Political Ornithology: A North African Fable
It's often assumed that the rather profound shift which has taken place in US Western Sahara policy in Bush's second term is a result of "hawks" within the administration seizing control of the matter. Hawks, of course, being the American political fauna's polar opposite to "doves" -- characterized as negotiation buffs, institution-builders and all around adherents to a liberal school of foreign policy, with their hawkish opponents being more into hardcore realism, balance-of-power, MAD doctrine and what have you. Conjures up names like Reagan, Henry Jackson, Rumsfeld and why not Elliott Abrams.
Now, Abrams -- yes, you may know him as Mr. Kenilworth -- is certainly considered a Hawk, and he has certainly been putting his finger prints on US Western Sahara policy as of late. But let me introduce yet another majestic bird of prey into the discussion: let's bring in the eagle.
Like the Hawk, the Eagle has no time for wishy-washy liberalism or the perpetual whine of human rights activists, and Doves, for him, are simply dinner. For the eagle, US national interest is what it's all about. He recognizes, like the Hawk -- or the sane-minded Hawk, a dwindling species -- that this lies in a generally peaceful and democratic world; in conditions of peace and free trade is where the US truly shines, and gets its will most easily and with the least resistance, since its power is joined together with the well-being of others. This is not unlike what many Doves say, but then they invariably start cooing about Indian rights in El Salvador. Not so the Eagles and Hawks, who has nothing in particular against Indians, or El Salvador, but sees both as perfectly expendable if that is what the game demands. But I digress.
Western Sahara: what about Western Sahara? If what has happened now with US policy -- which has gone all in for the Moroccan autonomy strategy -- is a strategy of Hawks (and that's a debatable point), then what about Doves and Eagles? Of course, the Doves are madly in love with the Sahrawis: here you have indigenous rights, human rights and international law in a perfect match -- what's there not to love for the Dove?
Eagles, now that's trickier. The first thing he does is sweep Polisario out of the picture: guerrilla or no guerrilla, he says, the game is about Morocco and Algeria. Polisario is not a power in its own right without Algeria, and cannot, as it stands, derail a political process on its own -- although it may become a significant nuisance if abandoned by Algeria. But that's for later: first to decide whether you want Algeria to abandon Polisario.
Then he puts international law into its proper place (for Eagles): it matters, surely, but it only matters in so far as it will actually have a political impact. What it says is of no concern; what it does, is. In Western Sahara, international law matters because that is what has made it possible for Polisario to prevent Morocco's de facto possession of Western Sahara (all the juicy pieces) into a de jure possession. The fallout for Morocco was grave during the war years, and even after the ceasefire, Rabat has had to endure 17 yars of the geopolitical equivalent of sleeplessness, nervous stress disorders, and really bad breath. This looks unlikely to change without some pretty fantastic legal acrobatics on Morocco's part, or acceptance by Polisario.
And then we're back at Algeria: as long as Algeria gives Polisario shelter, a drop-feed of money and aid, and makes sure it is represented internationally, Polisario does not have to move an inch from its present position. What's more, it can keep making things uncomfortable for Morocco with international human rights activists, and keep forcing it to spend truckloads of money to buy Sahrawi loyalty in the south, when that money is really desperately needed elsewhere.
So, in the Eagle analysis, again, nevermind Polisario. They may become very important in their own right later, as you start thinking of what to do with all those Kalashnikov-carrying Sahrawi guerrillas when you've got your autonomy or independent state. But not now. At this stage of the Western Sahara endgame, the Eagle keeps his eyes on the ball: and the ball is being kicked between Algeria and Morocco. (Or actually, he keeps one eye on the ball, given Eagle physionomy, but let's leave that aside.)
So, Algeria. What does the Eagle think of Algeria? He doesn't particularly like it: it is a point of pride for him not to like countries other than the USA, or at least not to let that affect his policy-making. You see, Hawks, at least in their modern shroud of feathers, are increasingly drawn to liking/disliking some countries, particularly if they're loyal allies, and making policy based on that; but the Eagle scoffs at such sentimental nonsense. No, for the Eagle right now, two big things -- the two biggest things -- are probably energy security and fighting terrorism.
When he says "energy security", he means oil.
When he says "fighting terrorism", he doesn't mean it in the metaphysical, romantic sense that Hakws nowaydays go whinging about, since the Eagle has a particular kind of terrorism in mind: that which endangers the US. He's thinking particularly of al-Qaida, which needs to be destroyed, and the conditions which breed al-Qaida's supporters, which need to be changed -- whether through raw force or through foreign aid and human rights, that's a matter of case-by-case analysis. (Lo, the Dove sheds a tear.)
So, oil and al-Qaida? There's Algeria for you.
Oil prices are zooming through the roof, and Algeria provides it to the USA, and (almost) always has, despite their sometime political differences; it also provides important allies in Europe with gas, so they don't need to rely on Russia more than they already do. As an Eagle, you don't want to endanger that, or lose your pull with a country that sits on that increasingly precious treasure, and which also, for the last 5 years or so, has begun showing signs of wanting to stop being an allround basket case economically (and reform + oil = business opportunities).
Al-Qaida -- well, apart from the US itself, is there any country in the world which has killed and jailed as many al-Qaida fighters as Algeria? Probably not. And with a new al-Qaida front coalescing in the Maghreb, stepping up attacks and growing more important generally for both North Africa, South Europe and transnational Islamism at large, it doesn't really matter what Algeria has or hasn't done: you need to be there and work with the people in charge to contain that threat. Simple as that.
So, from an Eagle-eye view, alienating Algeria at a time when the USA's top two priorities is, or should be, access to oil and fighting al-Qaida, just seems like a mighty stupid thing to do. Of course there's other arguments, like the usefulness and friendlyness of the Moroccan regime, in political and economic and anti-terror and inter-Arab affairs; also, there's the often underestimated value in always backing an ally no-matter-what, just to show how good it is to be your ally.
But as things go now, Morocco is becoming less and less attractive as a model for political reform (which was a significant advantage at the outset of Mohammed VI's regime). And its usefulness on the inter-Arab arena has been near nil these last years: no impact on Israel/Palestine, no impact on Iraq, none on Darfur, and so it goes. Granted, Morocco is giving important assistance in anti-terror issues, yet it is nothing compared to Algeria, which started fighting the first full-blown al-Qaida insurgency already 17 years ago, and never stopped since.
Still, there's the question the case at hand. Does the Eagle think autonomy is a good solution for the Western Sahara conflict? Yes, he does. He certainly does. In fact, he has backed it probably before anyone else. For, if he can avoid it, he doesn't want to have to choose between these two regionally and strategically very important countries. He will try to convince Algeria about the merits of this plan: please, just drop Polisario, or push it into a so-so agreement. Just look at all the benefits it brings you; and to sweeten the deal, here comes X, Y and Z of other stuff we'll grant you -- like business agreements, and presidential visits, and security cooperation, and arms sales, and aid, and what have you. He'll even bring a stick to the table -- he always does -- and tell Algeria some hard down truths about what he can do to it.
But what to do if Algeria refuses? If it sticks to its guns, or, as it happens, to Polisario's guns; like, in fact, it has so far done Then the attraction of sticking your neck out for the autonomy plan starts to dwindle fast.
There's only so much pressure that the US can apply on Algeria if it does not want to complicate its already snail-paced reform process, or push it further into the embrace of the Russian bear, or make it less cooperative on energy or terror issues, or start to destabilize it politically (and the US sure as hell doesn't want that). For Algeria, there's very little to lose by sticking to self-determination for Western Sahara. It knows that it can always opt out later, if it decides that the price has become too high, or the compromise offer has become high enough. Also, the investment it takes to keep Polisario afloat and Morocco in a state of perpetual frustration is minimal -- especially given present-day resources. Some minor economic support (the UN pays the food bill), a credible military deterrence, and a lot of diplomatic huffing and puffing. All of that is easily within Algeria's capacity today, and it was even during the worst years of civil war. The oil boom only adds new options.
Here's when the Eagle grabs the Hawk by the tail feathers. Hey, he says, let's rethink this.
He really doesn't see a the point in spending political capital (not much, but political capital, like everything else, is local: you only have so much with these two particular countries) to keep a stillborn strategy on life support. And especially not if this only serves to aggravate the -- from his perspective -- most important country in the region. Now, to be sure, the Hawk squawks something about trusted allies, moderate Arabs, and so on, to which the Eagle says: yeah? But my car still runs on gas, and bombs are going off monthly in the Maghreb.
Morocco knows this. It knows it needs to turn events around pretty quickly, or face more trouble later. What are the tools at hand? Well, Morocco can, to start with, lobby Congress, which decides what species of bird is in for the season. And it does, and with great success too; this has been 50% of its success so far (since 2003), while the other 50% is split between the autonomy plan and Morocco's reform image. Then, Rabat can start to make itself more useful to the US than it already is: for example, by restarting reforms (as you may have noticed, they've more or less stopped) or supporting US Middle East policy more aggressively. At the moment, it seems the King has already done most he is willing to do on those two fields, but you never knows.
Finally, it can raise the stakes further, thereby making the US nervous about backing off the new policy. By continuing to assert, as the monarchy basically already does, that the country rather commits suicide than lets go of the Sahara, it puts the big fright into US policy makers. They desperately don't want to destabilize Morocco, even if it so happens that Morocco has only itself to blame for being destabilized. Problem is, after nine years with Mohammed VI, the honeymoon is over. He is not the darling Young King of days past anymore, and nor is he a frail little reformist plant in need of protection: in the eyes of the world, he has grown into his fathers shoes, and proven himself perfectly capable of using them to trample the opposition if he so desires. So this line of argument is not entirely credible: the country would not crash and burn if it lost the Sahara. Indonesia didn't when it lost Timor, and neither will Morocco. But it will be rattled around quite a bit, and this is true, even if it's also true that keeping the Sahara is destabilizing in its own way. Still, the King can try harder to make this threat more credible. He just might do that, because it is his most powerful argument on Western Sahara: that the depth to which he has let himself sink already would make it hard to pull him out, without pulling him in two.
As for Algeria, they also know about all this. And they have the same options, but formulated differently. In Algeria's case, making itself "more useful" would mean starting real reform instead of the sham they're engaged in now -- especially economic reform. However, that may be out of the question for as long as internal power issues aren't done being solved, with Boutef's third mandate coming up and the generals still pushing each other around.
Then, it can also -- more so than Morocco -- try to make itself less useful, or threaten to do that. This is dangerous, since it may seriously piss off the US, and especially its Eagles, but it's an option. This can be done by varying levels of antiterror cooperation, and by politicizing business deals, especially if privatization is already happening, and arms sales continue. Then, Algeria could of course also lobby. It doesn't do that much right now, but there's news filtering out that it's beginning to. And with the oil & gas cash increasingly impossible to blow on Russian fighter jets alone, Algeria would have no problem outspending Morocco -- two times, three times, five times, ten times. Then, Algeria can, which it also hasn't really started yet, begin to try and play a role in wider Middle East issues; either outright friendly to the US, or by continuing its normal policy, but just doing it with the intensity it takes to make onself a useful player, whose help others will request. Bouteflika is a skilled diplomat, remember, and in this, oil money is, again, no obstacle to success.
Finally, Algeria can also raise the stakes. This means means upping military spending tremendously, and as everyone -- especially Eagle's -- have already noticed, this started happening years ago. One way is arms racing Morocco to either economic exhaustion or a humiliating climbdown, à la Reagan & Gorby: this is happening as we speak. And Algeria might even -- especially now that it's been slapped around so publicly by the US -- try its hand on sabre-rattling, just a little bit, just enough to force people to pay attention. This could come in the form of a whoopsie-oopsie border incident, or through eye-catching troop movements, or through unconfirmed press leaks about security plans, or some very significant arms purchase, or other things. It could even involve putting Polisario to work a little bit, since they're itching for action anyway, inside the territory or ceasefire-wise. Plausible deniability is there for the media, but the Eagles will know who gave the go-ahead -- and that is of course the very point.
Now, as much as oil and increasing stability helps it, Algeria also has a couple of significant drawbacks. First, it can't really tie its own future policy to Western Sahara's like Morocco has done, since that wouldn't go down well with a people who are not deeply invested (for the most part) with the issue. Not that they necessarily oppose it either, but if you're in El Mouradia -- or whatever army barracks where these decisions are taken -- you don't want to push your luck there. More importantly, Algeria is a sorry shape politically, and even economically. The population is hard hit by price rices (that it hits Morocco harder is no comfort), and getting sore with the slow pace of growth -- as in, growth for them. The oil bonanza has an unpleasant downside, and that is that everybody expects to get a piece, and they won't; both because of the way economies work, or in Algeria's case don't work, and because so much is being filtered off to le pouvoir or just plain wasted. (Here you see why economic reform would be good.)
Most significantly, the political crossroads that Algeria is at means it has other things on its mind, and may not be able to create wholly coherent strategy, even if it is generally aware of the options. Because: will Bouteflika get a third term? Who will he kick out of power next? What if he clinches the new term, and then goes and dies -- he has one foot in the grave already? Can Ouyahia be next in line? If not, who? And so on. Western Sahara matters, but first, as an Algerian decision-maker, you got to make sure you will stay an Algerian decision-maker.
Now, for the Eagle, of course, all of this confusion is just another reason to get more deeply involved with Algeria: not because you expect clean and pretty results, but because you want to be there and shape them, so they're dirty and disgusting in the way the US likes it. So the Eagle furrows his brow, thinking he needs to have a talk with that idealistic fumble-thumbs of a Hawk, and that maybe this is where the Dove can come in handy, it so being that two birds are stronger than one. But then again, what about the stability of Morocco?
And this is what's on the Eagle's mind, as he soars majestically over North Africa -- not yet quite sure on what side of the border he wants to land.
