rabat recently may well have been a lame duck president's way of servicing the next occupant of the White House: when asked a straightforward question, she pointedly avoided repeating Bush's glowing endorsement of Morocco's position, content instead to note that there are some "good ideas on the table."

Anyway, that actual, meaningful negotiations will have to wait a bit doesn't mean that a SRSG can't be appointed in beforehand -- either as a transitory character, or to create a running start for whatever policies will be pursued once the US has set its course. Peter van Walsum, despite his highly creative use of that unenviable position, seems to have been intended mainly as the first kind of SRSG: he was a retirement-age Dutch diplomat of little international stature, signalling that it wasn't quite time to go all in for a solution (Rabat, for once, arguing otherwise...). His predecessor James Baker was the exact opposite: a US heavyweight who spent considerable energy and time (1997-2004) on the issue, with visible White House backing. That lasted until 2004, when Bush suddenly, for reasons best known to those responsible, wrong-footed him by endorsing Morocco's autonomy proposal over his laboriously negotiated and fully UN-backed plan, causing him to resign and eventually sending the UN process into the diplomatic trainwreck that is Manhasset.

Now our darling UN-monitors at Inner City Press report that former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has been mentioned as a possible successor to van Walsum. This, if true, is potentially very interesting: a sort of James Baker redux.

Christopher has been involved with US foreign policy since the Lyndon B. Johnson years, and played a major role in both the Carter and Clinton administrations, culminating with him serving as secretary of state between 1993 and 1997. The first thing that strikes you, then, is that he is really too big a fish to want to swim in the Western Sahara pond, especially if there's going to be a Democrat in the White House, which doesn't look at all unlikely. On the other hand, so was Baker, and this slightly probability-reducing aspect of the idea is precisely what makes it significant: if he is appointed, it ought to mean something. (But that also means it could be just a malicious rumor spawned by intra-Democratic pre-presidency jockeying.)

We should note that his time in the State Department has given Christopher a little bit of a history with Western Sahara. He was seriously involved as early as during the Carter administration, eg. as an old copy of Time Magazine notes, being sent to Rabat to negotiate arms sales with King Hassan II and push him towards a compromise solution. (Reagan later removed all restrictions on arming Morocco, as well as the interest in crafting compromises; the latter but not the former returned under Bush Sr.)

But the issue here is not really the background or opinions of Warren Christopher. The question at hand is whether he -- should be be appointed to the post -- will have US backing for forcing, really forcing, one or all of the parties to the conflict to comply with either some experimental formula on shared sovereignty, or a let's-do-it-and-be-done-with-it referendum. The Clinton presidency squandered the crucial early nineties by letting Morocco (and also occasionally Polisario) have its way and stall the referendum process on technicalities or by demanding changes to accepted protocol, without coming down on either side of the fence. I do not believe, as does The New Internationalist, that this was necessarily due to any pro- or anti-Moroccanness of either Baker or Christopher or Albright:
The reason things have been unlocked in Western Sahara is nothing to do with the justness of the cause and everything to do with a change in the US State Department. When Bill Clinton won the White House it was actually a setback for Polisario because his Secretary of State Warren Christopher took a more pro-Moroccan line than had his Republican predecessor [i.e. James Baker]. Western Sahara is still beneath President Clinton’s notice but his appointment of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State for his second term has had an immediate impact in North Africa. Albright was formerly US Ambassador to the United Nations and thus cares about the disrepute into which the Western Sahara fiasco had brought the international organization. Her former post may also have lent her some sensitivity on the issue – when Morocco’s Crown Prince Sidi Muhammad visited Washington recently it is rumoured that she refused to meet him.
One does have to admit that the 1993-1997 period, Christopher's era in the State Department, was sort of a low point for the mission in Western Sahara. The reason, presumably, was priorities more than anything else, and certainly more than any affinities for either Alawi monarchs or Bedouin guerrillas. (Let us also note in passing that Madeleine Albright is on record [PDF] as supporting Morocco, and -- yes, these are her words -- it's "historic initiative" to "giv[e] the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco" which has "courageously shown its leadership." Perhaps she was simply too busy writing hymns to the Moroccan monarchy to meet the crown prince in 1997?)

To function properly, the Western Sahara peace process, let it be so called, needs active involvement and a strong man/woman on top of the issue, with White House backing -- and that's a bare minimum. This was the case under Bush Sr, and again in the later Clinton years. Under Bush Jr, it has been somewhat different. Baker's mission carried on after the 2000 elections, seemingly with the same level of support as before -- big Republican guy, close to the Bush family. Then policy abruptly shifted in about 2004 , undoing his work since 1997 in less than a year. The issue, then, is not primarily who is appointed the next SRSG, though a high-level American would certainly signify renewed Washington interest. Rather, keep your eyes on the State Department, and, more immediately, the White House...

Rice in Rabat

Hm.

QUESTION (Via interpreter): President Bush confirmed in a recent message sent to His Majesty, the King, that the Moroccan proposal for the Sahara autonomy is an ideal proposal. Does Washington maintain this position, and would Washington maintain it after the next November elections? Thank you.

SECRETARY RICE: (Inaudible) to speak to what we are going to try to do ahead. We are looking for a mutually agreed solution to this problem. It is time that it be resolved. We believe it is extremely important for Algeria and Morocco to have good relations, to be able to trade, to share information, particularly given some of the challenges that the two face here, in the Maghreb.

And, by the way, that is something that I heard in both capitals, and I heard in Tunisia, and in Libya, as well. 

There will be a new round for the solution of the Western Sahara problem. I talked with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon just before I left. We are going to support that round, that mediation. There are good ideas on the table, and there are ways to move forward. We don’t need to start over. 

And so, I hope that we can very much move forward and get this resolved.

Sep 1, 2008

The junta's new Mauritanian government

Prime Minister Moulay ould Mohamed Laghdaf [pictured right], who was appointed by the Haute conseil d'état (HCE) junta, has announced his new government:

Nouakchott, 31 août (AMI) - La Présidence du Haut Conseil d'Etat communique : par décret en date de ce jour et sur proposition du Premier ministre sont nommés :

Ministre de la justice : Amadou Tidjane Bal,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération : Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou,
Ministre de la Défense Nationale : Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamed Lemine
Ministre de l'Intérieur et de la Décentralisation : Mohamed Ould Maaouya
Ministre des Affaires Economiques et du Développement : Sidi Ould Tah
Minsitre des Finances : Sid'Ahmed Ould Raiss
Ministre de l'Education nationale: Ahmed Ould Bah
Ministre des Affaires Islamiques et de l'Enseignement Originel : Othmane Ould Cheikh Ahmed Aboul Maali
Ministre de la Fonction Publique, de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle : Hacen Ould Limam Ould Amar Jowda
Ministre de la Santé: Mohamed Abdellahi Ould Siyam
Ministre du Pétrole et de l'Energie : Die Ould Zeine
Ministre des Pêches et de l'Economie Maritime : Hacenna Ould Ely
Ministre du Commerce, de l'Artisanat et du Tourisme : Bamba Ould Dermane
Ministre de l'Habitat, de l'Urbanisme et de l'Aménagement du Territoire : Sy Adama
Ministre du Développement Rural : Messaouda Mint Baham
Ministre de l'Equipement et des Transports : Camara Moussa Seydi Boubou
Ministre de l'Hydraulique et de l'Assainissement: Mohamed Lemine Ould Aboye
Ministre de l'Industrie et des Mines : Mohamed Abdellahi Ould Oudaa
Ministre de la Culture, de la jeunesse et des Sports : Sidi Ould Samba
Ministre de la Communication et des Relations avec le Parlement : Mohamed Ould Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Moine
Ministre des Affaires Sociales, de l'Enfance et de la Famille : Selama Mint Cheikhna Ould Lemrabott
Ministre Délégué auprès du Premier Ministre chargé de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable : Mohamed Ould Ahmed Salem
Secrétaire d'Etat chargé de la Modernisation de l'Administration et des TICs: Sidi Ould Mayouf
Secrétaire d'Etat chargé des Affaires Maghrébines : Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Mohamed Ahmed
Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement : Bâ Ousmane
Commissaire aux Droits de l'Homme, à l'Action Humanitaire et aux Relations avec la Société Civile : Mohamed Lemine Ould Dadde
Commissaire à la Sécurité Alimentaire : Mohamed Ould Mohamedou
Commissaire à la Promotion des Investissements : Bâ Houdou
Salient points:
  1. It has approximately one million ministers, since in Mauritania there are just that many vested interests (tribes, business groups, parties, regional bigwigs, foreign-backed puppets, religious families, etcetera) which need to get a slice of the pie, or the whole thing will crumble. Now they can all hire their relatives as expert consultants and help themselves to appropriate portions of the road construction budget, rural development funds or fishery license incomes, and, in return, abstain from causing trouble. This, while not terribly conducive to good governance, is standard practice, and should not be blamed on the junta specifically.
  2. None of the major opposition parties take part, even -- as explained here -- from those that supported the coup. (In fact, four ministers were members of Ahmed ould Daddah's RFD, but they are now expelled.)
  3. There are only four Black Africans as opposed to 18 Arabs, which is a gross racial underrepresentation even by Mauritania's rather unfair standards. Seems a telling sign of junta discomfort: bye bye, attempts to maintain southern support, and hello northern tribal entrenchment.
  4. Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud ould Mohamedou is a sharp, English-speaking Harvard pol-sci doctor, which seems to be just what the junta needs (interview: PDF). Conveniently enough, he's also a member in good standing of the ouled bou Sbaa tribe -- just like the HCE top brass, including Gen. Abdelaziz himself. Sometimes you're just lucky with the genealogy, I guess.
  5. Slight shocker: new Human Rights Minister Mohamed Lemine ould Dedde. He is, or was, the leader of Conscience and Resistance, a leftist intellectual group in the habit of producing lengthy, verbose denounciations of all and sundry (you know the type). The CR has opposed the coup, and now duly expels its leader for collaborating with it.
  6. International reactions are, still, not quite what they hoped for. France: "We consider this decision, like all the measures taken by the military responsibles who have seized power, and in particular the overthrow of the president, to be void of all legitimacy." -- United States: "We are considering personal sanctions against those who are an obstacle to the return of constitutional order. Clearly we could consider individuals named in the government in that group".
  7. As the astute commenters of CRIDEM point out, the name Mohammed or Mahmoud appears 23 times in a list of 22 ministers, and at the start of the holy month of Ramadan that must surely be a sign of something.